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Creating Suspicion and Vigilance. Using Enemy Images to Hinder Mobilization

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Abstract

In recent years, many theoretical and empirical analyses about the changing regimes of Central and Eastern Europe have been written, pointing out the authoritarian tendencies and radicalization in the region. Hungary is a significant case in the changing landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. The right-wing government rules the country with incontestable force, despising and disrespecting the norms of liberal democracies. Although the general impression is that the government has such a strong grip on power that resisting it is futile, in fact, it only enjoys only the support of 30 per cent of Hungarian citizens. Thus, it would be reasonable to expect the opposition to be able to effectively mobilize against the regime. In reality, no political opponent seems to stand a chance of defeating it. In order to explain why this is so, we focus on the way Orbán constantly creates images of ‘the enemy’ that keep alive an atmosphere of vigilance that blocks the efforts of critical actors to efficiently mobilize citizens. Since the political system in Hungary is highly centralized, the Prime-Minister’s speeches epitomize the logic and ideology of the regime. Our aim is to understand the mechanism through which the dominant political actors frame the enemy in a system of images, thereby creating an environment where critical actors are stripped of the resources needed to mobilize against them.

Keywords: Framing, Hungary, Orbán speeches, public discourse, enemy.

...hatred only eats away at a person's intelligence and conscience, and an enemy mentality can poison the spirit of an entire people, lead to cruel and lethal internecine combat, destroy a society's tolerance and humanity, and block a nation's progress toward freedom and democracy (Liu Xiaobo – Nobel Laureate)

1. INTRODUCTION

Hungary's right-wing government rules the country with incontestable force, despising and disrespecting the norms of liberal democratic politics; for this, it is the subject of constant international criticism.¹ Although there are numerous symptoms of the illiberalism of the government, in this paper we focus on the way the government uses enemy images to buttress its rule by linking internal enemies with external ones, thereby seeking to dominate framing strategies.

The tactic of using enemy images to create support is as old as politics. When Bodin (1576) discussed the topic, he referred back to the Romans who relied on such a strategy. Promoting the threat to a community from external enemies offers the perfect means for sidelining domestic discontent and diminishing dissatisfaction about the incompetence of incumbents to properly govern a country. Bodin's approach refers to the traditional view of the enemy, which is connected to warfare: here, the enemy is external, visible and clearly threatens the existence of the community. With the rise of the modern state, the boundaries between peace and warfare are much less clear. Electoral politics based on party competition tempts actors to rely on negative campaigns for triumphing over their adversaries, an approach which goes hand in hand with framing one's competitors as enemies. Playing with the opponent-enemy distinction is becoming part and parcel of everyday post-cold war politics in Europe (Schwab, 1987; Szabó, 2004).

Although using enemy images has always been a part of politics, we nevertheless contend that it is important to analyze the mechanisms through which references to external enemies are linked with the identification of domestic critics as internal enemies – most likely working for foreign interests, using foreign support. During the past decade, Brussels, the European Union, the IMF, immigrants, foreign banks and speculators such as George Soros have been called the enemies of Hungary, and an increasingly belligerent tone has also characterized attitudes towards domestic opponents. Although this gradual radicalization of Hungarian politics has

¹ Although the general impression is that the government's strong grip on power makes resistance futile, in fact it only enjoys the support of 30 per cent of all Hungarian citizens. This 30 per cent represents 50 per cent of individuals certain to vote. Support for other parties lags far behind. For example, the second largest parties are capable of mobilizing only around 15-20 per cent of people certain to vote. Thus, even though the government is a long way from enjoying the support of two-thirds of voters, the opposition has not managed to get successfully organized or present a credible alternative. While numerous explanations are provided for this in the paper, we suggest that one reason is the difficulty of mobilizing citizens in the first place because this hinders the appearance and strengthening of new political organizations. For data about support for parties, see: Tárki: Formálódó Pártpreferenciák (*Evolving Party Preferences*) http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2017/kitekint/20170130_valasztas.html Accessed: 01-04-2017.

been pointed out by many (Biró-Nagy et al., 2013; Krekó and Mayer, 2015; Polyakova and Shekhovstov, 2016; Pytlas and Kossack, 2015) we contend that it is important to scrutinize the mechanisms of the construction of the enemy that this involves.

This article is therefore an exploratory study that seeks to analyze the use of enemy images in the recent main speeches of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán before 2015. We intentionally limit ourselves to the period before 2015 because as of now (late 2017) the Hungarian government's rhetoric is nothing but a permanent naming of new enemies who are attacking the country. Putting it differently, we contend that for studying the mechanism of 'enemy construction' investigation of a period when the rhetoric was not so intense is more appropriate than using a period when on every corner of Budapest one may bump into a giant anti-George Soros/immigration poster. In addition to studying this mechanism, we are also interested in whether the situation has always been similar (that is, did Orbán talk like this in his first speeches in 2010?). In answering these questions, it is important to highlight that do not seek to explain *why* a particular enemy image is chosen but rather to see *how* enemy images are used, what framing mechanisms Orbán relies on, and how internal and external enemies are linked rhetorically.

