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Mobilization of radical right movements in Central and Eastern Europe between 2008 and 2016

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Abstract

The radical right is on the rise all over Europe and beyond, either in terms of electoral success or activities outside the institutional arena, especially after the 2015 refugee crisis. Central and Eastern European countries are no exception, although not yet closely studied for radical right social movements and protest. In this article we investigate the degree and characteristics of the mobilisation of different types of radical right organisations (political parties and social movements alike) in Central and Eastern Europe to capture a broader picture of the current developments in radical right politics beyond elections and electoral campaign periods. By focusing on four countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), and combining qualitative and quantitative data derived from a protest event analysis reported in newspaper articles between 2008 and 2016 (for a total of 1587 events coded), we analyse the radical right mobilisation (i.e. intensity and degree of radicalism), linking it to the political opportunities and the organisational features of the groups mobilising. We argue that the radical right is using a very broad repertoire of action, beyond violence and the electoral arena, including expressive and symbolic strategies, as well as the use of new technologies like the Internet. We also stress that for the radical right, as for the left-wing social movements, the analytical framework of political opportunities and a resource mobilisation approach can help in explaining their mobilisation.

Keywords: radical right; social movement approach; political opportunities; protest event analysis

1 Introduction

The increase in right-wing mobilisation has led to a growing interest in the phenomenon and its spread around the world. Do regional specificities define radical right mobilisations?[1] And if so, what factors facilitate or hinder these tendencies?

[1] Scholars use labels such as 'extreme right' (Arzheimer, 2009; Bale, 2003; Lubbers et al., 2002), 'far right' (Golder, 2016), and "populist radical right" (Mudde, 2007) interchangeably to refer to the same organisations, such as the French National Front (FN), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), and the Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest (VB).

Our paper analyses right-wing radical mobilisations between 2008 and 2016 in four Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries: Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Drawing on social movement studies, we focus on several factors that explain the similarities and differences between the different mobilizations, and we take these factors to be 'opportunities' available to the movements (political opportunity structures, or POSs). First and foremost, we assess the political opportunities for the radical right, as in some of our cases there is a significant presence of parties with radical right agendas (i.e. promoting anti-immigrant narratives, homophobia, xenophobia, etc.) that have entered parliaments and allied themselves with grassroots groups. After the refugee crisis, and especially in the context of the EU resettlement programme, political elites began to make claims against immigrants and refugees. In the case of Poland, the use of anti-immigrant rhetoric also overlapped with election campaigns (both presidential and parliamentary).

We also examine the existence and enforcement of laws and regulations that prohibit or restrict right-wing extremist groups (but also strengthen them when relaxed). Finally, we analyse the popularity of these groups (in society), their potential for mobilisation, their preferred forms of organisation (e.g. formal or informal groups, subcultural associations, etc.) and their main types of activities (e.g. disruptive, confrontational, etc.), which may represent more contingent opportunities and resources for mobilisation.

Right-wing parties have grown alongside new forms of right-wing social movements (e.g. 'movement parties', Kitschelt, 2006), which act as laboratories for new political and organisational ideas (Minkenberg, 2010; Pankowski, 2010). Examples of sustained radical right mobilisation outside the electoral arena are increasing: The identitarian movement(s) spreading across several European countries; transnational xenophobic campaigns such as 'Fortress Europe' (Nissen, 2019); the anti-Islamic Pegida groups with their marches and street protests; as well as anti-immigrant vigilante groups such as the Soldiers of Odin, which are becoming increasingly popular (Berntzen & Weisskircher, 2016; Castelli Gattinara & Pirro, 2018), as well as similar initiatives in Central Europe (Gattinara, Froio & Pirro, 2021). However, while radical right political parties as well as social movements in Western Europe have received considerable scholarly attention even before the 2008 economic crisis (cf. Caiani et al., 2012), radical right protest activities, including more recent (anti 'gender ideology') activism against LGBT people (Guasti & Bustikova, 2020, Graff & Korolczuk, 2022) in Central Europe have been less studied (see, for some exceptions, Pirro, 2019; Vejvodová, 2016).

We aim to contribute to this literature by analysing the mobilisation and protest events of radical right groups in Central and Eastern Europe, drawing on comparative empirical material based on a protest event database. By examining the phenomenon in relation to contextual possibilities and against the backdrop of actors' symbolic (i.e. identities) and organisational resources, we hope to broaden our understanding of contemporary

We define (after Minkenberg, 2000, pp. 174–175) radical right groups as 'a political ideology, the core element of which is a myth of a homogeneous nation, a romantic and populist ultranationalism which is directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism.' The contemporary radical right does not call for returning to former, pre-democratic regimes such as monarchy or feudalism, but rather opts for government by the people, but in terms of ethnocracy instead of democracy.

political developments in Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. In short, we want to get a broader picture of trends in radical right politics in the CEE region, beyond elections and electoral campaigns. We also want to see if there are any regional characteristics of the four countries studied that would allow the creation of regional characteristics, in this case of right-wing activities.

We hypothesise that right-wing groups will be more active in countries where the political and cultural opportunities available to them are favourable (i.e. 'open'). Relevant variables include, for example, laws against racism and xenophobia, the degree of legal control of right-wing groups, electoral restrictions on small parties, and the degree of societal consensus regarding the Nazi past. Other important aspects that are generally considered to be opportunities for right-wing groups are: the presence of allies – such as centre-right parties – in power, an authoritarian past (Mudde, 2007, pp. 233–255), nostalgia for fascist or Nazi regimes, and socially accepted xenophobic ideologies (Rydgren, 2005). We expect more radical right-wing activity in countries with weaker legal regulation of extreme groups, lower electoral thresholds for small parties, and the like.

After we present our methods and sources, we investigate the intensity and trends of radical right mobilisation in our four cases. We evaluate how these groups use different strategies (including violence), organisational targets, issues, and their scope (i.e. national vs. supranational). We will relate the level and forms of mobilisation to the country and group-contexts in which they mobilise. In the final section, we conclude and summarise our findings.

2 Previous studies

Social movement scholars have historically focused on left-wing movements, overlooking the populist radical right (Hutter & Kriesi, 2013). Moreover, while Western European movements and collective action have received significant scholarly attention even before the European crises (economic in 2008, migration in 2015), protest activities in Central and Eastern Europe have remained understudied, especially regarding radical right organisations. More recently, research has focused on radical/extreme right collective actors and grassroots political activism in CEE (Císař & Štetkova, 2016; Císař, 2017; Mudde, 2005; Minkenberg, 2011; 2013; Gerő et al., 2017; Kajta, 2017, Susánszky et al., 2017); some scholars have addressed media coverage of radical right politics (Kluknavská, 2015; Gattinara & Froio, 2019). Political and cultural cleavages in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are also supported by right-wing governments, which in turn are strengthened by conservative civil society (Guasti & Bustikova, 2020; Bluh & Varga, 2019; Bustikova, 2019; Kotwas & Kubik, 2019; Molnar, 2016). The role of regional legacies is often overlooked (for exceptions, see Minkenberg, 2010; Pirro, 2015).

