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Locating the role of civil society in anti-corruption: A qualitative comparative analysis of 30 democracies

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Abstract

The paper explores the configuration of corruption in democracies and simultaneously looks at whether civil society figures in this configuration. It does so via a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 30 democracies in the third wave of autocratization. Results of the analysis suggest that the presence of high perceived corruption is accounted for by the absence of a robust civil society combined with the absence of wide and independent public deliberation and the presence of high political exclusion. On the other hand, the absence of high perceived corruption is explained by the presence of wide and independent public deliberation combined with the absence of high political exclusion. It is particularly in the latter case that civil society's role, whether in its presence or absence, is elusive. The paper contributes to the discussion on the contextual dependencies of corruption and the conditionality of civil society's anti-corruption role. Prospects for future research on the conditional and possibly indirect anti-corruption role of civil society in democracies are put forward.

Keywords: civil society; corruption; autocratization; consolidated democracies; QCA

1 Introduction

Studies that look at the relationship between corruption and democracy abound. A survey of the extant literature on the broader corruption-democracy linkage, though, reveals confounding results. True enough, as Sung (2004) noted, 'that democratization influences political corruption in a profound way is an indisputable truism but the directions of the impact of democratic reforms on incidence of corruption remain hotly contested' (p. 179).

For instance, several scholars claimed that there is an association between corruption and democracy: linear (La Porta et al., 1999; Ades & Di Tella, 1999) and non-linear (Sung, 2004; Bäck & Hadenius, 2008; Rock, 2008). Casting scepticism on the supposed absence of a relationship between democracy and corruption (see Treisman, 2000), particularly those founded on the belief that there is an upsurge of incentives for corrupt behaviour in emerging democracies or in those that are in transition, supporters of the positive

linkage between democracy and corruption posited that (1) despite eruptions of corruption among intermediate democracies, the consolidation of advanced democratic institutions eventually reduced corruption (Sung, 2004); (2) corruption is a transitional phenomenon common in democratic transitions especially where procedural practices have not been founded on a firm liberal culture and effective institutions (Harris-White & White, 1996; Rose-Ackerman, 1999); and (3) while corruption was typically lower in dictatorships than in partial democracies, once the threshold is attained, democratic practices suppress corruption (Montinola & Jackman, 2002). While these statistical studies are informative, more recent studies and several researchers suggest that the influence of the potential causes of corruption is likely to be affected by different contexts (Zhang, et al., 2009; De Graaf, et al., 2010; Akbar & Vujić, 2014). This was what urged Svensson (2005) to call for the investigation of the contextual dependencies of corruption.

The role of civil society in anti-corruption in democracies is similarly complex. The expectation that societies will further democratize via civil society and thus be able to address corruption is rather more complicated. Encarnación (2012) opined that errors in understanding the conditions under which civil society can be most effective are largely due in part to the neglect of important contexts: while a strong civil society may be a transformative political force capable of fixing the political system, there is a possibility that under certain (deteriorating) political conditions, civil society may as much be a burden as a help. Similarly, while democracy should open the space up for more competition and alteration of clientelistic networks through civil society, having a democracy is not a requirement for anti-corruption (Hira, 2016). On the other hand, speedy democratization has been an appealing argument to radically change perceptions about corruption (Rothstein, 2011). Scholars argue that it is only when well-functioning democratic institutions are in place that growth and transformation can begin (Rose-Ackerman, 2007) and building institutional capacity such as the rule of law in weak states may be a promising avenue for international organizations to address corruption (Jetter & Parmeter, 2018). Indeed, while participation in civil society has been considered as one of the most promising routes to tackle corruption, functioning democratic institutions also increase the costs of corruption for both public and private partners (Bertelli et al., 2020). Such is the complicated character of the relations between corruption and democracy, and the role of civil society is situated in this context. Encarnación (2012) succinctly captured the dilemma facing governments tackling corruption: do we promote civil society development or political institutionalization?

Understanding both the contexts for corruption and the conditions under which civil society is successful in its anti-corruption role thus become more pressing. Due to the wide recognition of the complex nature of corruption, addressing its profound negative political, economic, and social consequences has prompted democratic governments and civil society to shift their strategies to holistic ones. The failure of previous anticorruption approaches is in part brought about by separate, individual interventions to tackle such a systemic problem (Gans-Morse et al., 2018). Hira (2016), for instance, noted that the focus on formal institutional incentives while ignoring culture has contributed to the failure of reforms in developing countries. This complexity seems to resonate with what qualitative comparative analysts hold regarding the import of contexts and with the configurational character of much of social life.

In this paper, I look at the configurations of corruption and the conditions that affect civil society's role in this regard, through a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of 30 democracies that did not experience autocratization from 1994–2017, a period known as the third wave of autocratization.[1] QCA, introduced by Ragin (1987), can help unpack complex causal relations and uncover necessary and sufficient conditions that account for the occurrence and non-occurrence of an outcome. As one of the first to use QCA in exploring the configurations of corruption, the objective of the paper is thus two-fold: identify the formula for the presence and absence of corruption and locate civil society in this configuration.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relevant conditions for corruption and the conditions for the anti-corruption role of civil society and provides the theoretical directional expectations of the study. After which, the methodological choices are outlined in section three. The results are presented next in the fourth section. The last section concludes.

