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Movement Entrepreneurship of an Incumbent Party.
The Story of the Hungarian Incumbent Party Fidesz
and the Civil Cooperation Forum

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Abstract¹

This paper discusses movements created, initiated and maintained by political parties: a quite neglected area of social movement studies. Between 2010 and 2014, the biggest demonstrations were pro-government marches in Hungary. The engine of pro-government actions was the movement of the Civil Cooperation Forum (CCF) implicitly founded by the incumbent party Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance. The purpose of this article is to analyze this relationship within a constructivist analytical framework. Through intertextual analyses I will draw up the narrative of the movement focusing on four key challenges (constructing identity, strategic visions, organizational tactics, appropriate and persuading communication). I will demonstrate how independent the movement is. After the descriptive case study, two hypotheses will be generated about the political parties' reason for launching a movement entrepreneurship; and the citizens' motivation for participating and expressing their preferences between elections through a collateral organization like CCF.

Keywords: Social Movements, Political Parties, Collateral Organization, Consent Mobilization

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Introduction

Between 2010 and 2014, the biggest demonstrations in Hungary were pro-government marches. Such activism² is particularly striking in contrast to experiences from Western European countries, where the number of party-sponsored protests is relatively low; however it is not decreasing. (Hutter, 2013) The centre of events was the movement of Civil Cooperation Forum (Civil Összefogás Fórum, CCF) created indirectly and implicitly by the party Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance. Thus the following questions have arisen immediately: *How do CCF and Fidesz connect to each other?* *How was this top-down mobilization set up?*

Such movements are not easy to be conceptualized. Despite an increased interest in political discourses, it is surprising that so little empirical and theoretical research has actually been conducted on captured movements (e.g., Smith, 1976; Kolinsky-Patterson, 1976; Garner-Zald, 1987; Maguire, 1995; Rucht, 2006; Hutter, 2013; Piccio, 2015). The organizations captured/initiated by parties/governments are usually mentioned as ‘pseudo-movements’³ (Smith, 1976: 336; e.g., labor unions), ‘quasi-movements’⁴ (Kolinsky-Patterson, 1976: 12; e.g., peace movement in Italy), government organized non-governmental organizations (e.g., Russian youth movement Nashi “Ours”)⁵ or ‘astroturf’ (fake grassroots) organizations (e.g., Tea Party)⁶. These notions do not just have negative prejudices, but they are also too vague, contradictory and controversial notions to use systematically.

The problem is rooted deeply in the distinction between “good/real” and “bad/fake” movements applied implicitly in social movement studies.⁷ The “good”

² However, top-down mobilization is not extraordinary in Hungary. The elite and intellectual movements had the leading role in the transition process of the country as well (Szabó, 1998). Since then the political parties regularly used to create or dominate the flows of mobilization in one way or another (Halmay, 2011; Szabó, 2003; Körösné, 2013).

³ Pseudo-movements are highly formalized and institutionalized, but make claims for the identity of movements.

⁴ Quasi-movements typically emerge from existing organizations. Due to strong institutional loyalty movement identity cannot develop properly. Through the instances of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the French Communist Party (PCF), Garner and Zald (1987: 312) highlight that the creation of quasi-movements typically characterizes strongly centralized parties. The Italian peace movement ‘could emerge only within PCI (...) support, and it was organizationally and financially dependent on the party’ (Maguire, 1995: 225).

⁵ The state-conformist and regime-maintaining Nashi was established in early 2005 to recreate and dominate the Russian civil sphere. Nashi has been mobilized against the opposition and ‘colored revolutions’ in Ukraine and Georgia. The organization is characterized by anti-fascism, anti-oligarchic-capitalism, state patriotism and the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’. Its connections to Kremlin are formalized: its members have become parliamentary deputies for United Russia, regular meetings with government officials, including Presidents Putin and Medvedev (Atwal, 2009; Atwal and Bacon, 2012; Horvath, 2011; Lassila, 2011; Lee, 2013).

⁶ However, Theda Skocpol dismissed the idea that the Tea Party would be an astroturf movement, which is manipulated as marionettes from above by rich and powerful conservative puppet-masters (Skocpol and Williamson, 2012: 11-12).

⁷ References to normative bias: ‘In all fairness, most social movement theories are based on observations of left-wing movements; this is a broad failing of social movement research in general. Nonetheless, with the current growth of right-wing conservative movements in the modern era, it is perhaps especially

movements are fitted into a bottom-up (grassroots) perspective of the political process. According to the conventional view, ex-ante existing movements have three options for entering politics. Firstly, they could transform into political parties (movement parties) such as some green, new left, and feminist movements have done in the past (Gunther-Diamond, 2003; Kitschelt, 2006). Secondly, they could have an impact on established parties (on their organization and policy visions) such as ecologist, feminist, or single issue movements (Piccio, 2015). Finally, they could even capture a party (Kriesi, 2014) as the Christian Right continuously intends to do with the Republican Party (Green et al., 2001). In contrast, the “bad” or “populist” movements are a top-down phenomenon (directly or indirectly) founded and promoted by political or private actors (political parties or business companies) to form public opinions.