Research on the populist radical right in Western Europe (e.g. the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party) has emphasised the role of specific structural and socio-cultural factors (Pirro, 2015). These prominent hypotheses regarding the emergence of radical right mobilisation are difficult to translate into the CEE context: the 'silent counterrevolution' (Ignazi, 1992) and the 'third wave' phase based on 'unemployment and xenophobia' (von Beyme, 1988) do not seem to apply to our cases. Some scholars argue that

'the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe seems to retain features sui generis, introducing a juxtaposition of old and new politics; as a result, the historical legacies and idiosyncrasies of the post-communist context are likely to play a prominent role' (Pirro, 2013, p. 600). There is also a large body of research published in local languages on this topic, but it is difficult for non-native speakers to access (cf. Platek, 2020; Platek & Płucienniczak, 2017). Therefore, we decided to add to the existing knowledge on the mobilisation of the radical right, especially regarding these specificities.

In the CEE region, studies looking at protest and the online sphere usually focus on progressive left-wing groups (Císař, 2017). Moreover, systematic empirical studies comparing different radical right-wing organisations are rare. Some have focused on the relationship between right-wing parties and civil society organisations politically and ideologically close to them, and their role in fostering cultural narratives for the radical right (Bill, 2020). Others (Grzymala-Busse, 2015; 2019; Kotwas & Kubik, 2019) have demonstrated the deep ties between the radicalised Catholic Church and right-wing groups (e.g. in Poland) or examined the discourses and collective memories that characterise these political forces (Kazharski, 2019; Korycki, 2019). Finally, empirical research on the radical right and the spread of its political mobilisation, identity and propaganda online remains rather fragmented and limited, focusing mainly on political parties (Castelli Gattinara & Pirro, 2019; Fofiu, 2015; Karl, 2016).

3 Case studies and context

The revitalisation of the European radical right grew after 2008, following the economic (and related political) crisis, both in terms of electoral successes and protest activities (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Benček & Strasheim, 2016). The groups behind these mobilisations form a single family with common features, including nationalism, chauvinism, xenophobia, the quest for a strong state, welfare chauvinism, revisionism and traditional ethics (Mudde, 2007, p. 21). Central and Eastern European parties are also following this trend (Mudde, 2013).

The electoral performance of Bulgaria's Ataka, Hungary's Jobbik, Slovakia's National Party and Czechia's Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), especially during the period under study (2008–2016), seems to confirm the pervasive appeal of the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe (Pirro, 2013; Pirro et al., 2021). The electoral victories of Fidesz in Hungary since 2002 and Law and Justice in Poland in 2005 and later in 2015 and 2019 mark this trend, but since these parties came to power they have become 'cartel parties' (Mair, 2012), distancing themselves from contact with social movements and grassroots support. When it comes to 'movement parties', the ultra-nationalist and anti-Semitic Jobbik won 14.7 per cent of the vote in the 2014 European elections and secured 26 parliamentary seats in the 2018 national elections.[2] The anti-Roma, anti-immigrant and anti-NATO

[2] Jobbik cannot be considered a radical right party anymore. After 2013 Jobbik changed its strategy and moved towards moderate and conservative positions, losing its grassroots and 'civic' allies. A new real far-right party Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) – founded by a former leader of Jobbik – replaced Jobbik in their previous role.

Kotleba People's Party Our Slovakia won 8.6 per cent of the vote in 2016 and 7.9 per cent in 2020 (securing 17 seats). In Czechia, the anti-immigration and Eurosceptic SPD won 10 per cent of the vote in the 2018 national elections.

Our four cases share a similar story of post-communist transformation and have all recently experienced a resurgence of right-wing activism (Mudde, 2010), but they also differ along dimensions that we consider relevant to the degree and forms of right-wing radicalism (on the political opportunities for the radical right in CEE, see Bustikova, 2009, and Pirro, 2015). The electoral strength of the radical right was measured by the electoral results of radical right parties in national and local elections in the countries studied. Values were assigned as follows: 0–5 per cent = 0; 5.1–10 per cent = 0.5; >10.1 per cent = 1 (for a similar construction of the indicator see Mudde, 2007, p. 246).

Some characteristics of the CEE countries could be conducive to the mobilisation of the radical right. For example, Mudde (2002) argues that the communist legacy could make these societies particularly vulnerable to right-wing anti-European populism due to the strong anti-political and anti-elitist sentiments nurtured under communism. Moreover, communist authoritarianism limited opportunities to openly reflect on the issue of human rights violations after the Second World War and hindered inclusive conceptions of the post-1989 polity, thereby giving the radical right more political legitimacy to mobilise against various cultural 'others' (i.e. ethnic minorities) (Kluknavska, 2015).

While these factors may provide fertile ground and symbolic resources for radical right mobilisation ('historically determined opportunities'), Mudde (2013) argues that three decades after the transition, we need to look beyond a direct link between communist legacies and radical right activity. Moreover, the radical right actively frames historical narratives, legacies (and thus opportunities) and collective identities for the purposes of political competition (Pirro, 2015).

Distrust of representative institutions is considered a hallmark of the CEE region (Howard, 2003, p. 78) and may be related to the successful mobilisation of the radical right. Trust in national parliaments is lower in CEE than in other EU countries (20 per cent in Czechia, 30 per cent in Hungary, 23 per cent in Poland and 29 per cent in Slovakia,[3] compared to an EU average of 36 per cent). This mistrust also applies to other facets of institutionalised politics, resulting in low levels of unionisation and fewer civil society organisations in our four cases.

We also looked at the organisational characteristics of radical right organisations, focusing on the degree of formalisation of radical right organisations in each country, measured by a variable that assigns values ranging from 0 (0 per cent) to 1 (100 per cent) on the basis of the percentage of radical right organisations that have a 'membership form/formal subscription' for new members. This was measured with a variable that assigns values from 0 (0 per cent) to 1 (100 per cent) on the basis of the percentage of right-wing extremist organisations in each country that 'sell some kind of merchandise online for self-financing' (T-shirts, flags, war gadgets) or, more generally, 'provide instructions and facilities on their websites for receiving funds for the group' (transfer method, bank account, donation, etc.).

[3] Based on Eurobarometer's poll of citizens' trust in national parliaments: http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index

4 Theoretical framework

Institutional and protest politics can be antagonistic or mutually reinforcing (Hutter, 2014). Although scholars agree that the recent European economic and financial crises have emboldened radical social actors who capitalise on citizens' discontent, political scientists tend to focus on the electoral channel, while sociologists explore non-electoral political trends (Rydgren, 2007).

Discursive opportunities, which determine which ideas become acceptable in the public sphere, can be measured by the degree of social acceptance of political groups or their narratives (such as anti-immigration discourse). Historical opportunity structures refer to the existence of historical Nazi groups or parties to which contemporary groups might refer.

Although grievances (in the context of social movement studies as understood by della Porta, 2017) are important for any collective mobilisation, we emphasise the ability of collective actors to adapt to contextual resources and constraints, or to take advantage of available political and cultural opportunities (Rydgren, 2003, p. 49). These political-cultural and symbolic opportunities facilitate or hinder the emergence and repertoires of collective actions and actors (Tarrow, 1994; Kriesi, 2004; and Koopmans & Statham, 1999 on the discursive opportunity structures of the radical right). 'Open' political opportunity structures are expected to facilitate collective mobilisation, while 'closed' opportunity structures are expected to hinder protest but promote radicalisation (i.e. disruptive or violent action repertoires) should it occur. Scholars have operationalised political and cultural opportunities as 'allies in power', 'institutional access points to the system', elite stability/instability, elite culture towards challenges, elite discourse, and citizens' attitudes towards movements (cf. Gamson & Meyer, 1996).