We believe that it is important to realize that one aim of the combative rhetoric of populist political actors is to undermine the legitimacy of opponents and thereby limit their opportunity to successfully mobilize against their rule. If a regime manages to frame its critics as 'enemies' and 'foreign agents', while at the same time citizens worry about showing their discontent,² an environment may be successfully created where critical actors are stripped of the resources needed to mobilize against it. While recent protests in Hungary in support of Central European University³ and in opposition to the law against civil organizations suggest that there are still some citizens not completely discouraged from showing their discontent, it is important to see that the whole campaign against CEU and NGOs is the epitome of the logic of regime-buttressing through use of a nationalist rhetoric that identifies nation-threatening enemies both outside and within. By constantly identifying newer enemies, and by maintaining an atmosphere of vigilance and suspicion, the regime creates a Manichean domestic political divide that hinders critical actors from efficiently mobilizing citizens.

After introducing how 'making enemies' contributes to the domination of the public sphere, we describe the corpus we work with and the methods we use to study internal and external enemies. Next, we show how the two are gradually linked, and also illustrate the three important framing mechanisms/strategies in Orbán's speeches, which we identify as *ambiguity*; links made to *shared historical grievances*, and *allusions to conspiracies* against Hungary. Finally, in our conclusion we add a few comments about Popper and his notion of the enemies of open society. We do so

² A survey conducted by our research team in 2014 clearly showed that the fear of consequences significantly hindered citizen mobilization: around one third (35 per cent) of respondents told us that this fear plays a significant role in their staying away from protests (MTA-ELTE Peripato 2014).

³ For detailed information, visit the description of events and collection of URLs at: <https://www.ceu.edu/category/istandwithceuf> Accessed: 02-05-2017, and <http://www.cka.hu/blog/2017/04/12/hosok-vetoja-koszonjuk-a-reszvetelt-es-a-tamogatast/> . Accessed: 02-05-2017.

because Orbán has recently picked Soros as the nation's (and even Europe's) arch-enemy; a man who is planning to import millions of immigrants into Europe. While this claim about Soros's objectives is blatantly untrue – being pure populism – we nevertheless believe that Orbán's opposition is not only rhetorical because his regime is founded on principles that outright reject the ideals of the open society promoted by Popper and Soros. In fact, we suggest that perhaps the illiberalism Orbán talks about is best captured by what Popper identifies as closed society or tribalism.

Finally, we quote here a passage by Popper that offers a penetrating insight into the way populist leaders of a closed societies maintain their rule. Discussing enemies of an open society, Popper pointed out that a popular leader, while preaching freedom, actually brings the people to tyranny and names ever newer enemies to buttress the legitimacy of their rule: '*The people who have hailed him [the popular leader] first as the champion of freedom are soon enslaved; and then they must fight for him, in 'one war after another which he must stir up [...] because he must make the people feel the need of a general'* (Popper, 2013[1947]:42).⁴

2. CONTROLLING THE DISCOURSE BY USING ENEMY IMAGES

In recent years, voices suggesting that a new type of regime is being born in Eastern Europe, with the emergence of strong leaders, such as Viktor Orbán, have been getting louder. Many of these pieces of work find it puzzling that, following their 1989-1990 post-communist transition towards Western-type liberal democracy, these states today are shifting in a different direction. Csillag and Szelényi (2015) argue that the recently emerged strong leaders of post-communist countries are establishing managed illiberal democracies in which property relations are increasingly neo-prebendal in style.⁵ Varga and Freyberg-Inan (2012) identify these new systems as 'selective democracies', meaning that governing actors maintain democratic rule on the surface, but nevertheless rely on exclusionary strategies. First, opponents are presented as being excluded from the polity, then democratic rules 'are applied to specific groups within it who have entrenched themselves in power' (Varga and Freyberg-Inan, 2012: 351) Although these theories approach the issue from different angles, they have one element in common: they suggest that in order to succeed, these strong leaders need to control resources more firmly than their colleagues in Western-type democracies do. Although for Csillag and Szelényi, resources primarily refer to property (that is, control of ownership rights, and the power to allocate and redistribute resources), studies on mobilization tend to understand resources more broadly. In social movement studies, resources typically also include legitimation, prestige, networks and supporters. Along these lines, similarly to Varga and Freyberg Inan (2012), we also consider *the ability to enter the political discourse* and the *ability to engage others in political debate* as a resource, since it is a precondition of being

⁴ See: the longer quote later in the text.