2 The conditions for corruption and the role of civil society

Civil society's role in anti-corruption policy outcomes is thought to be conditioned by several factors, both internal (Donaghy, 2011; Uhlin, 2009; Widojoko, 2017) and external (Grimes, 2013; Themudo, 2013; Marinova, 2011). While it is true that civil society's success also depends on opportunity structures provided by the state including a certain degree of autonomy in liberal democracies, as several political opportunity structure theorists suggest (see Kriesi et al., 1992; Bernhard, 1993; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Della Porta, 2009), civil society organizations (CSOs) can also exert their influence on policy through their resources and expertise (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999; Treib et al., 2007; Schrama & Zhelyazkova, 2018).

Among their resources, CSOs have a large membership base needed to mobilize collective action. As such, civil society becomes a venue through which civic causes are amplified. As Schrama and Zhelyazkova (2018) posited, in countries where policy issues and areas attract high civic engagement through CSOs, the governments are more likely to listen and be responsive to CSOs' inputs. Apparently, civil society becomes venues for public deliberation and monitoring of public officials and institutions (Warren, 2011). Similarly, the extent to which citizens' opinions are integrated as policy inputs during deliberations point to the import of civil society's policy representation function. Indeed, democratic engagement with citizens improves trust in government by enhancing public participation and deliberation in public affairs, as research on transparency and collaborative governance show (Innes & Booher, 1999; Newman et al., 2004). Such interaction between the state

[1] As an overarching concept that covers democratic breakdowns, democratic recession, and autocratic consolidation, autocratization is defined as the substantial de-facto decline of core institutional requirements for electoral democracy (polyarchy). Considered as the reverse of democratization, autocratization can occur both in democracies and autocracies. There are three waves of autocratization: first (roughly from 1926 to 1942), second (from 1961 to 1977), and third (from 1994 to present) (see Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019).

and the citizens through civil society in collaborative governance is known to resolve seemingly intractable policy problems and produce successful policy outcomes (Booher, 2004).

Conversely, CSOs become ineffective anti-corruption actors when structural support is lacking via denial of public and legal recognition and access to policymaking (Harasymiw, 2019). This is apparent in states moving towards autocratization as they try to tighten the civil society environment in a phenomenon known as 'closing' or 'shrinking' of civic space (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014; Mendelson, 2015; Poppe & Wolff, 2017; Buyse, 2018). This is part of the general trend towards democratic backsliding, which also includes increased government pressure and harassment of mass media. That restrictions for both CSOs and media are expanding together is no surprise: corrupt governments consider free media, especially those that constrain discretionary government action, as an enemy as they lay the ground for an environment where strong collective action flourishes and where civil society is also strong (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2016). Indeed, the positive effects of anti-corruption tools are stronger in contexts of greater media freedom (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2016) and civil society's critical role as an effective anti-corruption actor particularly its ability to generate sufficient public pressure needed to monitor governments is dependent on freedom of the press (Themudo, 2013; Harasymiw, 2019). A robust civil society (ROBUSTCSO), both in terms of resources and opportunity structures, thus becomes important in anti-corruption policy outcomes. However, such an effective anti-corruption role also hinges on the contexts of wide and independent public deliberation (ENGAGE) and simultaneously extensive media freedoms (FREEMEDIA). Given the above, the first configuration for anti-corruption is thus: ROBUSTCSO*ENGAGE*FREEMEDIA.[2]

Civil society's anti-corruption role also hinges on its work on reducing political inequality (EXCLU). In several institutional settings plagued by clientelism, NGOs are usually challenged (Lewis, 2010). Tilly (2007) notes that conditions of inequality, the unequal distribution of socioeconomic and political resources, between social groups characterize state-citizen relations and the eventual process of democratization and de-democratization. Civil society enables people to build trust networks and cross-class alliances and thus aids in the reduction of political exclusion (King & Hickey, 2015; Brett, 2017) usually seen in states suffering from elite capture, co-option and personalized leaderships. Moreover, as noted above, civil society expands the democratic principle of inclusion in its policy representation function. Collective decisions are given legitimacy through inclusion and public deliberation (Warren, 2011) and trust networks are integrated into public affairs through civil society. In the context of autocratization, the decline of democratic attributes which eventually lead to less inclusive forms of governance has implications for civil society's anti-corruption work (Leiniger & Lührmann 2019). As such, the second configuration of anti-corruption is the presence of a robust civil society combined with the absence of political exclusion: ROBUSTCSO*~EXCLU.[3]

[2] In Boolean logic, and as used here, (*) denotes logical AND; (+) denotes logical OR.
[3] (*) denotes logical AND; (~) means the absence of the condition.

3 Methodology, data, and calibration

Current research on corruption and transparency, including the supposed role of civil society in this regard, are yet to formalize the configurations of corruption as set relations and in terms of causal complexity. The paper thus utilizes qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), a comparative analytical technique that has the strengths of both large-N statistical studies (variable-oriented) and small-N case study research (case-oriented) (Ragin, 1987), to fill in this gap. As a set-theoretic method that looks at relations between social phenomena as set relations (Ragin, 1987), QCA is associated with causal complexity that involves equifinality, conjunctural causation, and asymmetry (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Equifinality provides that there may be multiple paths to a given outcome – that is, several conditions or combinations of conditions can lead to an outcome. Second, conjunctural causation means that the effects of single conditions or factors depend on the presence or absence of other conditions. As such, a single condition can only lead to an outcome in combination with other conditions and not on its own. Lastly, asymmetry means that the absence of conditions that lead to the presence of an outcome may not lead to the absence of such an outcome. Thus, an analysis for the occurrence of an outcome and its non-occurrence are separately performed.