Different types of right-wing organisations tend to exploit the opportunities and constraints of their respective countries in different ways. Actors' specific characteristics and resources (material and symbolic) should influence their strategic choices (della Porta, 1995). We also consider movements' material and symbolic resources (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996, p. 3) as they constrain how movements can respond to different opportunities (Koopmans et al., 2005, p. 21). More recently, social movement scholars have highlighted the importance of grievances (Kriesi, 2012; della Porta, 2015). In the shadow of the economic and financial crisis of 2008, popular grievances have fed into electoral and protest mobilisations (della Porta, 2015). We therefore expect radical right protest activities to focus on economic and immigration issues.

Finally, the radical right milieu is far from homogeneous, as it includes many different groups, from political parties to subcultural organisations, all of which have different strengths and resources (Table B in the appendix). Braun and Koopmans (2014) highlight that radical right and anti-refugee activists are more concerned with peer approval (as opposed to mainstream media), making online social media an important arena to study. Furthermore, the emergence of social media allows us to study the emergence and trajectory of discursive, social and cultural processes in new ways.

Thus, we expect radical right mobilisations and action repertoires to vary according to the type of actor. Specifically, we hypothesise that countries with stronger radical right milieus will experience more disruptive actions, whereas more moderate repertoires

will be found in cases where the radical right consists of institutionalised actors. We also consider the importance of situational characteristics, such as specific issues and targets.

5 Methods and data

We combined qualitative and quantitative data to analyse the intensity and characteristics of radical right mobilisation (both party and grassroots) in our four cases. We considered the political opportunities available in each country, the groups' organisational characteristics and contingent dynamics such as opponents (i.e. movement and counter-movement dynamics, della Porta & Diani, 2006), issues and grievances. Radical right organisations in CEE use a wide repertoire of actions, ranging from electoral strategies to violence, which varies across time and countries, depending on the relevant combination of grievances, opportunities, and organisational factors (Kriesi, 2012).

We conducted a protest event analysis (PEA) based on newspaper articles published between 2008 and 2016. Protest event analysis is a methodology used to study and understand protests, demonstrations, and other forms of collective action. It involves the systematic collection and analysis of data related to protest events, including their locations, participants, goals, tactics, and outcomes. The goal of protest event analysis is to examine patterns, trends, and dynamics within protests, as well as their broader social and political implications. To achieve this researchers gather data from various sources, such as news reports, social media, official records and eyewitness accounts. These data may include information about the date, time, and location of the protest, the organisations or individuals involved, the issues being protested, and the tactics used. The collected data is then coded and categorised to identify common themes, characteristics and variables. Protests may be classified based on their goals (e.g. political, social, economic), tactics (e.g. peaceful, violent), or the identity of the participants (e.g. students, workers, activists). Protest event analysis often involves quantitative techniques to analyse patterns and trends. Statistical methods may be applied to identify factors associated with the occurrence, scale or success of protests. Researchers may also use network analysis to examine the relationships between different protest events, organisations, or individuals.

The analysis of protest events aims to generate meaningful insights and conclusions. Researchers interpret the data and findings to understand the dynamics of protests, the factors that influence their outcomes, and their broader societal impact. Overall, protest event analysis provides a systematic framework for studying protests and understanding their role in social and political change. By examining the characteristics and dynamics of protest events, researchers can gain insights into the motivations, strategies and effects of collective action.

We recorded a total of 1040 events (302 in Czechia, 401 in Poland, 125 in Slovakia and 212 in Hungary) and coded them for strategies and levels and forms of mobilisation. Our data came from articles published in the main national newspaper in each country: the liberal Gazeta Wyborcza for Poland, the liberal-conservative Mladá fronta Dnes for Czechia, the liberal Denník SME for Slovakia, and the liberal and opposition Népszabadság Online for Hungary. In general, the use of multiple sources (e.g. several newspapers with different orientations in the same country) is preferable for the analysis of

protest events to reduce possible biases. However, biases are consistent over time, and most studies show that results tend to be stable, especially within individual newspapers and over longer periods of time (cf. McCarthy et al. 1996). To retrieve relevant articles, we conducted a keyword search of the Lexis Nexis database and the electronic editions of each newspaper. We used multiple keywords (e.g. 'extreme right', 'neo-Nazi', 'white supremacist*', 'far right', 'skinhead*', 'Nazi', etc.) in an iterative process and eliminated redundant articles. Inter-coder reliability tests ensured consistency in article selection and coding. Once articles were located, we stored them for reference during the qualitative assessment.

We build on the concept and techniques of protest event analysis (PEA), a method for systematically collecting large data sets on protest activities and their various components and dimensions. The main unit of analysis in PEA is a single protest event. To define a protest event, we use the concept of 'political claim' (Koopmans et al., 2005, p. 180). This means that we consider any intervention in the public sphere, verbal or non-verbal, that contains a political claim as a 'protest event'. With caveats and many weaknesses, newspaper-based analysis allows us to show, if not the actual number of protests, at least the associations between specific variables of protest event forms, as well as much more general trends (Franzosi, 1987; McCarthy et al., 1996). Despite some limitations (see McCarthy et al., 1996), PEA is a method of analysis that allows us to quantify many characteristics of protests, such as frequency, timing and duration, location, demands, size, forms, bearers and targets, as well as immediate consequences and reactions, such as police intervention, damage and counter-protests (Koopmans & Rucht, 2002). Because the datasets are based on published material, PEA can facilitate quantitative and qualitative assessments of protests over large geographical areas (Rucht et al., 1999).

We used a formalised codebook to conduct our PEA. Our unit of analysis was the protest event, each of which contained the following elements: the actor initiating the protest event, the form of action, the target of the action, an object actor whose interests are affected by the event and the substantive content of the event (the issue). In our study, a protest event consists of a political event initiated by a right-wing extremist actor (either collective or individual, even anonymous), regardless of the type of actor (we included: right-wing political party; right-wing political movement – also related to parties; youth subcultural group: a. Skinheads; b. Music bands or labels, c. Ultras / football fans / hooligans; nostalgic & revisionist organisations; neo-Nazi groups; radical right cultural, New Age and neo-mystical organisations (including integralist Catholic organisations), historical organisations (for the protection of culture, history, language); radical right commercial organisations and publishers. We also coded the form of the event (e.g. conventional actions, mild or severe violence, unconventional symbolic and expressive actions, etc.). We looked at the targets of the events: ethnic, religious and social minorities (e.g. homosexuals, homeless people); political opponents (e.g. anti-fascists, squatters, anarchists, communists, etc.); national institutions; political parties; other right-wing actors; non-national (i.e. other) state or supranational institutions (i.e. EU, NATO, WTO). We also focused our analysis on the goals of the protests, which included: social and economic issues; political issues; conservative values (e.g. religion, law and order, abortion and LGBT+ issues, family and gender regimes, etc.); globalisation and European integration; migration; nation and history as well as the past. Finally, we included in our dataset information on potential counter-events and the police response to the event. An event may last for several days (e.g. a protest campaign).