⁵ In a neo-prebendal system of property relations, property is distributed by the political leader to loyal servants in the form of rewards for services, and thus can be taken back when the required service is no longer provided, or not in sufficient quality.

recognized as a legitimate member of the political community. Due to its constant naming of critics as enemies of the government – and foremost, as enemies of the nation –, a government can deprive its critics of their right to speak, and thus of the legitimacy to challenge its rule.

While democracies involve conflict and competition, political adversaries are usually considered opponents, not enemies. In fact, democracy is built on the recognition of ‘the other’ as a legitimate critic, struggling similarly for the well-being of the community, albeit having different ideas about how to create the common good. Yet, this is an idealized image as even in democracies actors can be tempted to challenge the legitimacy of their adversaries. The most powerful means of doing this is to strip them of their legitimacy by excluding them from the political community (Szabó, 2007; Schmitt, 2008).

A political community is typically understood as a collective of individuals who possess citizenship of a country, with this citizenship more or less overlapping that of the inhabitants of the country who share the same cultural or ethnic background. However, this definition of a political community is not clear-cut, and one of the main points of contestation in politics involves the definition of the borders and qualities of the political community (see for example: Anderson 2006; Schmitt 2008) and the creation of cohesion between those defined as its members. Social psychology studies also emphasize that the identification of common enemies may trigger group formation and group cohesion (see: Gerő et al., 2017; Oppenheimer, 2006). Referring to enemy images evokes strong emotions by suggesting that the internal core of members is threatened by an existential threat from outsiders, although not necessarily *only* from the outside because there may also be accomplices within. The two types of enemy – external and internal – have different roles in politics: the former serves as a threat, a form of oppression, while the external enemy calls upon the ‘community’ to act.

Although relying on enemy construction may provide strong legitimization for the politicians who rely on it, the danger is that once the threat is eliminated or disappears, politicians can easily lose the legitimacy they earlier obtained (Ferguson et al., 2014). Thus, politicians who rely on such rhetoric may feel the need to keep the image of the enemy alive by identifying or constructing either an unbeatable enemy – which is always at hand – or by finding ever newer enemies (Ferguson et al., 2014). Thus it is reasonable to assume that enemy construction is an ever-intensifying process.

Along these lines we formulate two assumptions to drive our analysis of Orbán’s speeches:

Assumption I. We assume that internal and external enemies are connected in the Hungarian Prime minister’s speeches. The subject of our interest is about the mechanisms and framing strategies used by Orbán to connect these two types of enemies.

Assumption II. We assume that, as Popper suggests, there is a need for incumbents to identify ever-newer enemies, and that the level of radicalization of rhetoric increases with time (it is one thing to have this general impression, but another to see if this is actually true of Orbán’s speeches: Orbán is known for his

double-talk, always tailoring his speeches to the audience. A ‘peacock dance’⁶ – as he once called the art of diplomacy).

3. THE ANALYSIS OF SPEECHES - METHODOLOGY

In our study we rely on frame analysis, an analytical approach developed by Benford and Snow (2000) for understanding strategic action by political actors. The approach involves interpreting collective experiences through a meaning-creation process. The authors identify three core framing tasks: the construction of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames: the first identifies the problem, the second the solution, the third tries to evoke the motivation for joining in the action that will lead to the solution.

To identify the indicators of the framing processes of the governing party, we turn to the speeches of Viktor Orbán, the acting Prime Minister of Hungary and president of Fidesz. Orbán is one of the founding fathers of the party and has served as its leader almost continuously throughout its 28-year history.

Orbán’s speeches contain all the framing elements listed above. Orbán is diagnostic when he identifies the problems of the past, and what Hungarians have inherited. This material includes both references to Hungarian history and typical mindset, but also the past eight years of socialist rule.⁷ The second frame involves descriptions of the unfolding dangers and challenges the Hungarian nation faces, from the encroaching of Brussels and the IMF to liberals and liberal ideas that threaten the future of Hungary. Finally, speeches tend to be visionary and prophetic avowals that call on supporters to be vigilant and suspicious, and to stick together because the enemy – frequently unspecified, perhaps hidden – is at the gates. Naming/creating enemies is simultaneously a component of both diagnostic and motivational frames: It identifies threats, and by personalizing them, is more effective at evoking strong emotions such as fear or hostility (Berkowitz, 1994).

As János Kornai claims, the political system in Hungary is highly centralized. ‘The executive and legislative branches are no longer separate; both are controlled by Prime Minister Orbán, who has positioned himself at the very pinnacle of power’ (Kornai, 2015: 35).

In such a centralized system, the public speeches of the Prime Minister epitomize the logic and the ideology of the regime. To examine enemy images we used a corpus of Orbán Viktor’s speeches. First, we collected all of the speeches held during 2010 and 2015 from the Prime Minister’s official website.⁸ We then selected 18 of them that were held on important occasions. Eight of these speeches were held

⁶ Tóth, Á. (2012) Pávatánc. Nol.hu Published online: 04/06/2012 <http://nol.hu/velemenyn/20120604-pavatanc-1312137>. Accessed: 01-02-2016.