In QCA, cases are described as to their degree of membership in the set of cases that has a specified condition or outcome. This necessitates a calibration or transformation of the raw data into membership scores of cases in sets. Specifically, I use a fuzzy set QCA, which uses a coding scheme with a continuous scale from 0 to 1 with assigned thresholds for each value. Whether a case is a full member or non-member of a given condition or outcome is decided through a calibration (assignment of fuzzy set scores) based on the specification of three thresholds: full membership (1), full exclusion (0), and crossover point of maximum ambiguity (0.5). In this study, both theory-guided calibration and an indirect method of calibration were used (see Appendix A for more detail) for the conditions set and outcome set.

After having calibrated the raw data, a test of necessity and sufficiency are performed. QCA then identifies whether specified conditions or configurations of conditions (including those that are linked by the Boolean operators, AND and OR) can be considered as being consistently necessary or sufficient for a specified outcome to occur (Stevens, 2016). The results of the sufficiency test in QCA will eventually offer a complex solution (causal configuration) to corruption. Fuzzy-set QCA provides an option to minimize this complex solution to a parsimonious one based on the rules of Boolean algebra. It does so by eliminating inconsistent configurations (those whose consistency scores were below 0.75). Inconsistent causal configurations mean that while they share the same combination of causal condition, they do not lead to the given outcome.

The following cases of democracies that did not experience statistically significant autocratization (see Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019 for an extensive discussion) from the Varieties of Democracy (2018) were included in the QCA test. Originally, there were 36 such cases, however, the microstates were removed given their idiosyncrasies. This yields a total of 30 cases, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Democracies never experiencing an autocratization episode (2017)

Country	EDI 2017	Country	EDI 2017
Australia	0.88	Namibia	0.74
Botswana	0.71	New Zealand	0.88
Canada	0.86	Paraguay	0.65
Cyprus	0.84	Senegal	0.72
El Salvador	0.66	Slovakia	0.84
Finland	0.88	Slovenia	0.86
Georgia	0.74	South Africa	0.73
Ireland	0.84	Sweden	0.90
Israel	0.69	Switzerland	0.90
Jamaica	0.83	Taiwan	0.80
Japan	0.83	Timor-Leste	0.72
Lebanon	0.51	Trinidad and Tobago	0.76
Mauritius	0.83	Tunisia	0.70
Mexico	0.65	United Kingdom	0.87
Mongolia	0.68	United States of America	0.82

Note: The Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) ranges from 0 (not democratic) to 1 (fully democratic).
Source: Lührmann and Linberg (2019)

3.1 Calibration of the outcome

The outcome of interest is high perceived corruption *(CORR).* Public perception of corruption is used as an appropriate gauge of the effectiveness of anti-corruption (policy). A lag of two years was used for the outcome data, following the 2017 data from the Varieties of Democracy project. The data thus follow the country-year format.

Since the interest here is on national levels of corruption rather than particular forms of corruption, data come from the Control of Corruption from the World Governance Indicators by the World Bank. Such capture perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests. The scores range from +2.5 to –2.5 (better to poor). Based on the method originally used, for a given episode or country to be fully in the set of CORR, it must have a governance score of –1.2815 (10th percentile) and below. For it to be out of the given set, its rating must be +1.2815 (90th percentile) and above. The maximum point of ambiguity or cross-over point is 0, which is typically the

mean in a z-score distribution. The indirect method of calibration was thus used, and the resulting outcome is a continuous fuzzy set. All data sources and summary of calibration thresholds are presented in Appendix A.

3.2 Calibration of the conditions

a) Robust civil society (ROBUSTCSO)

This is a macrocondition derived from four indicators of robustness of civil society that measure both the strength of civil society as to membership (CSOparticipation) and policy (CSOconsultation) and the external environment within which they operate (CSOrepression and CSOentryexit). These ordinal scores that run from 0 (worst) to 4 (best), were calibrated with the corresponding four-value fuzzy set: 0, 0.33, 0.67 and 1, where 1 is fully in and 0 is fully out of the given set. Given that this is a macrocondition and that all four indicators must be present to have a robust civil society, the minimum score (logical AND, using the MIN function) of a case in all four indicators is used as its score for the given condition set (see Appendix Final Data for the aggregation).

b) Extensive media freedoms (FREEMEDIA)

Similar above, this condition is a macrocondition indicative of how extensive the independence of the media is. Such does not only involve the absence of government repression on the media (Govmediacensor), but also the presence of critical media (Critmedia) and the extent to which the media represents a wide range of political perspectives (Mediabias). A four-value fuzzy set is also used as thresholds as above: 0, 0.33, 0.67 and 1, where 1 is fully in and 0 is fully out of the given set.

c) Wide and independent public deliberations (ENGAGE)

This condition is a measure of the extent of public deliberations during important policy changes. The original ordinal data used six qualitative assessments with corresponding numerical scores. The same assessment was used for the six-value fuzzy set for the manual or theoretical calibration: 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1.

d) High political exclusion (EXCLU)

Unlike the conditions above which run from low to high level of democracy (worst to best), political exclusion, as a measure of denial of access to services or participation in governed spaces, runs in the opposite direction. That is, higher scores mean worse (less democratic). As an index in the V-Dem 2018 Project that ranges from 0 to 1, it is calibrated into a continuous fuzzy set where 0.90 is full inclusion and 0.10 is full exclusion. The maximum ambiguity is set to 0.5.

4 Results

After data calibration, the analyses of necessity and sufficiency were performed.[4] A condition is necessary if it passes the consistency threshold of 0.90. This would imply that without such condition, the outcome would not be achieved. Sufficiency, on the other hand, suggests that a condition or a combination of conditions is present whenever the outcome is present.