6 Analysis

The political and discursive opportunity structures for radical right mobilisation differ in our four cases. Institutionally (our proxy for 'allies in power', cf. Rucht, 2004), Poland has consistently strong radical right parties (before and after the 2008 economic crisis), Hungary and Czechia experience an increase in the electoral strength of the radical right after 2008, and Slovakia's radical right is moderately strong, peaking briefly after 2008 (but its subsequent decline is accompanied by increasing unconventional activity; see Table A in the appendix). While the availability of sufficient 'political space' may predict a strong radical right party, it may also weaken radical right social movements (Hutter, 2014). Among the CEE countries in our study period, Hungary's radical right had the strongest electoral results for the radical right, but its institutional gains hampered street mobilisation that sought to re-imagine the relationship between protest and conventional politics.

In terms of the radical right's discursive opportunity structures (DOS), the situation has changed somewhat since Cisař (2013) noted that 'in post-communist environments, […] radical right-wing associations, especially racist and nationalist ones, seem to have greater resonance [than those on the left], although their demands usually fall outside what is generally considered socially acceptable'. Since then, radical right-wing attitudes have become more socially acceptable, especially in Poland and Hungary, possibly because of their state-controlled public media.[4] In Czechia and Slovakia, opposition parties and civil society seem to be slowing down this trend.

Of our four cases, only Hungary has received a modest number of refugees, especially after the 'refugee crisis' of 2015, or experienced conflicts involving social minorities (especially Roma). However, ethnic prejudices are widespread in Polish and Hungarian societies, constituting a 'social consensus' towards the radical right. Radical right organisations use 'welfare chauvinism' to frame their propaganda, claiming that immigrants and minorities are 'stealing jobs' or 'living on welfare' (Piotrowski, 2017). The claims of political elites against migrants and refugees escalated in the context of the EU relocation programme, most visibly in Poland but spreading across the region (cf. Winiewski et al., 2016), opening space for increasing xenophobic rhetoric and mobilisation. The mainstreaming of radical right discourse has been more dramatic in Hungary and Poland, where the ruling Fidesz party (in Hungary) often uses xenophobic discourse (Loch & Norocel, 2015), but right-wing and populist candidates have also become major players on the political scene and in public discourse in Slovakia and Czechia.

Finally, our four cases offer different pictures of the resources of radical right-wing social movements: the sector is relatively weak in Czechia, moderate in Slovakia and strong in Poland, both before and after the 2008 European crisis. Resources include income from merchandise, such as CDs, memorabilia and patriotic clothing (Doległo, 2018) as well as concerts and events. Right-wing organisations benefit financially and materially (e.g. office space) from greater official acceptance and individual participation (e.g. via crowdfunding platforms).

[4] Another possible explanation could be the radicalisation of the regime/governing party.

Institutional features, such as the functional and territorial distribution of power and shifts in party control configurations, have emerged as important independent variables in explaining social movement development (Caiani et. al. 2012, p. 11). Given the POS and DOS of the radical right in our cases, we argue that Poland and Hungary are more conducive ('open') contexts for radical right mobilisation, Slovakia is more constrained ('closed'), and Czechia lies somewhere between these two extremes.[5]

7 Radical right mobilisation: Where and when does it emerge?

Our analysis of protest events shows that right-wing mobilisation is a significant – and growing – phenomenon in Poland between 2008 and 2016 but remains stable (Czechia and Slovakia) or declines, as in Hungary. We find significant differences between the four countries (Figure 1).



Figure 1 Trends in extreme right mobilization levels, by country (2008–2016) (absolute values)

Czechia is characterised by a high level of radical right mobilisation at the beginning of our timeframe (in 2008); Slovakia shows moderate levels of radical right activity in 2008; Hungary and Poland start at medium to high levels of mobilisation. The trends in mobilisation also diverge: in all countries except Poland, radical right mobilisation increases immediately after 2008 (the European financial crisis) but declines sharply from 2009 to 2010.

[5] For additional qualitative details on the political and cultural opportunities and the radical right in these four countries, see Caiani (2019).

Despite the electoral results of the radical right and the prevalence of xenophobic discourse in Hungary, it is the only country where mobilisation decreases (from 33 events in 2008 to nine events in 2016). In Poland, on the other hand, radical right-wing mobilisations have become more frequent, especially after 2015 (from 20 events in 2010 to 82 events in 2016). In Czechia and Slovakia, the number of events fluctuates, but increases sharply from 2014 to 2015, possibly due to the electoral calendar and the use of the 'refugee crisis' by politicians.

In addition to the number of actions, we also considered the number of participants at each event. According to our data, the size of events organised by far-right groups in Central Europe varied considerably (Figure 2), from thousands of participants, such as at Poland's national Independence Day celebrations after 2012 (Łukianow & Kocyba, 2020), to just a few. However, in all four cases, fewer people attended these events in 2016 than in 2015.



Figure 2 Number of identified participants, by country (2008–2016) (absolute values)

In all cases, most events involve 10–30 people, but due to a few very large events, the average is 406. Violent actions are mainly carried out by small groups (five people) or individual activists.

In addition, the radical right's ability to mobilise large numbers of people has increased in recent years, especially after the 'refugee crisis'. Despite the lack of actual refugees (only a few dozen reached the borders of the countries we studied), the fear of 'phantom refugees' (Buchowski, 2018) seems to be prominent. This figure has entered mainstream discourse and corresponds to the shift within mainstream politics.

8 How do they protest?

Following Tarrow (1989), we distinguished six categories of protest event strategies: 'conventional actions', associated with conventional politics, such as press conferences, distribution of leaflets, election campaigns, etc.; 'demonstrative actions' – events aimed at mobilising large numbers of people, e.g. rallies, petitions, street demonstrations; 'expressive actions', aimed at members of the in-group to reinforce cohesion and identity, e.g. commemorations, music festivals; 'confrontational actions' – events that are nonviolent but usually illegal, aimed at disrupting official policies, e.g. demonstrations, petitions, street protests, etc, commemorative events, music festivals; 'confrontational actions' – non-violent but usually illegal events aimed at disrupting official policies or institutions; and 'violent actions', which range from less serious violence against people or property (e.g. insulting or threatening minorities and political opponents, graffiti, pro-fascist or pro-Nazi slogans, etc.) to more serious acts such as riots, street demonstrations.) to more serious acts such as physical assaults on homosexuals, ethnic minorities and political opponents, or bombing or setting fire to the offices of political opponents (e.g. trade unions, squatters' social centres, left-wing party headquarters or newspapers). With the numbers of violent, and expressive events being close to negligible, biggest fluctuations of frequencies of protests over the years can be observed in conventional and demonstrative types of events, that – especially demonstrative – peaking in 2009 and 2015, which could be explained by occurrence of major crisis: economic (when austerity measures to combat the 2008 economic crisis were introduced) and 'migration' in 2015, as shown on Figure 10.