⁷ The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) formed the government from 2002-2010.

⁸ Speeches were downloaded from www.miniszterelnok.hu. The site was made available later in archived form on a new homepage of the Prime Minister. Speeches from 2017 can be found at <http://2010-2015.miniszterelnok.hu/beszedekek/>.

on national holidays,⁹ five at a sort of ‘summer school’ organized yearly for Fidesz’s supporters,¹⁰ while the final five were given at other Fidesz-organized events. These are speeches in which Orbán talks to the whole nation, and it is expected to identify the main threats that the nation faces in the future.

From these speeches we identified the actors (groups, persons, institutions, nations, countries) mentioned as threats to the community presented as an in-group (i.e. Hungary, Hungarian people, ‘Us’, European Christianity, Christians).¹¹ Since the line between opponents and enemies is not always clear, each speech was checked by two of the present authors independently, who categorized the enemies as ‘internal’ or ‘external’ (or ‘both’).

After carefully reading Orbán’s 18 main speeches we turned to the full collection of all of Orbán’s speeches during the same period (N=489)¹² Due to this process we were able to study how the concepts of the enemy identified in the 18 main speeches had been used in the larger corpus, and trace the dynamics of their occurrence. We tested the 18 main speeches and found that they were systematically among the most intense in terms of the frequency of reference to enemy and enmification.¹³ This is a crucial finding, because it justifies our analytical focus on these 18 speeches. This does not mean that Orbán did not identify different enemies in his other speeches. This could certainly be the case. However, as our aim was to capture the general dynamics and the way enemies are framed, the 18 speeches were thought to be sufficient (the case would have been different and our choice more difficult to justify if we had found that the other speeches were more intense, meaning that Orbán’s more moderate speeches were included in 18 we picked).

Second, we categorized the enemies that were specified as either external or internal enemies (Table 1.). For example, Brussels, IMF, and Tavares were classified as external, while leftists or socialists (referring to the opposition) were deemed internal. However, some enemies could have been classified as both external and internal (‘speculators’ may be Hungarian or international, just as ‘liberals’ may refer to both Hungarian intellectuals and to European political opponents). In these cases, classification of the references was impossible, so we categorized these enemies as such (‘uncertain’). Below are some typical examples from Orbán’s speeches. In the texts we highlighted the enemies. These examples show the nature of the speeches we analyzed. However, at this point a caveat is due. While we located all the occasions that Orbán identified ‘enemies’ in the corpus of 18 speeches, not necessarily all these mentions included framing of the referent specifically as an ‘enemy’. For example, the

⁹ March 15: the national commemoration of the revolution and freedom war of 1848-1849, and October 23, the commemoration of the revolution in 1956.

¹⁰ Called the ‘Tusványos Free University’, symbolically held in a Transylvanian town. Orbán makes a speech at the summer university every year offering a vision based on a loose interpretation of large-scale social changes.

¹¹ Each speech was coded by at least two of the authors. In the disputed cases, decisions were made in pairs.

¹² 2010 would have been an incomplete year since speeches were collected from only after the elections in April, 2010.

¹³ For example, the speeches given at the Summer Camp of Bálványos are the most intense from those given from 2012-2014, and the third most intense in 2015.

use of the word ‘civil’ is dualistic. It frequently refers to a civil organization that is ‘contributing to the national struggle’, as led by the government. On these occasions the reference to ‘civil’ has a positive connotation in Orbán’s speeches. However, when the word ‘civil’ is linked with – or the related organization is supported and financed by – liberals or foreigners, it refers to an enemy.¹⁴ The reason we have included in the table the frequency of mention of liberal/s in the 489 speeches is because liberal is negatively connoted in Orbán’s speeches, offering an effective way to capture the general dynamics of enemy-framing.

Table 1. Examples of enemies in Orbán’s speeches

Internal	External	Uncertain
left civil socialist/s	IMF Brussels colonizers strangers immigrants Norwegians Tavares	liberals speculator/s

In the first example, the left is identified as the enemy of the nation. For the first years of its rule Fidesz constantly referred to the crimes the left had allegedly committed during the previous eight years while it was in government. While this might normally only qualify the left as a (political) opponent, the quote below clearly shows that the left is more than that. It is actually allied with foreigners against the nation of Hungary:

‘Do not forget that the *fallen left* is always ready to incite against Hungary! It is ready to incite *journalists, EU institutions, banks, cartels and multinational companies*. They are ready to write reports like the *Tavares* report that spread lies about Hungary.’¹⁵

It is important to point out that it is not made explicit in the text that the left is ‘the enemy’. What we find are statements that the left ‘incite against Hungary’ or ‘spread lies about Hungary.’ However, these strong words indicate that the left are against ‘Hungary’ (not just Fidesz), so we interpret such claims as meaning that the *left* are the *enemy of the nation*, and are *not merely political opponents*.