4.1 Analysis of the outcome high perceived corruption (CORR)

The test of necessity below shows that there are no conditions with a consistency score above the threshold of 0.90. As such, there are no necessary preconditions (both in their presence and absence) for the outcome. Table 2 presents the parameters of fit.

Table 2 Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome high perceived corruption

Condition	Consistency of necessity	Coverage of necessity	Relevance of necessity
ENGAGE	0.815	0.356	0.369
ROBUSTCSO	0.301	0.214	0.614
FREEMEDIA	0.860	0.371	0.364
EXCLU	0.394	0.929	0.989
~ENGAGE	0.616	0.715	0.903
~ROBUSTCSO	0.751	0.429	0.584
~FREEMEDIA	0.562	0.673	0.895
~EXCLU	0.864	0.317	0.185

~ denotes absence of the condition

After the test of necessity, the test of sufficiency was conducted. This necessitates the creation of a truth table, which shows all logically possible combinations of conditions.[5] Table 3 presents the 30 cases spread out in six out of the 16 logically possible combinations. This leaves ten logical remainders, those configurations for which there are no observed cases (rows one through 16).

[4] The 'QCA' (Dusa, 2019) and 'SetMethods' (Oana & Schneider, 2018) programming packages in R were used.

[5] The number of logically possible combinations is equal to $2^{k,}$ where k is the number of conditions (four) included in the analysis. This yields a total of 16 possible combinations.

The first column shows the row number as displayed in the R output. Columns two through four indicate the status of the four conditions used in the study where 0 is absent and 1 is present. The next column 'OUT' shows whether a given row is sufficient for the outcome to occur, where 1 means sufficient and 0 is not sufficient. The column 'incl.' displays the row's consistency score and the 'PRI' column shows the PRI[6] score. The decision for sufficiency (threshold) is based on these two scores. Although a 0.75 consistency score may typically be had, row three, with consistency of 0.758, is not included in the analysis as the corresponding PRI is rather low at 0.454. Also, given the significant gap as to the consistency scores of rows four and three, a consistency score equal to or higher than 0.941 is set as a benchmark in the study. Lastly, column 'n' refers to the number of cases in a given row and such cases are specified in the last column 'cases'.

By applying the rules of Boolean algebra to reduce their complexity, the truth table is minimized, and this resulted to conservative (see Appendix Table B.4), parsimonious (see Appendix Table B.5) and intermediate (Table 4) solutions.[7] Given the theoretical directional expectations set in section two of the paper, the intermediate solution is reported.

The intermediate solution reveals one path for the outcome high perceived corruption (CORR), which includes three of the four conditions: ~ROBUSTCSO*~ENGAGE*EXCLU. In states that have not experienced autocratization in the third wave, high perceived corruption is brought about by the absence of a robust civil society combined with the absence of wide and independent public deliberations and presence of high political exclusion. The said solution has a high consistency ('Cons.' column) of 0.945. The coverage, which indicates how much of the outcome is in line with the solution, ('Raw cov.' column) at 0.384 is rather low. Only two of the 30 cases are covered by the theoretical model or the solution formula: Lebanon and El Salvador.

[6] PRI stands for proportional reduction in inconsistency, an alternate measure of the consistency of subset relations, and only relevant to fuzzy sets (Pappas & Woodside, 2021). PRI consistency is used to avoid simultaneous subset relations of configurations in both the outcome and the absence of the outcome. The PRI score should be high and ideally not too far from raw consistency score (e.g. 0.75). Configurations with less than 0.5 PRI scores indicate significant inconsistency (Greckhamer et al., 2018, p. 489).

[7] The conservative solution is based only on empirically observed evidence. The parsimonious solution is based on assumptions about the logical remainders which contribute to parsimony. The intermediate solution is based only on those simplifying assumptions that at the same time represent easy counterfactuals. The intermediate solution is often but not necessarily always less complex than the conservative solution and more complex than the parsimonious solution (Paustyan, 2021).

Table 3 Truth table, outcome high perceived corruption

Row	E	R	F	EX	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
2	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.952	0.856	Lebanon
4	0	0	1	1	1	1	0.941	0.84	El Salvador
3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.758	0.454	Paraguay
9	1	0	0	0	0	2	0.689	0.34	Israel, South Africa
11	1	0	1	0	0	10	0.538	0.279	Australia, Botswana, Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, Namibia, Senegal, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago
15	1	1	1	0	0	15	0.258	0.072	Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America
1	0	0	0	0	?	0			
5	0	1	0	0	?	0			
6	0	1	0	1	?	0			
7	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	1	1	1	?	0			
10	1	0	0	1	?	0			
12	1	0	1	1	?	0			
13	1	1	0	0	?	0			
14	1	1	0	1	?	0			
16	1	1	1	1	?	0			

Consistency cut-off: 0.90
E: ENGAGE
R: ROBUSTCSO
F: FREEMEDIA
EX: EXCLU

Table 4 Intermediate solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
~ROBUSTCSO*~ENGAGE*EXCLU	0.945	0.864	0.348		Lebanon, El Salvador
Solution	0.945	0.864	0.348		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

4.2 Analysis of the outcome absence of high perceived corruption (~CORR)

Results of the test of necessity for ~CORR are presented in Table 5. While one condition (~EXCLU) has a very high consistency at 0.986 and a moderate coverage at 0.778, its relevance of necessity (RoN) which is close to 0.5 could be a reason for concern as it can indicate that the necessity relation is trivial (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).