Figure 10 Frequency of events by type of action

Our data show a significant but fluctuating level of right-wing violence, which is on the decline overall. On average, around 15 per cent of right-wing extremist actions between 2008 and 2016 were violent, but the level of violence varies from country to country. Poland

shows the most marked decrease in the level of violence (since 2008), from 40 per cent of all actions to 8.5 per cent in 2016, despite an increase in the total number of right-wing extremist events. This result shows that the number of violent events initiated by the far right is rather stable. Hungary seems to follow a similar pattern from 2011 to 2014, with an increase in violence in 2015, before decreasing again in 2016. Again, the arrival of refugees in Hungary could be an explanation, together with changes in the legal environment (the outlawing of the paramilitary group Magyar Gárda and similar militias). In Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the share of violent events seems to have generally declined since 2013, suggesting a continuing institutionalisation of the radical right sector (cf. Płatek & Płucienniczak, 2017).



Figure 3 Violent actions, by country (2008–2016) (%)

Regarding other strategies of action of the radical right beyond violence, we find that these groups have a diverse repertoire, which differs from country to country.[6] Confrontational protests organised by the radical right are prominent in Hungary and Poland (accounting for 20–21 per cent of the total number of actions studied in both countries), contradicting the assumption of an inverse relationship between institutionalisation and moderation. In our view, the institutionalisation of some aspects of the radical right (i. e. xenophobic discourses) provides opportunities for non-institutional right-wing actors, who also benefit from the relaxation of legal constraints (e.g. states withdrawing cases against right-wing activists or imposing lighter sentences). On the other hand, Slovak

[6] This is also confirmed by the low but significant Cramer's V coefficient between 'action form' and 'country' (0.28**).

right-wing organisations rely much more on the least radical forms of action, namely conventional actions (accounting for more than 18 per cent of all actions), than in the other countries analysed. In Hungary, this type of intervention is the rarest (4.7 per cent), and demonstrative actions are the most common type of right-wing extremist activism in CEE as a whole (46–56 per cent in all countries analysed). In countries with strong right-wing (or even far-right) parties in the parliaments (Hungary and Poland), the number of violent and confrontational actions is higher than in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, where, on the contrary, more than 50 per cent of the recorded events are expressive or demonstrative. In general, we were surprised by the low number of online events, between 1 per cent and 2.6 per cent of recorded events – at least according to those reported in newspapers.



Figure 11 Type of actor by years

9 Who protests? Organizational features and radical right mobilization

For radical right groups, as for any collective actor, the development and forms of mobilisation are linked to organisational characteristics. Which types of right-wing organisations are most likely to mobilise? And which are more associated with violence?

In all our cases, the most active right-wing actors are individuals belonging to political movements (31 per cent of all protest events) and political parties (25.8 per cent) (Figure 4). This finding suggests that some traditional segments of the radical right, such as skinheads, revisionists and youth groups, are less mobilised, suggesting that these are not the milieus in which radical right groups mobilise. When looking at the distribution of types

of actors over the years (Figure 11), we can observe the declining importance of neo-Nazi and youth subcultural groups, which can be explained by the decline of the skinheads subculture and perhaps with the growing self-consciousness of journalists that started to differentiate protesters better. What can be seen is the growing presence of political movements and political parties (with other types of actors, such as 'nostalgic & revisionist' or 'commercial' virtually absent from our dataset). The two most often occurring groups have actually began to merge from one to another in the process of institutionalisation of the far right in Central Europe. Movements, such as for example Ruch Narodowy in Poland, began their strictly political activities, transforming into fully-fledged political parties with their own MPs. These 'movement parties' seem to be in line with political and party developments over the world.



Figure 4 Figure not showed, data available upon request. Forms of actions of the radical right, by countries (%)

Importantly, we find that the degree of radicalism of far-right mobilisation varies according to the type of group (Figure 5). Youth and skinhead groups – the least hierarchical or structured – are the most likely to use violence (59.6 per cent of violent incidents). Neo-Nazi and general right-wing extremist groups are the next most violent, and cultural groups are the least violent.



Figure 5 Radical right protest events, by type of actor (2008–2016, all countries) (%)

10 Issues and targets of radical right mobilization

We also seek to understand collective action as the product of its 'organisational field', or the strategies and tactics that emerge from the interaction of 'networks within and between movements, and internal conflict and competition' (Meyer & Staggenborg, 2008, p. 210). In particular, the radical right is seen as responding to counter-movements from the left and institutional political opponents.

We observe that right-wing mobilisations most often target ethnic minorities (32 per cent of all events), political opponents (12.9 per cent of all events) and political parties (12.7 per cent) (Figure 6). Right-wing events targeting political opponents tend to focus on national authorities or the police, who are accused of 'arbitrariness' or violent behaviour and repression. Many of the events targeting political opponents are also violent and take place during confrontations between right-wing extremist organisations and counter-movements.

When right-wing groups target minorities, the events are largely demonstrative (55 per cent) or violent (23 per cent). The targets vary according to the ethnic composition of each country and the relevant xenophobic framework. Other targets (3.5 per cent of all events) of radical right mobilisation are religious minorities – mainly Muslims and Jews – (Figure 6), including firebombing of gatherings at Islamic centres, protests against Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Islamic or anti-Semitic statements.



Figure 6 Action forms, by type of radical right organization (%)

Our data confirm the observation that the radical right tends to mobilise around national or sub-national issues (Figure 7). Actions targeting supranational or international institutions (e.g. the EU) are very rare. This finding suggests that local conflicts and grievances are more salient for right-wing actors.



Figure 7 Radical right targets (2008–2016, all countries) (%)



Figure 8 Radical right issues (2008–2016, all countries) (%)

Furthermore, immigration-related issues seem to be the most important source of far-right mobilisation (27.8 per cent of protest events). Figure 8 illustrates the prevalence of these issues in each country and shows the disproportionate role of immigration in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Radical right-wing organisations also mobilise around political issues and conservative values (18.7 and 18.4 per cent, respectively). Contrary to our expectations, economic issues were less frequent (only 5.5 per cent of actions, all Figure 8) and seemed to be of some relevance only in Hungary and Poland (Figure 9). The moderate frequency of events related to the internal life of the radical right suggests the existence of a certain participatory internal environment that allows members to strengthen social and organisational ties (Figure 9).



Figure 9 Radical right issue field by country (2008–2016) (%)

11 Discussion: Opportunities, resources, and radical right mobilization

How can we explain the tendency of different right-wing groups in different countries to use different repertoires of action? Our cases differ in terms of their institutional structures and political cultures and the resulting opportunities and constraints for radical right groups. Nominally, radical right parties and groups in our four cases face laws against racism and xenophobia, some degree of legal control over neo-Nazi/fascist groups, and electoral constraints on smaller parties. In reality, however, implementation is uneven between (and within, especially in the case of Poland and Hungary) these countries.

Furthermore, the organisations and actors relevant to our PEA differ both in terms of ideology (as the radical right is not homogeneous even within a single country) and resources, including levels of professionalisation and financial assets (Table 1). How do these contextual and organisational factors influence the mobilisation of right-wing groups?

The index of radicalism (dependent variable) was constructed by summing and weighting types of action with increasing values. The values related to the 6 action strategies presented above (conventional, expressive, demonstrative, confrontational, light and heavy violence) range from 1 (minimum degree of radicalism) to 6 (maximum).