¹⁴ Also, ‘the EU’ sometimes refers simply to Europe or to a neutral political entity and sometimes to the international community to which Hungary belongs. However, on other occasions the EU stands for an encroaching force against which Hungary and the interests of Hungarians need to be defended. Speeches mention Brussels as well - among the ten-most-mentioned enemies in 2011. Brussels is clearly more of a negative actor, often associated with bureaucracy or unreasonable rules

¹⁵ Orbán Viktor’s Speech at Kossuth Square. 10-05-2014. <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedekek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orban-viktor-beszede-a-kossuth-lajos-teren> . Accessed: 01-09-2017. Quotes are translated by the authors.

The second example is important as it links the present with historical grievances, and thereby links foreign enemies from the past – as they are preserved in national memory – with more recent ones; for example, Brussels.¹⁶ While the words themselves do not include reference to an ‘enemy’, the quote is difficult to interpret differently, also including references to notable revolutionary dates:

‘We do not allow foreigners to tell us what to do! Be they from *Vienna* in 1848, 1956 or 1990 from *Moscow*. And we do not today allow *Brussels* or anyone else to tell us what to do!’¹⁷

The third quote is an example of how the US and liberals come up in the texts that link liberalism, foreign policy and threats to Christian national identity¹⁸ (notwithstanding flaws in the argumentation and other inconsistencies, with the speaker frequently alluding to supposedly common-sense truths). It is also important to underline the fact that, from this time on, Orbán declares he will pursue an illiberal model of democracy, and that anything connected to liberals/liberalism represents the enemy:

‘We should be brave enough to say *that liberal foreign policy* is nothing but hypocrisy...it claims, putting it very simply that there is good – predominantly the *US and its allies* – and there is bad, which must be defeated. Yet, in the end it always turns out that it was only about money, oil, raw materials, something very different than it was claimed to be about at the beginning. [...] This is the *essence of liberal foreign policy*. [...] now we have the opportunity that if *we fight* well in this debate, we can reclaim the respect and reputation of a national and Christian identity as opposed to a *liberal one*.’¹⁹

We may connect this third quote with a fourth quote from Orbán’s speech, making the nature of the fight clearer. It is a fight between old and new – the latter referring to Fidesz’s nationalism, purported Christianity and a conservatism reminiscent from the inter-war period (although the content of this Christian conservatism remains extremely vague):

‘There is a *permanent fight in Hungary* between those who represent a new world – [who are] building the nation and economy according to new rules – and *those representing old truths*. One should not be surprised about this *as*

¹⁶ In the 18 main speeches we found 58 different enemies. Naturally, some of these are used synonymously and are often mentioned together (*Brussels* and the *European Union*, *speculators* and *stockbrokers*).

¹⁷ <http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orban-viktor-beszede-a-xiv-kotcsei-polgari-pikniken> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

¹⁸ There are flaws in the argumentation and there are inconsistencies, with the speaker frequently alluding to supposedly common-sense truths.

¹⁹ The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orban-viktor-beszede-a-xiv-kotcsei-polgari-pikniken> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.


the old elite was made rich and powerful according to those old rules and truths.²⁰

Finally, in our last quote Orbán talks about civil society and the struggle that has become increasingly intense. One could argue that the attack against CEU neatly fits with this logic: Soros is identified as *the* individual who is financing civil society and acting against the government.

‘I looked at *civil society* in Hungary apropos of debates over the Norwegian funds...and what I saw were *paid political activists*. Paid political activists *sponsored by foreigners!*’²¹

From the enemy images discussed above, references to ‘liberal/s’ are always used with a negative connotation in speeches, symbolizing the arch-enemy. This situation provides a useful way of showing how speeches are becoming more ‘intense’ or radicalized. Figure 1 shows the cumulative number of occasions that the term liberal is stressed during Orbán’s speeches. The trend indicates that radicalization is certainly happening as the word ‘liberal’ is used more frequently in speeches. This process of radicalization, however, happens in leaps connected to electoral campaigns (in 2014), and to the campaign against immigrants in 2015.²²

Figure 1. Frequency of the term ‘liberal’ in Orbán’s speeches



²⁰ The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at:

<http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedekek-publikaciok-interjuk/fsikeres-allamot-csak-akkor-lehet-felepíteni-ha-eros-nemzet-all-mogotte> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

²¹ The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at:

<http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedekek-publikaciok-interjuk/a-munkaalapu-allam-korszaka-kovetkezik> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

²² This campaign started shortly after the attack on Charlie Hebdo in 2015 and peaked in the summer of 2015. In 2016 and 2017 new campaigns were launched about immigrants and George Soros. For more information: Hungary’s Poster War on Immigration, BBC. Published online: 15/06/2015. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33091597> . Accessed 02/09/2017.

4. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The first question we raised for this study asked about the relationship between internal and external enemies. In answering this question, we also aimed to identify framing strategies used by Orbán. On the basis of the 18 speeches by Orbán, we found that there is indeed a constant linking of internal and external enemies. Yet we found more. Namely, our analysis found that domestic enemies were mostly identified as enemies that primarily serve foreign interests. That is, it is foremost through their affiliation with foreigners that they have been turned into enemies. The following examples of quotes support this hypothesis of a link between internal and external enemies:

- ‘At the time of the transition they teamed up with foreign forces in order to play into the hands of foreigners, and to capture the wealth and resources of the country. Recently they changed their loyalty from Moscow to Tavares’²³
- ‘Those who could not undermine the renewal and progress of Hungary at home now try to do this in Brussels’²⁴
- ‘It is very important to make it clear – if our aim is to reorganize a national state instead of a liberal state – that here we are not dealing with civil actors. [...] these are not civil agents we meet with. [...] but political activists trying to promote foreign interests in Hungary (28th July 2014).’²⁵
- ‘During the past seven years, Hungary has experienced times when ‘those’ who made decisions about the most important developments in Hungary were paid by ‘others’.’²⁶
- ‘We want Hungary to remain the country of Hungarians. This needs to be emphasized because there are ‘those’ who think about this differently.’²⁷

The first example refers to the time of transition, which is ironic in the sense that the country’s Westernization and joining of NATO were goals almost unanimously shared. No doubt numerous mistakes were made, but exactly what

²³ The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at:

<http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedekek-publikaciok-interjuk/a-nagysag-dicsoseget-hagytak-orokul-1956-hosej> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

²⁴ The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at:

<http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedekek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orban-viktor-beszede-a-kossuth-lajos-teren> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

²⁵ The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at:

<http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedekek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orban-viktor-beszede-a-kossuth-lajos-teren> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

²⁶ The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at:

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²⁷ The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedekek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orban-viktor-eloadasa-a-xxvi-balvanyosi-nyari-szabadegyetem-es-diahtabOrban> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

remains hidden in the speech is the clear identification of the internal enemy (as if it were common knowledge; everybody knew who it was about). This reference to common background knowledge is seen most clearly in how enemies are not directly named but alluding to. One of the characteristics of Orbán's speeches is that, although domestic enemies are occasionally named (for example, the left or 'civils'),²⁸ the primary internal enemy is not clearly identified. Instead of naming the internal enemy, it is referred to as 'those' who act against 'us': the 'others'.

This rhetorical shift is winsome. By not naming 'those', the sense of 'us' is reinforced, because 'we' know who 'we' are referring to as our enemies – there is no need to point them out directly. This not only creates a touch of complicity between Orbán and his followers, but also allows every listener to freely interpret the term 'those' and pick their own scapegoat for modern Hungary's ills (Russians, banks, liberals, feminists, etc.) and thereby join the new fight for the freedom of the nation. We return to the need for a new fight later, yet this ambiguity of naming the enemy we believe to be crucial. Namely, through this ambiguity the speaker calls supporters to be alert because certain actors become the subject of suspicion. These actors are working against the national interest, and despite their claims are actually traitors.

A pertinent example of this is the conflict between the government and some civil actors, following which the civil sphere was stigmatized. The actual case Orbán refers to is the government's claim that certain civil actors were not independent but affiliates not only of political parties – which they should not be – but were actually using foreign money – here, money from the 'Norwegian funds' (Norway Grants) – to achieve political goals that were not in the interest of the Hungarian people. Being alert to such challenges is crucial, because, as Orbán argues '*[...] freedom had its heroes, but also its traitors. All our revolutions were put down by foreign powers. And we also know that **there are those** who help foreigners*'.²⁹ The important point to note here is the ambiguity and uncertainty that this framing creates. It suggests that one *can never be sure*. One should be hesitant, except for when clearly acting with the majority – which Orbán claims to be leader of. This fact, we believe, is contributing to stripping civil actors of their resources for mobilizing, as it is difficult to know if the actors who call for support are what they claim to be, or just enemies in disguise.³⁰ This framing strategy we suggest calling *the strategy of ambiguity*.

The trope of fighting for the freedom and independence of the nation – frequently repeated by Orbán – works perfectly as the Hungarian national mythology

²⁸ By 'the left' Fidesz is referring to the Socialist Party and government that ruled the country for eight years – to the extent that *the past 8 years* have become a recurring trope in Fidesz's rhetoric.