Table 5 Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

Condition	Consistency of necessity	Coverage of necessity	Relevance of necessity
ENGAGE	0.886	0.832	0.692
ROBUSTCSO	0.536	0.832	0.875
FREEMEDIA	0.873	0.811	0.656
EXCLU	0.134	0.680	0.953
~ENGAGE	0.315	0.786	0.925
~ROBUSTCSO	0.488	0.600	0.667
~FREEMEDIA	0.323	0.832	0.943
~EXCLU	0.986	0.778	0.412

~ denotes absence of the condition

The following is the generated truth table used for the Boolean minimization in the analysis of sufficiency. A 0.80 cut-off was used, retaining 27 out of the 30 cases in the analysis. Row three (Paraguay) with a consistency of 0.798 is not included (even when a 0.75 cut-off is acceptable) given that PRI is rather low at 0.546.

Table 6 Truth table, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

Row	E	R	F	EX	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
15	1	1	1	0	1	15	0.906	0.883	Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America
9	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.831	0.641	Israel, South Africa
11	1	0	1	0	1	10	0.808	0.7	Australia, Botswana, Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, Namibia, Senegal, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago
3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.798	0.546	Paraguay
2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.715	0.144	Lebanon

Table 6 *(continued)*

Row	E	R	F	EX	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
4	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.692	0.16	El Salvador
1	0	0	0	0	?	0			
5	0	1	0	0	?	0			
6	0	1	0	1	?	0			
7	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	1	1	1	?	0			
10	1	0	0	1	?	0			
12	1	0	1	1	?	0			
13	1	1	0	0	?	0			
14	1	1	0	1	?	0			
16	1	1	1	1	?	0			

Consistency cut-off: 0.80
E: ENGAGE
R: ROBUSTCSO
F: FREEMEDIA
EX: EXCLU

The minimization process resulted to conservative (see Appendix Table B.6), parsimonious (see Appendix Table B.7), and intermediate (Table 7) solutions.

Table 7 Intermediate solution, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
ENGAGE*~EXCLU	0.839	0.785	0.883		Israel, South Africa, Australia, Botswana, Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, Namibia, Senegal, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America
Solution	0.839	0.785	0.883		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

The formula for the outcome absence of high perceived corruption is the presence of wide and independent public deliberations combined with the absence of high political exclusion (ENGAGE* ~EXCLU). It has a high consistency score of 0.839 and a high coverage of 0.883.

4.3 Robustness checks

To look at the robustness of the tests carried out, a sensitivity analysis is done to check if changes in the calibration, raw consistency scores, and case selection, produce substantively different results (Wagemann & Schneider, 2015). A sensitivity check that involves alternative calibration strategies for the condition EXCLU and the outcome was performed to assess the robustness of the results, given the lack of agreement on thresholds for when a case is highly corrupt and is characterized by high political exclusion. Both slightly higher and lower calibration strategies were used (see Appendix Table C.1). As Skaaning (2011) notes, 'while many other breakpoints are possible, they are placed at levels near the original anchors. Only minor changes are made to ensure that similar theoretical justifications could apply to the original as well as the new anchors defining set-memberships' (p. 395). The test reveals that the results for the outcome high perceived corruption in the original test are robust. The intermediate solution formula derived from the first alternative calibration is the same with that of the original test. The slightly lower alternative calibration features a solution formula that is not so much different from the original (with one condition missing but with the same configuration). For the outcome absence of high perceived corruption, while the results from the slightly lower alternative calibration are the same with the original test, the slightly higher alternative calibration reveals that ~EXCLU is sufficient by itself (it does not combine with ENGAGE unlike in the original test and in the slightly lower alternative calibration).

It was not advisable to perform a sensitivity test that involves a different raw consistency cut-off from the original test because of the low PRI score (which means higher inconsistency) of the rows that could have been included if only based on the consistency score of 0.75 above, in both the presence and absence of the outcome (see Truth Tables). Similarly, while providing as much diversity to the outcome, the cases selected are deemed to be homogeneous as they are those that have not had a statistically significant decline in their democratic attributes in the given autocratization period. Although it might be sound to, for example, have the cases of non-autocratizing, consolidated democracies with high-income as alternative cases, these are not diverse when it comes to the outcome. QCA is applicable in cases with such diversity in the outcome, after all, difference-making can only be had in such an instance. Nonetheless, for future research, an alternative, more nuanced case selection strategy in this line can be done.

5 Discussion and conclusion

Following the logic of QCA this study reports the pathways to corruption in non-autocratizing states. The paper also intended to locate the role of civil society in anti-corruption (whether it appears on the configurations of corruption) and whether such a role is conditional on the presence or absence of other conditions, given the context of states that have not had an autocratization episode.

While such a role is indeed present as the absence of a robust civil society combines with the absence of wide and public deliberations and simultaneously with the presence of high political exclusion to produce the outcome of high perceived corruption, the coverage

of such a solution formula is rather very low. Only two (2) out of the thirty (30) countries that did not experience autocratization were covered by the said solution. Despite the high consistency of such a solution, the weak coverage raises concern about the causal import of the pathway. Interesting as it is, it is in the sufficiency analysis for the outcome absence of high perceived corruption that the role of civil society could not be located. As the intermediate solution provides, the pathway for the absence of high perceived corruption is the presence of wide and independent public deliberations combined with the absence of high political exclusion. Not only was the solution consistent; it also covered more cases as shown by the high coverage score.