As we expected, the more formalised an organisation (e.g. political parties or other registered organisations), the more moderate (less violent) its actions. Surprisingly, however, better funded organisations tend to be more radical. The number of radical right organisations does not seem to be related to the level of radicalisation.

Table 1 Contextual opportunities, organizational characteristics and radical right mobilization (Correlations, Pearson)

		Degree of radicalism of radical right mobilization (index)
POS	Radical right electoral strenght	.091**
	Anti-immigrant appeals of political elites	-.008 (not significant)
	Population mistrust in representative institutions	.017 (not significant)
COS	Cos	.146**
	Degree of acceptance of the far right as a legitimate political actor	0.51 (not significant)
	Anti-immigrant and/or nationalistic attitudes of the population	.008 (not significant)
	Antifa civil society orgs.	-.146**
Organizational characteristics	Formalization	-.113**
	Number of identified extreme right organizations in the country	.50 (not significant)
	Financial resources	.162**

N= 1587 Note: * = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); n.s. = Correlation is not significant.

We find that specific, external political and cultural opportunities have an impact on right-wing political activism at the country level. Countries in which the political and social culture is more accepting of the radical right (i.e. open or favourable contexts) tend to experience more violent right-wing events. Contrary to the expectations of some scholars (Hutter, 2014), the electoral strength of the radical right is weakly but positively associated with more radical repertoires. On the other hand, strict legal restrictions against right-wing extremism and the degree of acceptance of the radical right as a legitimate political actor are not statistically significant. Instead, the presence of a network of watchdog and anti-fascist associations (albeit relatively weak in our cases) seems to hinder the use of more radical actions by right-wing groups. Mistrust of representative institutions does not seem sufficient to explain the political activism of the radical right, despite expectations to the contrary. In sum, both exogenous, contextual factors and endogenous resources influence the strategic choices of radical right organisations.

12 Conclusion

In this article, we have analysed the intensity and characteristics of radical right mobilisation in four countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with a particular focus on the repertoires of action and the types of groups involved. By analysing institutional features, group resources and the events themselves, we sought to better understand the contexts and opportunities that facilitated specific actors' strategies. We hoped to contribute to overcoming the 'strict division of labour' between political science-oriented analyses of radical right parties and sociological studies of social movements (Rydgren, 2007, p. 257).

Academics and journalists often cite globalisation, EU austerity and enlargement programmes, economic crises, immigration and multiculturalism, and disillusionment with mainstream politics and representative democracy as reasons for the growing popularity of radical right groups across Europe (Caiani, 2011). Our findings support some of these expectations. According to our expectations, the countries that offer more open opportunities for the radical right (such as Poland and Hungary) are also those where the intensity of radical right protest activities is higher. After 2008, radical right activism on the streets increased in all countries (with the exception of Poland). The mobilisation of the radical right grew out of a growing fatigue with post-transition neoliberal reforms and a low level of trust in the left (Piotrowski, 2017).

The total number of radical right protest events and participants increased between 2008 and 2016, in line with the electoral fortunes of these groups (Rooduijn et al., 2014). However, far-right groups have a repertoire of actions beyond elections and violence, and political and discursive opportunities also contribute to mobilisation. Many mainstream politicians in CEE adopted xenophobic discourses in the wake of the 2015 'refugee crisis' (especially around election campaigns, see Postelnicescu, 2016), which gave radical right-wing actors more attention and created favourable conditions for their mobilisation. As expected, right-wing mobilisation (and violence) is more common where social acceptance of more extreme right-wing values is widespread.

Overall, radical right parties are quite weak in our four cases, rarely exceeding 7 per cent of the popular vote; however, Slovakia's radical right party is the most successful and

(although in decline) durable.[7] The Catholic Church serves as a vector and potential ally of the radical right in all of these countries, although this is particularly true in Poland; to a lesser extent in Slovakia (Grzymala-Busse, 2015; 2019; Kotwas & Kubik, 2019). Moreover, the legacy of the past differs from country to country and is particularly pronounced in Slovakia and Hungary. And although right-wing populism has become part of the region's political arenas (especially in Hungary and Poland), we cannot ignore the specificities of these populisms: one tends towards Russian-inspired national populism based on surveillance capitalism, and the other seeks to preserve the remnants of a liberal democratic order (Szabó, 2020).

Moreover, despite the typical Euroscepticism of the radical right and the discursive opportunities for mobilisation against Europe provided by the economic crisis, there is no visible - at least according to the protest events reported in the newspapers - direct radical right mobilisation against the EU in any of the countries we have analysed. However, differences between the forms of radical right activism in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia can be attributed to specific contextual opportunities, such as dynamics between political parties and movements (as in Poland). In this context, it is worth highlighting the process of pillarisation of Polish civil society observed by Ekiert, which is also reflected in the mobilisation of protests (Ekiert, 2020). The consequence of pillarisation was the re-etatisation of civil society, i.e. the strengthening of ties between conservative political parties and the sector of organisations they support. According to the author, this process deepened after 2015, when the parliamentary coalition of the United Right *(Zjednoczona Prawica)*, led by the Law and Justice party, implemented the 'good change' *(dobra zmiana)* political programme. The ruling coalition made personnel changes in many public institutions, including the civil service, state enterprises, the judiciary and cultural institutions. As a result, the radical right was strengthened. locally salient issues or grievances (such as those generated by the immigration or financial crises). In a different trajectory, in Hungary the government has assumed the mantle of the radical right thus changing the trajectory of the far-right dynamics.

Beyond the commonalities, we also found some country (and organisational) specificities. If the refugee crisis similarly provided a unique opportunity to '[Westernise] the Eastern European radical right in its opposition to Islam and migrants with non-European backgrounds' (Bustikova, 2018), and can therefore be interpreted as a 'critical juncture' that spurred radical right mobilisation, as our data showed, radical right groups in the four countries differed not only in the intensity of mobilisation (and violence), but also in their preferred issues and targets. They may be partly related to the particularly favourable 'political opportunities' (including discursive ones, Caiani et al., 2012) for radical right mobilisation in Poland and Slovakia, to the explicit links with the Church here, but also to the country specific salience of different issues of mobilisation.

[7] Here a note on PiS and Fidesz – as they are radical right wing populist parties in the region and well-studied examples, our study focused on political parties that took part in elections but never held a position of power, that would move them from 'movement parties' towards 'cartel parties', more focused on securing their power and relaxing their ties with grassroots groups that we wanted to analyze.

The differences found may also be related to country differences in terms of ethnic heterogeneity, economic performance and cultural heritage (Bustikova, 2018). Slovakia, for example, is more ethnically heterogeneous and these cleavages can structure radical right politics. In the other three more homogeneous countries analysed, radical right mobilisation tends to focus mainly on Roma or social and religious issues, as our data also highlights (Bustikova, 2018).

While most Central European democracies share some characteristics that are generally considered conducive to radical right mobilisation – declining trust in institutions, emboldened uncivil society, populists as political leaders, civic apathy and nationalist contestation (Bustikova & Guasti, 2017) – not all CEE countries are the same. The illiberal turns of some countries, such as Hungary and Poland (Piotrowski, 2020), are different from the 'swerves' of others: Czechia and Slovakia.