Overstating theoretical conflict has highlighted that these movements need a comprehensive and stable conceptual ground. Sartori's (1970) concept formation called “ladder of abstraction” could easily be denuded of normative boundaries. To create high-level categories the researcher can maximize extension and minimize intension of the concept. At the lower levels, (s)he can focus on the special attributes that make these movements different from the others.

Avoiding the normative conceptions, the study relies on Mario Diani's (1992) conceptual synthesis. I define social movements (broadly) as non-conventional, extra-institutional and informal networks of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political conflict, on the basis of shared collective identities.

More specifically, I borrow the concept and typology of collateral organizations introduced by Thomas Poguntke (2005b) to describe the relationships between the party and other organizations. According to this party-centric perspective the parties use these organizations to create or recreate linkages to various groups of potential voters (Lawson, 1988; Poguntke, 2005a). Four types of collateral organizations are discerned: the independent, the corporately linked, the affiliated, and the ancillary organization. In Poguntke's institutionalist approach the main differences between these forms are the extent of the overlapping membership and organizational autonomy. The difference regarding party dominated organizations is that ancillary organizations have dual membership in contrast to affiliated organizations, in which the membership is just partially overlapping. According to Poguntke's (2005) framework CCF would be an affiliated or ancillary organization, even though it has not got either explicit organizational links to the party or minimal autonomy. Thus I

pertinent to NSM (New Social Movements) theory to account for them as well.’ (Pichardo, 1997: 413, 1. footnote) ‘Within the recent literature on social movements, one of the more accepted ‘truths’ has been that small citizen groups in the so-called ‘new social movements’ represented a social force much stronger than that of more established organizations.’ (Hjelmar, 1996: 177) I will follow Castells’ practice: ‘Since there is no sense of history other than the history we sense, from an analytical perspective there are no ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ progressive and regressive social movements. They are all symptoms of who we are, and avenues of our transformation, since transformation may equally lead to a whole range of heavens, hells, or heavenly hells. (...) And yet, this is our world, this is us, in our contradictory plurality, and this is what we have to understand, if necessarily to face it, and to overcome it.’ (2010: 4)

will use Poguntke's typology within a constructivist⁸ perspective (della Porta and Keating, 2008; Kratochwil, 2008). The difference between party dominated collateral organizations is the strength of the relationship. In other words: affiliated organizations have wider autonomy for their own actions than ancillary ones.

In this paper, I will inquire into the CCF movement and its relation to Fidesz focusing on critical points to create and keep a movement alive. I expect that the CCF provides answers to these questions:

Who are we? Who are our enemies? – Identity, “we” and “they” are constructed out of a fountain of fluid and amorphous myths, symbols, and thoughts. In this process the movement creates its own world view, which not necessarily reflects the real world.

What do we want to achieve? – Strategic visions are designed by imagination. The main goals of the collective actions must be clear and well defined.

How do we want to achieve it? – Organizational tactics are adapted to optimize the exploitation of resources. Thus the organizational forms and maneuvers must be suited to political competition and environment (opportunity structure).

Why do we want to achieve it? – Persuasive communication convinces the citizens to participate and to identify themselves with the movements, aims, and means.

The uniqueness of answers formulated by CCF shows the movement's independence from Fidesz. In other words: the more freely the movement creates its own world, the greater distance the movement can keep from the political party to act *in the name of the party*. From another direction, if the movement does not have its own answers or the decisive will to give its own answers, the movement will be more integrated in the party's background. Consequently, the movement can act only *with the party*.

I will focus on the movement's narratives (Polletta, 1998) and the world they have created, believed in and not on the interpretation of outsiders who might have opposing interests. The analysis of these activities relies on four types of evidence: publications (Civil Ethical Codex, CEC and National Social Contract, NSC), speeches, interviews, and general news found on the website of CCF (civilosszefogas.hu, ca. 540 posts between 2009 and 2015). The CEC is a general ethical collection for “national” civil society, which includes general instructions for collective action. The NSC is the product of personal and national consultations and civil recommendations. Both books are sponsored by the National Cooperation Fund (Hungarian governmental civil fund) and the Foundation for a Civic Hungary (a foundation of Fidesz).