The results for the outcome absence of high perceived corruption are striking although not surprising as it is in line with the foundations of QCA. The results herein show that the absence of high perceived corruption (in non-autocratizing states) is not brought about by robust civil society organizations (both in their presence or absence, and/or in combination with other conditions) but by the presence of wide and independent public deliberations combined with the absence of high political exclusion. One is prompted to ask, could this very well be indicative of the differential impacts of civil society? Could this perhaps point to the different roles that civil society organizations play in anti-corruption in different contexts, of autocratization or non-autocratization, in this case? Or does this relate to the general political atmosphere that characterizes much of state-civil society relations in these countries?

For instance, Yabanci (2019) held that in competitive authoritarian (CA) regimes, dissenting social forces turn to civil society as they have no practical access to political institutions to democratically challenge the government. Even while CA regimes extensively violate these democratic practices and political institutions, unlike closed autocracies, they seek to engage with civil society rather than eliminate it as they cannot ignore societal consent and legitimacy and rule by pure coercion (p.286). A caveat exists, however: the growth and diversification of civil society in such regimes cannot be a guarantee for its ability to become agents of democratic change (Giersdorf & Croissant, 2011; Yabanci, 2019). The existence of a co-opted civil society, or the politicization of the same, shows that the roles of the CSOs are thus contingent to the preferences of the government. Moreover, the complicated relationship between state and civil society may undermine the supposed positive impact of civil engagement in anti-corruption. As Zaloznaya et al. (2018) posited, the government and civil society have fundamentally incompatible goals as the former approaches the issue of anti-corruption and reform from the point of self-preservation while the latter seeks to directly challenge the elites. In their study, they claim that under certain conditions, active civil engagement produces suboptimal outcomes: under the pretext of faux collaboration (façade of cooperation) and non-collaborative co-presence (shared governance role without compromise-based solutions), civil society may actually hinder long-term goals of anti-corruption, including democratization and effective governance.

But how about in contexts of non-autocratization? Why is it, for instance, that the presence of a robust civil society organization (by itself or in combination with other conditions) does not necessarily lead to the absence of high perceived corruption, given the solution formula discussed above? Most of the countries in the list are highly consolidated democracies and advanced industrialized countries. What roles, if any, do CSOs play in anti-corruption in governance contexts where citizens have access to stable democratic

political institutions, where citizens are empowered, and where collective action is fostered, among others? These are among the bases for sustainable development and control of corruption, which Mungiu-Pippidi (2016) claimed are rather long term and which few donor agencies pursue to address corruption in the case of neo-patrimonial systems. Corruption levels are quite low once all democratic components are strong, noted McMann et al. (2019). But could it then be that in the case of non-autocratizing states, the anti-corruption effects of other components of democracy (and in combination with each other) are more crucial than civil society's? Or is it possible that civil society's anti-corruption role is rather indirect, as manifested in its work on two relevant aspects in democracies: enhancement of political participation through public deliberation and reduction of political inequality? One thing remains for sure, and it is consistent with the underpinnings of QCA: apart from institutions that support wider and independent public deliberations and that address systemic political inequality, there must be several other conditions and configurations not covered here that can possibly be a pathway for the outcome absence of corruption.

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Appendices

A. Calibration and data sources

CONDITIONS/OUTCOME	Measure/Questions	Calibration	Data source
CONDITIONS Macrocondition: 1. ROBUSTCSO			
CSOrepression	Does the government attempt to repress CSO? 0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. 1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). 2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in response 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts. 3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. 4: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.	(0 worst to 4 best) (less democratic to more democratic) 1: (4) 0.67: (3) 0.33: (2) 0: (0) and (1)	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018

CONDITIONS/OUTCOME	Measure/Questions	Calibration	Data source
CSOentryexit	To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations into public life? 0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity. 1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity. 2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience. 3: Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence. 4: Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.	(0 worst to 4 best) 1: (4) 0.67: (3) 0.33: (2) 0: (0) and (1)	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018

CONDITIONS/OUTCOME	Measure/Questions	Calibration	Data source
CSOconsultation	Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members? 0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies. 1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account. 2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.	(0 worst to 2 best) 1: (2) CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and are routinely consulted by policy makers. 0: (0) and (1) CSO are not consulted or are consulted to some degree but CSOs are only one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018
CSOparticipation	Which of these best describes the involvement of people in CSOs? 0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary. 1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them. 2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal. 3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.	(0 worst to 3 best) 1: (3) Many diverse CSOs exist, it is normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them 0.67: (2) There are many diverse CSOs; popular involvement is minimal 0.33: (1) There are voluntary CSOs but few people are active in them 0: (0) state-sponsored CSOs, large people maybe active but participation is not purely voluntary	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018

CONDITIONS/OUTCOME	Measure/Questions	Calibration	Data source
Macrocondition: 2. FREEMEDIA			
Critmedia	Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government? 0: None. 1: Only a few marginal outlets. 2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do. 3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.	(0 worst to 3 best) 1: (3) All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally 0.67: (2) Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do 0.33: (1) Only a few marginal outlets 0: (0) None	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018
Govmediacensor	Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media? 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine. 1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine. 2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues. 3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues. 4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.	(0 worst to 4 best) 1: (4) absent 0.67: (3) 0.33: (1) and (2) 0: (0) present	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018

CONDITIONS/OUTCOME	Measure/Questions	Calibration	Data source
Mediabias	Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives? 0: The major media represent only the government's perspective. 1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party. 2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society. 3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.	(0 worst to 3 best) 1: (3) 0.67: (2) 0.33: (1) 0: (0)	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018
3. ENGAGE	When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations? 0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed. 1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them. 2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites. 3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas. 4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and varies with different issue-areas. 5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighbourhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.	(0 worst to 5 best) 1: (5) Large numbers of non-elite groups and ordinary people discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighbourhoods, or in streets; grassroots deliberation common and unconstrained 0.8: (4) Public deliberation actively encouraged; broad segment of non-elite group often participate and varies with different issue-areas	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018