²⁹ The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at:

<http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedekek-publikaciok-interjuk/a-nagysag-dicsoseget-hagytak-orokul-1956-hosei> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

³⁰ However, there is an additional consideration here. Namely, the underlying Manichean logic contributes to the creation of an atmosphere where the normal politics of debate and discussion about particular issues becomes impossible, as all disagreement is interpreted as a general attempt to overthrow the regime. Thus, civil actors' attempts at mobilizing citizens behind particular issues are blocked by the fact that they cannot recruit support for causes from those otherwise not fully committed in their opposition to the regime. Putting it differently, the regime manages to limit the chances for the mobilization of citizens around single issues.

is built on the necessity of constant struggle against oppressors, be they Turks, Austrians or Russians. It could be argued therefore, that with his speeches Orbán aims to touch on this shared point of reference, suggesting that the present is just the continuation of the fight Hungarians have been fighting for ‘eternity’. The title of Orbán’s speech: ‘*We again need to go to battle*’³¹ offers a perfect example of this, with the title creating the general frame: Hungarians again need to fight; the speech elaborates on this in more detail. This historical continuity, or reference to the fate of Hungarians, is best captured by a sentence in Orbán’s speech from March 15, 2014, at the commemoration of the 1848 Revolution. In this speech, Orbán asks: ‘Can it be that we are fighting the same fight over and over again since 1848?’³² promoting this trope of the necessity of fighting enemies to ensure the liberty of the nation. This process of framing enemies we called the *strategy of making links to historical grievances*.

However, the argument contained in these speeches occasionally goes further by not only 1) naming enemies – and thereby linking domestic and external agents, and 2) underlining the constant need for a fight for freedom, but also 3) explaining why these enemies of Hungarians do what they do. Namely, they – and in the quote below Orbán gives a perfect example of this by referring to the left – are working against Hungary because they *do not like Hungarians* and do not like them *for being Hungarian*. On the surface, this argument is circular and makes little sense; nevertheless it is an effective rhetorical move for undermining the legitimacy of the opponent:

‘In 2004 the left who in Hungary were inciting against Hungarians living in neighboring countries today would happily welcome illegal immigrants. These people, these politicians simply do not like Hungarians, and they do not like them for being Hungarian’.³³

We interpret this method of framing enemies as reliance on a sort of soft ‘conspiracy’ theory, according to which there are enemies of Hungary out there who act against Hungary because they do not like ‘us’. Again, an allusion and vagueness, no specificity about the enemy, yet going beyond ambiguity by adding a hint of conspiracy. This framing strategy we call *allusions to conspiracies against Hungary/ians*.

The second question we asked focused on the dynamics of naming enemies. We assumed that as time goes by, Orbán would need to name newer enemies, and his speeches would get increasingly radical. While our expectations were confirmed, we

³¹ The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at: <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orban-viktor-beszede-a-kossuth-lajos-teren> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

³² The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at: <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orban-viktor-unnepi-beszede> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

³³ The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/hirek/a-magyarok-dontottek-nem-akarnak-torvenytelen-bevandorlokat> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

were greatly surprised to find when rereading Orbán's early speeches (e.g. his first speech in the period under analysis) that there was no reference to the need to fight. After Fidesz' sweeping victory in the parliamentary election of 2010, Orbán's first speech was about victory and *the end* of the fight:

'The fight we fought for freely defining our Hungarian future we end now with success. This fight ended with our victory; with the victory of those who fought in 1956; with the victory of those fighting for transition; that is, with the victory of free Hungarians in 2010 April [when Orbán won the elections]. In 1956 Hungarians defeated lies on the streets. Now in 2010 we have defeated lies, and given a final blow to the system of lies.'³⁴

The speech is shocking as it is the speech of a self-confident leader successfully ending the struggle, claiming that the days of prosperity and normal daily politics have come with no need to fight any more. There is nothing about enemies in the speech. The only combative element we find in this speech of March 2011 is that Hungarians are not going to allow outsiders to decide their fate – although Brussels gets mentioned analogously to Moscow for trying to dictate to Hungary.³⁵ Thus, it would be wrong to claim that the speech does not indicate future conflict, but it explicitly declares that the fight is over.

Re-reading the speeches we were also surprised that those from 2010 and 2011 frequently included a touch of self-criticism.³⁶ Orbán discussed how Hungarians lacked confidence, and were not united. Yet, as we move forward in time, the speeches turn against enemies, both external and internal; ultimately, with Orbán seeing himself in a fight³⁷ with the corrupt, liberal West in general, including with hypocritical US foreign policy, Brussels, and George Soros.³⁸

What we get here is pure Occidentalism – as Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit (2004)³⁹ point out in their short book on the history of anti-Westernism – which can easily be interpreted as a fight between proponents of a closed society against those of

³⁴ The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at:

<http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orban-viktor-unnepi-beszede-a-kossuth-teren-2010-oktober-23> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

³⁵ 'Being true to our oath, we did not tolerate Vienna to dictate to us in 1848, and we did not tolerate Moscow to dictate in 1956 and 1990. Even now, we will not let anyone from Brussels or from any other place dictate to us.' The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at: <http://2010-2015.miniszterelnok.hu/beszed/1848-es-2010-is-megujulast-hozott> . Accessed 09/14/2017.