Inspired by Minkenberg and Kossack (2015), we assessed the strength of radical right movements in our cases (see Table B in the appendix). In Poland, the radical right remained moderately strong; in Hungary, it grew from moderate to strong; in Czechia, it grew from weak to strong; and Slovakia was the only case of decline, with the radical right shrinking from strong to moderate. Only in Czechia did radical right movements dominate political parties. We found a moderate to strong relationship between the strength of the radical right sector in the country and the intensity of protests, but the relationship between movement actors and political parties does not seem to play an important role. This seems to be a vicious circle, because on the one hand, radical right groups can serve as laboratories of contention (Pleyers, 2010) for mainstream political groups, especially those in power (as is the case in Hungary and to some extent in Poland). On the other hand, radical right groups can become major challengers to mainstream right-wing parties, pushing the agenda and radicalising discourse and repertoires of action.

Although right-wing violence has emerged as a widespread phenomenon (Císař, 2013), we find that strategic choices (such as whether or not to use violence) are related to the characteristics of the actors. Specifically, political parties tend to use conventional repertoires, while individual activists and small groups are more likely to engage in direct, violent confrontations. This finding may indicate a degree of organisational weakness or a strategic division of labour between political parties, which operate in the institutional arena, and movements or activists who engage in unconventional political action. Similarly, we confirm the findings of a previous study on the Polish case (Płatek & Płucienniczak, 2017), which shows that as the radical right becomes more institutionalised, the level of political violence decreases. However – counter-intuitively – better-funded radical right organisations tend to engage in more violent actions than their less well-funded counterparts. The increase in hate crimes, particularly against ethnic and religious minorities, can be explained by rising levels of xenophobia among individuals who may not be associated with any particular far-right organisation.[8]

[8] See, for instance, Freedom House's report on xenophobia in Central and Eastern European countries: https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/central-europe-s-faceless-strangers-rise-xenophobia-region

Our preliminary analysis underlines the difficulty of describing broad regional characteristics. For example, Hungary and Slovakia both experienced Nazi-aligned regimes in the 1940s (the Arrow Cross government in Hungary and the Tiso Republic in Slovakia), a similarity that could potentially facilitate the emergence of related historical revisionist groups. However, the radical right groups in these two countries are quite different. We challenge the academic tendency to portray geographically close social movements as sharing the same roots, motives or values. In fact, we argue that radical right-wing mobilisation in our cases is so different from country to country that it cannot be considered a 'regional CEE characteristic'.

The most far-reaching conclusion we can draw is that contextual features and opportunities are crucial in explaining the political behaviour of right-wing groups, just as they are for left-wing and Western groups (Caiani, 2023). Applying POS and resource mobilisation approaches to the analysis of radical right mobilisation can broaden our understanding of these increasingly successful political forces. By focusing on both exogenous and endogenous factors, we can emphasise the agency of these actors and treat them as 'key actors in the narrative of their success or failure' (Wilson & Hainsworth, 2012, p. 15), rather than seeing them as mere cogs in the relative deprivation theory or as automatic, anomic responses to times of crisis.

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Appendix

Table A Radical Right Election Results in Selected National Parliamentary Elections in Eastern Europe and Western Europe, from 1990

	Results for chambers of deputies (% average for 5 years)				
Eastern Europe	**1990–1994**	**1995–1999**	**2000–2004**	**2005–2009**	**2010–2014**
Bulgaria	–	–	–	8.7	7.3
Czech Republic	6.8	6.0	1.1	–	**1.1**
Hungary	0.8	5.5	4.5	2.2	**16.7**
Latvia	–	–	–	1.5	10.8
Poland	**14.1**	8.0	18.1	**10.4**	0.0
Romania	5.8	9.2	20.9	3.1	1.2
Slovak Republic	6.7	9.1	7.0	11.7	4.5
Average	*4.9*	*5.4*	*7.4*	*5.4*	*5.9*
Western Europe					
Average	*8.3*	*11.2*	*9.9*	*11.2*	*11.6*

Table B Strength of Radical Right-Wing Movements in Central and Eastern Europe, pre-2004 and 2014

	pre-2004	**2014**
Countries with strong RR movement sector	**Poland** Romania **Slovakia**	*Czech Republic* Hungary Latvia ***Poland*** *Romania* Ukraine
Countries with moderately strong RR movement sector	Hungary	Bulgaria Lithuania **Slovakia**
Countries with weak RR movement sector	Bulgaria **Czech Republic** Estonia Latvia Lithuania Ukraine	Estonia

Note: Countries in italics are those where radical right movements have been dominant vis-à-vis political parties or replaced them.

Source: Minkenberg / Kossack 2015

Table C Operationalization of variables for the Table 1.

POS	Extreme right electoral strength	The electoral strength of the extreme right has been measured on the basis of the electoral results obtained in national and local elections, by extreme right parties in the countries studied. Values have been assigned in the following: 0-5 % = 0; 5.1 %-10 % = 0.5; >10.1 =1. For a similar construction of the indicator, see Mudde 2007: 246. Bíró Nagy, A.; Boros, T.; Vasali, Z. 2013: Hungary in: Right-Wing extremism in Europe edited by Ralf Melzer, Sebastian Serafin, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 229-254 Mareš, M., & Vejvodová, P. (2010). Dělnická strana: profil české pravicově extremistické strany. Rexter, 8(2), 42–74. Čakl, O. –Wollmann, R. 2005. Czech Republic. In: Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe edited by Mudde, C. Routledge: New York, 28–53.
	Legal and policy constraints against the extreme right	This dimension of the POS has been operationalized by looking at the restrictiveness of the legal and policy constraints against racist and extreme right activities in a country. Sources were secondary data from official reports and specific literature on the topic (Mudde, C. 2005. Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 19(2), 161–184. Kluknavská , A., 2015. Enemies at the Gates: Framing Strategies of Extreme Right Parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Dissertation. Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava Milo, D. 2005. Rasistický extrémizmus v Slovenskej republike: neonacisti, ich hnutia a ciele. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). 2014. Report on Slovakia, 2014. [Online]. Available at: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Slovakia/SVK-CbC-V-2014-037-ENG.pdf. [accessed April 27, 2017]. European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). 2015a. Report on Hungary, 2015. [Online]. Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/hungary/HUN-CbC-V-2015-19-ENG.pdf. [accessed April 27, 2017]. European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). 2015b. Report on Poland, 2015. [Online]. Available at: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Poland/POL-CbC-V-2015-20-ENG.pdf. [accessed April 27, 2017]. Čakl, O. –Wollmann, R. 2005. Czech Republic. In: Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe edited by Mudde, C. Routledge: New York, 28-53. .). The countries have been classified according to the following values: 0 ('weak legislation and policies'); 0.5 ('moderate'); and 1 ('strict').
	Anti-immigrant appeals of political elites	This indicator looks at the extent to which anti-immigrant appeals are frequent in the discourse of the country elites. Political elites have started making claims against immigrants and refugees after the refugee crisis and in particular in the context of the EU re-location programme. Also, in the case of Poland, the use of anti-immigrant rhetoric overlapped with electoral campaigns (presidential and parliamentary) during which some politicians (Kaczyński) were projecting health claims with the increase numbers of refugees.