CONDITIONS/OUTCOME	Measure/Questions	Calibration	Data source
		0.6: (3) Public deliberation actively encouraged; some autonomous non-elite participate but confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tend to be the same across issue-areas 0.4: (2) Public deliberation is not repressed but infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites 0.2: (1) Some limited public deliberation allowed but the public below the elite level is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them 0: (0) Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed	

CONDITIONS/OUTCOME	Measure/Questions	Calibration	Data source
5. EXCLU	Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better. Interval, from low to high (0-1) The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl), access to public services by political group (v2peapspol), access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol), and access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbpol).	Continuous fuzzy set (0-1) 0.90 is fully in 0.5= cross-over point 0.10 fully out	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018
OUTCOME			
CORR	Runs from -2.5 to 2.5, higher scores mean better corruption condition. (Use public perceptions of political corruption as an appropriate gauge of the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy)	1= -1.2815 (10^{th} percentile) 0.5=0 0= +1.2815 (90^{th} percentile)	World Bank's World Governance Indicator Control of Corruption

B. Sufficiency Tests

Table B.1 Raw Data

Country	R				F			E	EX	C
	CSOr	CSOe	CSOc	CSOp	CM	GMC	MB			
Australia	4	4	1	3	3	4	3	4	0.011	1.81
Botswana	3	3	1	2	2	3	3	3	0.258	0.71
Canada	4	3	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.026	1.77
Cyprus	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.102	0.6
El Salvador	3	3	1	2	3	3	3	2	0.584	-0.55
Finland	4	3	2	3	3	3	3	5	0.027	2.15
Georgia	4	4	1	3	2	3	3	4	0.091	0.67
Ireland	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.031	1.46
Israel	3	3	1	3	3	2	3	3	0.368	0.81
Jamaica	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.118	−0.06
Japan	4	4	1	2	3	3	3	4	0.048	1.48
Lebanon	3	3	1	3	3	2	3	2	0.521	−1.16
Mauritius	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.113	0.32
Mexico	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	0.277	−0.82
Mongolia	3	4	1	2	2	3	3	4	0.291	−0.44
Namibia	4	4	1	2	3	3	3	3	0.204	0.37
New Zealand	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.055	2.17
Paraguay	3	3	1	2	2	3	2	2	0.425	−0.83

Country	R				F			E	EX	C
	CSOr	CSOe	CSOc	CSOp	CM	GMC	MB			
Senegal	4	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	0.23	0.05
Slovakia	3	3	2	2	3	4	3	3	0.09	0.33
Slovenia	4	4	2	3	2	4	3	3	0.037	0.91
South Africa	4	4	1	3	3	2	3	3	0.356	0.08
Sweden	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	5	0.022	2.12
Switzerland	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	5	0.023	1.98
Taiwan	4	3	1	3	3	3	3	4	0.058	1.05
Timor-Leste	3	3	1	2	2	3	3	3	0.454	−0.38
Trinidad and Tobago	4	3	1	3	2	3	3	4	0.199	−0.19
Tunisia	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	5	0.178	−0.08
United Kingdom	4	3	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.08	1.77
United States of America	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.03	1.22

Legend:
R: ROBUSTCSO
- CSOr: CSOrepression
- CSOe: CSOentry
- CSOc: CSOconsult
- CSOp: CSOparticip

F: MEDIAFREE
- CM: Critmedia
- GMC: Govmediacensor
- MB: Mediabias

E: ENGAGE
EX: EXCLU
C: CORR

Table B.2 Calibrated Data

Country	R				F			E	EX	C
	CSOr	CSOe	CSOc	CSOp	CM	GMC	MB			
Australia	4	4	1	3	3	4	3	4	0.011	1.81
Botswana	3	3	1	2	2	3	3	3	0.258	0.71
Canada	4	3	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.026	1.77
Cyprus	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.102	0.6
El Salvador	3	3	1	2	3	3	3	2	0.584	-0.55
Finland	4	3	2	3	3	3	3	5	0.027	2.15
Georgia	4	4	1	3	2	3	3	4	0.091	0.67
Ireland	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.031	1.46
Israel	3	3	1	3	3	2	3	3	0.368	0.81
Jamaica	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.118	-0.06
Japan	4	4	1	2	3	3	3	4	0.048	1.48
Lebanon	3	3	1	3	3	2	3	2	0.521	−1.16
Mauritius	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.113	0.32
Mexico	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	0.277	-0.82
Mongolia	3	4	1	2	2	3	3	4	0.291	-0.44
Namibia	4	4	1	2	3	3	3	3	0.204	0.37
New Zealand	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.055	2.17
Paraguay	3	3	1	2	2	3	2	2	0.425	−0.83

Country	R				F			E	EX	C
	CSOr	CSOe	CSOc	CSOp	CM	GMC	MB			
Senegal	4	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	0.23	0.05
Slovakia	3	3	2	2	3	4	3	3	0.09	0.33
Slovenia	4	4	2	3	2	4	3	3	0.037	0.91
South Africa	4	4	1	3	3	2	3	3	0.356	0.08
Sweden	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	5	0.022	2.12
Switzerland	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	5	0.023	1.98
Taiwan	4	3	1	3	3	3	3	4	0.058	1.05
Timor-Leste	3	3	1	2	2	3	3	3	0.454	−0.38
Trinidad and Tobago	4	3	1	3	2	3	3	4	0.199	−0.19
Tunisia	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	5	0.178	−0.08
United Kingdom	4	3	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.08	1.77
United States of America	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.03	1.22