Finally due to negligence of this topic bordered by social movement and political party studies, the descriptive case study induces two theoretical problems: *Why would an incumbent party form a new enterprise in an extra-institutional arena?* *What leads citizens to express their preferences between elections through a collateral*

⁸ The constructivist approach is not new in movement studies (See, inter alia, Oliver, Jorge and Strawm, 2003: 225-234.; Hjelmar, 1996; Castells, 2010).

*organization.*⁹ The case study generates two hypotheses to provide possible answers to these questions. I interpret this entrepreneurship as a form of “consent mobilization” (Beer, 1992), which is not a new strategy just an unconventional, extra-parliamentary one. In addition, I assume that the activists’ motivations come from their partisan commitment and identity (Flesher Fominaya, 2010; Klandermans, 2014; Polletta and Jasper, 2001) rather than material incentives.

The paper is presented in five sections. Section 1 highlights the characteristics of CCF’s movement identity. Section 2 discusses their goals, claims, and policy/politics/polity changes. Section 3 shows the movement’s organizational challenges, internal solutions and external linkages. Section 4 inquires into the communication that persuades the supporters to identify themselves with the movement, to accept the strategic visions and organizational tactics of the movement. Section 5 takes into account the limitations and implications of the research while also offering two theoretical propositions about movement entrepreneurship of parties and the motivation of activists.

The case of CCF

Who are we? Who are the others?

Establishing identity is always a dual activity. It includes not just the question of “who are we?” but also the question of “who are the others?”. The CCF has paid particular attention to constructing a community aiming to embody the “*real*” civil society, the *people, and nation who govern*.

We are the “real” civil society

The CCF was built on a decentralized mass movement of Civic Circles (*polgári körök*) founded directly by Fidesz to reorganize and extend the party’s background after the lost elections in 2002 (Halmai, 2011). Since its foundation in 2009, the movement of CCF aims to strengthen the Hungarian civil society, represent its interests and values. Due to the bottom-up image, political parties and profit-oriented organizations cannot join and the promotion of any other political movement or political party is not tolerated in protest events (civilosszefogas.hu, 3.5.2009).⁹

In the narrative of the movement, civil society is the driving force behind democracy and a synonym for freedom. Independent from other sectors, civil society seeks to balance between political, economic actors and society. They control the state, but protect the state from outsiders (multinational corporations and European Union) as well. However, CCF is not just a member of civil society. It claims to be civil society itself to coordinate and mobilize the civil society.

For CCF, being civil or civic means being communitarian “citoyen”, “patriotic” and not individualist bourgeoisie. Thus the movement expects a complete metamorphosis of individuals:

⁹ <https://civilosszefogas.hu/nemzetstrategia-kell-es-uj-alkotmany> (Accessed: 30-01-2015)

'The key is in the man. The individual man must rise up against himself, and if he has freed himself from shackles of his soul, he must join to the others – this is what is called *soul exchange* today.' [Italics added] (civilosszefogas.hu, 22.03.2010)¹⁰

In this sense, civil society is based on active participation, duty for the community and moral steadfastness. This is what the movement calls "*civilitics*" (*civilitika*), which means civil politics.

In contrast, the oppositional NGOs are not considered true civilians by the group, because they are much closer to the sphere of politics.

'It is also likely, that the organizations, who define themselves as civil so far, will explicitly enter onto the stage of politics and run for elections as parties. The question is if such civil organizations are real civilians, in other words if they are independent form professional politics (...). The answer is Janus-faced: on the one hand the laws allow for the so-called social organizations to become parties at any time (...). On the other hand, however, these organizations are presumably founded with the secret goal to transform into a party with an ideal timing after assessment of their strength and networking.' (CEC, 2012: 66)

"Fake" civilians' behavior is characterized by individual ambitions and a constant struggle for power. In contrast, "real" civilians deal with true, pure and important public issues. CCF asked the left-wing movement called Milla (*Egy millióan a magyar sajtószabadságért, One Million for Press Freedom*) not to believe in economic and political interest groups and join CCF. After the movement (Milla) was captured by the former Prime Minister (PM) Gordon Bajnai the picture has changed dramatically:

'From where could the slogan of "people have been disillusioned with parties" be familiar? At a time, a Nazi leader called Hitler had come to power in such a way, that he was always saying that over and over again. The fake civil overture before the announcement of forming a party evokes associations, because Mr. Bajnai also began with attacking parties.' (civilosszefogas.hu, 01.21.2013)¹¹

According to their narrative the anti-government protesters are hired as soldiers, partisans, rivals of democracy, to support failing politicians to regain power. Their activism sponsored by foreign funds (Soros Foundation, EEA-Norway Grants) gives only rise to panic and permanent hysteria in the name of overthrowing the government.