	Anti-immigrant appeals of political elites	Values were assigned on the basis of secondary sources (e.g. Dempsey, J. (2015). Understanding Central Europe's Opposition to Refugees. Retrieved November 3, 2015, from http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=61404 Polyakova, A., & Shekhovtsov, A. 2016. On The Rise: Europe's Fringe Right. World Affairs, 179(1), 70-80. Winiewski, M., Hansen K., Bilewicz M, Soral, W., Świderska A., Bulska D.: Mowa nienawiści, mowa pogardy. Raport z badania przemocy werbalnej wobec grup mniejszościowych retrieved from: http://www.ngofund.org.pl/). Value '1' was assigned to those countries where anti-immigrant or racist appeals from the elites are particularly frequent; '0.5' to those countries where they are moderately frequent, and '0' when absent or rare.
COS	Cultural Opportunity Structure (COS)	Is there a societal consensus toward extreme right actors? Is the extreme right accepted in society in terms of values or is it stigmatized? This aspect has been measured with a number of variables.
	Population mistrust in representative institutions	In the European countries the percentage of people who 'tend to trust' in the national Parliament was considered (source: Eurobarometer spring 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index; Ádám, Z. and Bozóki, A., 2016. State and Faith. Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, 2(1), pp.98-122. Kovács, A. 2010. The stranger at hand: Antisemitic prejudices in post-communist Hungary (Vol. 15). Brill.).
	Anti-immigrant and/or nationalistic attitudes of the population	This indicator looks at the extent to which racist and/or nationalistic attitudes are diffused within the population in a country. Sources have been data from reports of international monitoring organizations, opinion polls and secondary literature. We assigned a value of '1', when racist/nationalistic attitudes are widely diffused in the country; 0.5, when they are moderately diffused; and 0, when they are absent or very weak. Dempsey, J. (2015). Understanding Central Europe's Opposition to Refugees. Retrieved November 3, 2015, from http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=61404 Simonovits, B. and Bernát, A. 2016: The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary, TÁRKI, Budapest
	Degree of acceptance of the far right as a legitimate political actor	This indicator was constructed looking at the extent to which extreme right organizations are accepted as legitimate political actors within the political system (e.g., persistence of relevant far right actors within the country's political systems) or marginalized (e.g., poor electoral results and absence of relevant far right actors). On the basis of information from scientific literature and official country reports we assigned the value '1' ('strong') to those countries where the far right is widely accepted as a legitimate political actor; '0.5' ('moderately' accepted) and '0' where the society is highly hostile to the far right political forces. Caiani, M. and Kluknavská, A. (forthcoming). Extreme Right, the Internet and European Politics in CEE countries: the cases of Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In Michailidou, A. and Barisione, M. (eds.) Social media and European politics: Rethinking power and legitimacy in the digital era. Palgrave Macmillan

	Antifascist civil society orgs.	This dimension measures the presence (varying from 0, weak, to 0.5 to 1, strong) in a country of watchdog civil society organizations, a network of organizations whose aim is to counter radical right, and racism by monitoring and denouncing expressions of racial hatred and anti-democratic attitudes. This is considered affecting both the chances of success and the strategies of mobilization of extreme right actors (della Porta and Diani 2006: 211). Although there are antifascist and antiracist groups in all of the countries, in Poland they seem to be weaker and have less impact on policies and politics. Fella, Stefano & Ruzza, Carlo (eds.) (2012). Anti-Racist Movements in the EU: Between Europeanisation and National Trajectories. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Flam, Helena & Lloyd, Catherine (2008). 'Contextualizing Recent European Racist, Antiracist, and Migrant Mobilizing'. International journal of sociology 38(2): 3–16 Ruzza, Carlo (2013). 'Antiracist movements in Europe'. In Snow, David A., della Porta, Donatella, Klandermans, Bert & McAdam, Doug (eds.) The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
	Fascist past	This dichotomic indicator (0-1) refers to the presence (1) or absence (0) of a fascist/nazi regime (or the one that is considered as such) in the country's history. Ádám, Z. and Bozóki, A., 2016. State and Faith. Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, 2(1), pp.98-122. Kovács, A. 2010. The stranger at hand: Antisemitic prejudices in post-communist Hungary (Vol. 15). Brill. Blaščák,F., Gyárfášová, O., Hlavinka, J., Vrzgulová, M. (2013). Slovenský vojnový štát a holokaust v kolektívnej pamäti slovenskej spoločnosti. Retrieved from http://www.ivo.sk/buxus/docs//
Organizational characteristics	Formalization	the degree of formalization of extreme right organizations in each country and has been measured with a variable that assigns values ranging from 0 (0 %) to 1 (100 %) on the basis of the percentage of ER organizations which have a 'membership form/formal subscription' to the group for new members.
	Cohesiveness of the extreme right milieu	characteristics and shape of the extreme right milieu in each country (fragmented vs. cohesive and homogeneous), which according to social movement scholars can predict the emergence of collective action (more likely within dense social networks). Values are assigned according to the density of the network. Proxy = number of organizations
	Financial resources	degree of financial resources of extreme right organizations in each country and has been measured with a variable that assigns values ranging from 0 (0 %) to 1 (100 %) on the basis of the percentage of extreme right organizations in each country that 'sell some merchandise for auto-financing online' (e.g., T-shirt, flags, war- gadget) or in general, 'offer instructions and facilities on their websites to receive funds for the group' (e.g., fund transfer method, bank account, donation, etc.).

Codebook PEA

1. Country
2. Date
3. Title (of the article)
4. Type of actor organizing the event
   - Right-wing political party
   - Right-wing political movement (here also right wing newspapers and magazines and youth political movements related to parties)
   - Youth subcultural group (es. a. Skinheads; b. Right-wing Music Bands or Labels , c. Utras / Soccer fans / Hooligans)
   - General reference to extreme right activists of organizations/anonymous actor/ unknown actor
   - Nostalgic & Revisionist extreme right organizations
   - Neo-Nazi groups
   - Extreme right Cultural, new age and neo-mystical organizations (here also integrist catholic organizations) and historical organizations (organizations for the protection of culture, history, language)
   - Radical right commerical organizations and publishers
   - other ___________________
5. Scope of the event
   a. Local
   b. Regional
   c. National
   d. Sovranational/international/crossnational (es. European; international; etc)
6. Action
   a. Conventional
   b. Demonstrative
   c. Expressive
   d. Confrontational
   e. Light violence
   f. Heavy violence
   g. Online action
7. Form of action
8. Number of participants
9. Number of wounded (or 'Dead', or arrested/ blocked/denounced people during the event)
10. Target type
    a. social minorities (e.g. homosexuals, homeless),
    b. religious minorities
    c. ethnic minorities
    d. political adversaries (social groups eg. antifascists, squatted centers, anarchists, the left, communists, etc)
    e. national institutions / political parties
    f. extreme right actors
    g. non national (i.e. other) government or supra-national isntitutions (i.e. EU, NATO, WTO)
    h. other

11. Aims
    a. social and economic issues
    b. political issues
    c. conservative values issues (e.g. religion, law and order, abortion and gay issues, family and role of the women in the society, etc.)
    d. life of the extreme right
    e. Globalization and European integration
    f. Migration
    g. Nation and history, past
12. Potential counter-event (e.g. left wing movements, or citizens which organize a counter demonstration against /in response of the event initiated by the right? Or police's reaction against the event of the right?)

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