Legend:
R: ROBUSTCSO
- CSOr: CSOrepression
- CSOe: CSOentry
- CSOc: CSOconsult
- CSOp: CSOparticip

F: MEDIAFREE
- CM: Critmedia
- GMC: Govmediacensor
- MB: Mediabias

E: ENGAGE
EX: EXCLU
C: CORR

Table B.3 Final Data*

Country	E	R	F	EX	C
Australia	0.8	0	1	0.02660796	0.015386674
Botswana	0.6	0	0.67	0.14413213	0.163648002
Canada	0.8	0.67	1	0.02962224	0.016842876
Cyprus	0.8	1	0.67	0.05070396	0.201235509
El Salvador	0.4	0	0.67	0.64983914	0.77966371
Finland	1	0.67	0.67	0.02983456	0.007104138
Georgia	0.8	0	0.67	0.04694532	0.176618767
Ireland	0.8	1	1	0.03069872	0.033745846
Israel	0.6	0	0.33	0.27454878	0.13457526
Jamaica	0.8	1	1	0.0566824	0.534410276
Japan	0.8	0	0.67	0.03464923	0.032279137
Lebanon	0.4	0	0.33	0.53856899	0.934946205
Mauritius	0.8	1	0.67	0.05474624	0.324044121
Mexico	0.6	0.67	0.67	0.1622577	0.868078296
Mongolia	0.8	0	0.67	0.17675789	0.733209188
Namibia	0.6	0	0.67	0.10166273	0.299405452
New Zealand	0.8	1	1	0.0364147	0.006787234
Paraguay	0.4	0	0.67	0.36538143	0.870687348
Senegal	0.6	0	0.67	0.12052199	0.471310916
Slovakia	0.6	0.67	1	0.04661707	0.319031842
Slovenia	0.6	1	0.67	0.03204054	0.109988178
South Africa	0.6	0	0.33	0.25730983	0.45417594
Sweden	1	1	1	0.02878749	0.007607238
Switzerland	1	1	1	0.02899401	0.010463457
Taiwan	0.8	0	0.67	0.03719756	0.082221978
Timor-Leste	0.6	0	0.67	0.41614705	0.70539182
Trinidad and Tobago	0.8	0	0.67	0.09835031	0.607437511
Tunisia	1	1	0.67	0.08546777	0.54582406
United Kingdom	0.8	0.67	1	0.04345255	0.016842876
United States of America	0.8	1	0.67	0.03048043	0.057155083

* The macroconditions have been created from the conditions using the MIN function (Logical AND)

Legend:

E: ENGAGE; R: ROBUSTCSO; F: FREEMEDIA; EX: EXCLU; C: CORR

Table B.4 Conservative solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
~ENGAGE* ~ROBUSTCSO* EXCLU	0.945	0.864	0.348		Lebanon, El Salvador
Overall solution	0.945	0.864	0.348		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

Table B.5 Parsimonious solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
EXCLU	0.929	0.819	0.394		Lebanon, El Salvador
Solution	0.929	0.819	0.394		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

Table B.6 Conservative solution, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
ENGAGE* ~ROBUSTCSO* ~EXCLU	0.795	0.695	0.434	0.043	Israel, South Africa, Australia, Botswana, Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, Namibia, Senegal, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago
ENGAGE* FREEMEDIA* ~EXCLU	0.859	0.807	0.813	0.421	Australia, Botswana, Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, Namibia, Senegal, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America
Solution	0.849	0.796	0.855		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

Table B.7 Parsimonious solution, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
ENGAGE	0.832	0.778	0.886		Israel, South Africa, Australia, Botswana, Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, Namibia, Senegal, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America
Solution	0.832	0.778	0.886		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

C. Robustness tests

C.1. Test 1 Calibration

Table C.1 Robustness test set membership scores calibration

Conditions*/Outcome	Full membership	Cross-over point	Full non-membership
CORR(i)	−1.2815 (90th percentile)	0 (50th percentile)	1.2815 (10th percentile)
CORR(ii)	−1.6448 (95th percentile)	0.1256 (55th percentile)	1.6448 (5th percentile)
CORR (iii)	−1.0364 (85th percentile)	−0.1256 (45th percentile)	1.0364 (15th percentile)
EXCLU (i)	0.90	0.50	0.10
EXCLU (ii)	0.95	0.55	0.05
EXCLU (iii)	0.85	0.45	0.15

Note: (i): original analysis; (ii) first alternative calibration; (iii) second alternative calibration

Table C.2 Summary of solution formula derived from the alternative calibrations, outcome high perceived corruption

Calibration	Parsimonious solution	Intermediate solution
i	EXCLU	~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO*EXCLU
ii	EXCLU	~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO*EXCLU
iii	EXCLU	~ROBUSTCSO*EXCLU

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND;

Note: (i): original analysis; (ii) first alternative calibration; (iii) second alternative calibration

Table C.3 Summary of solution formula derived from the alternative calibrations, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

Calibration	Parsimonious solution	Intermediate solution
i	ENGAGE	ENGAGE*~HIGHPOLEXCLU
ii	~EXCLU	~EXCLU
iii	ENGAGE*~EXCLU	ENGAGE*~EXCLU

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND;

Note: (i): original analysis; (ii) first alternative calibration; (iii) second alternative calibration