³⁶ Some 'terms' and tropes that indicate this: disbelievers (huhogók); inclined to doubt, haunted by doubt (kétkedés hajlama, kísértő kételkedés, kételyek); sceptics, those who are discouraging us (lebeszélők); pessimism defeatism, making bad compromises (kishitűség, megalkuvás); self-defeating (önsorsrontó).

³⁷ As an example see footnote 19.

³⁸ The following absurd claim reveals that by now there is hardly anything or anyone that is not seen as an enemy. In a speech on September, 17, 2015, Orbán said: "*The essence of all is that Europe today is ruled by liberals. There should be no misunderstanding, as conservatives are also liberals. Perhaps not honestly, but they cannot resist violence.*" <http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orban-viktor-beszede-a-xiv-kotcsei-polgari-pikniken> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

³⁹ Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit (2004) *Occidentalism*. Penguin.

an open society. The point here is not that the West, the US, or modernity do not have their deficiencies, and are not occasionally hypocritical or overly bureaucratic. But what is it that Orbán can offer instead? We know what he is fighting against (who his enemies are), but what is he fighting for? We suggest that Popper's depiction of closed society gives us a clue.

Before turning to examining this in the conclusion, we here sum up our answer to the second question. What we can indeed see is the intensification and radicalization of Orbán's speeches to the extent that they can be seen as a crusade for the remaking of Hungary and Europe based on purported Christian roots – i.e., the defense of Christianity, as Orbán sees it.

5. CONCLUSION

With this paper we intended to show how, by the creation of enemy images and portraying politics as a constant fight against enemies, the regime manages to undermine the mobilization potential of civil actors. We argued that the regime is dominant not only because of its better ability to mobilize material resources, but also because it creates a general environment of suspicion in which conditions for mobilization are heavily constrained. The regime attempts to undermine the legitimacy of its potential opponents – calling them enemies of the regime and the nation. To the extent the regime is succeeding the room for civil actors is shrinking radically, as they are now looked at with overwhelming suspicion that can paralyze, or at least seriously constrain, their opportunities. While much could be said about how the regime attempts to undermine the legitimacy of its opponents, in our paper we focused only on examining the way enemies are framed in Orbán's speeches. As we expected, we found that internal and external enemies are linked, and that as time went by Orbán's speeches became more radical/intense. In addition to this, we also identified three framing strategies used in the speeches: the strategy of *ambiguity*; making *links to shared historical grievances*; and *making allusions to conspiracies against the nation*. Furthermore, we were also surprised to see that Orbán's early speeches were not so belligerent and even included a touch of self-criticism.

However, since 2010 much has changed in terms of the intensity of Orbán's fight against its enemies, which reached a recent peak with the attack against George Soros and CEU, the university established in Hungary by Soros and the most important promoter of an 'open society' in Hungary. But what does Popper mean by open society? Reading Popper is inspiring, as the closed society he depicts seems to approximate the model Orbán envisions, and also because, as we highlighted earlier, Popper clearly pinpoints the fact that popular leaders tend to buttress their rule by initiating one war after the other.

According to Karl Popper, the main characteristic of an 'open society' is individualism. This means that citizens' actions are driven by their own interests and wishes. This makes society an ever-changing place, with each individual trying to fulfil his or her ambition freely, remaining unsatisfied with the place allotted to them by the fate of being born into a particular type of family in a particular type of social setting.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Orbán's rigid system resonates in his practice of limiting social mobility – Hivatkozások, ha kell

In contrast to this 'liberal' concept of society, in a 'closed society' everybody knows their role within society, and also that 'true happiness' is nothing else but fulfilling that given role. Proponents of closed society 'reduce people to mere cogs in an uncontrollable machine' (Corvi, 2005: 52). Such a closed society need not be changed or developed since people are already in a state of 'true happiness'.⁴¹ Such a society works on the analogy of an organism in which 'there is no inherent tendency on the part of legs to become the brain' (Popper, 1947: 153), and where 'the institutions leave no room for personal responsibility' (Popper, 1947: 152). This closed society is characterized by a state of tribalism in which there is no room for rational criticism, as society is built on unquestionable taboos.

In his book, Popper discusses Plato and his vision. He does not say that Plato had bad intentions. Popper firmly believes that Plato wanted to bring happiness to the people of Greece. However, he sought to do this by returning Greece to a state of tribalism (p. 163). We cannot say whether Orbán's and Plato's visions collide, or whether the former reads the latter. Nevertheless, Popper's insight seems to be correct: a popular leader following such a path would constantly need to identify newer enemies to buttress its regime.

⁴¹ Orbán's claims to national unity actually allow for such a reading: He states that strength lies in unity: 'In the past four years, we performed better because we were united. We are today the most homogenous country in Europe.' <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedekek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orban-viktor-unnepi-beszede> . Accessed: 01-09-2017.

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