¹⁰ <https://civilosszefogas.hu/lelekcserelo-idok-janak> (Accessed: 30-01-2015)

¹¹ <https://civilosszefogas.hu/bajnai-bruesszeli-markaboltja> (Accessed: 30-01-2015)

We are the people, the nation, who governs.

“Let the people decide!” – sounded the call, when the Bajnai cabinet was set up in 2009 due to a constructive vote of no confidence. Substantially the movement as the only representative of civil society has the privilege to negotiate with the government. ‘Cooperation of the government and the people is such as the leaven in the bread.’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 07.02.2012)¹² For instance, Zsolt Semjén (leader of the Christian Democratic People's Party, minister without portfolio and Deputy Prime Minister) signed the first Social Contract on behalf of the newly formed government in 2010. After the ratification of a new constitution (called Basic Law) in 2011, CCF saluted the members of parliament (MPs), who supported the new constitution. They also engaged in some consultations with ministers delineating suggestions gathered from civil society. In addition, they explicitly support the government's official public consultations (postal questionnaires).

Even though the movement expects organizational independency from civil society, they have repeatedly emphasized that being a civil actor does not necessarily entail being neutral as well.

‘Despite the naturally existing party sympathies the NGO undertakes his civil, civic nature (...) [But] being civil is not used as a springboard to become a party. (...) [T]his independence does not mean partisan neutrality: the party sympathy confessed by the organization is not a sin, but openness, a virtue.’ (CEC, 2012: 13)

‘The civilian is not a party soldier, for individual and communal interests do not contract to the applying functions of parties and government.’ (CEC, 2012: 15)

However, the movement signed a cooperation agreement with the Ministry of Administration and Justice, the Ministry of Agriculture, and with some grocery and general merchandise retailer chains as well (CBA, Coop). Moreover CCF received financial support of 40 million HUF from the Foundation for a Civic Hungary to strengthen the citizens' cooperation. The movement declared explicitly, that such support contributes to a common purpose of both sides and so they cannot be expected to be self-limiting in giving and using such support.

‘Support for the civilians is a general thesis: the subvention is equally important for both the proponent and those who are being supported. Who gives – does so with an explicit purpose and it aims to fulfill the publicly formulated and approved programs. Who receives – deserved it, and demonstrated capability and reliability previously. It is not charity. Under no circumstances could it mean the self-conditioning gesture of the promoter. The support is clearly a defined and self-imposed goal for both of them.’ (CEC, 2012: 85)

¹² <https://civilosszefogas.hu/cet-sajtokoezlemen-y-a-patriota-europa-mozgalom-bejelenteserl> (Accessed: 30-01-2015)

The government's critics from inside or outside of the country became adversaries of the movement as well. Despite the fact that at the elections of 2010 Fidesz won a two-third super majority, CCF declared clearly that the battle is won but the war is far from over yet. Later, the war narrative became permanent: 'Our troops are at war' (civilosszefogas.hu, 26.05.2011).¹³ They have fought against rival MPs, other politicians, or former PMs. Two "self-defense and educational" campaigns were addressed directly at them:

'They have ruined the country together' – the poster shows former PMs Gyurcsány and Bajnai supported by the Hungarian Socialist Party (*Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP*) which alludes to Bajnai's new political formation (Together 2014).

'They deserve no more chances' – the CCF campaigned with this slogan in the parliamentary elections of 2014. The poster shows Gyurcsány, Bajnai, Attila Mesterházy (the leader of MSZP at that time) and Miklós Hagyó (former deputy mayor of Budapest and member of the Parliament, who was arrested on suspicion of extortion and breach of fiduciary responsibility) as prisoners with a clown.

Similarly, the biggest demonstrations of CCF have been the multiple Peace Marches (Békemenet) with slogans on its lead banners like:

'We are not going to be a colony!' (January 21, 2012, Budapest) – Reference to the Orbán government's conflicts with the International Monetary Fund and the European Union (estimated attendance: max. 400,000).

'We Will Not Remain Debtors—The Homeland Is One!' (October 23, 2012, Budapest) – Reference to paying off the 2008 emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund and exiting the European Union's Excessive Deficit Procedure (estimated attendance: max. 400,000).

'Bajnai - Gyurcsány: Together They Destroyed the Country!' (February 5, 2013, Gyula) – Reference to the former left-wing PM Ferenc Gyurcsány and Gordon Bajnai supported by MSZP (estimated attendance: max. 30,000).

'Those Who Are Aggressive Are Frightened. We Are Not Frightened!' (October 23, 2013, Budapest) – Reference to incidents of breaking a model statue of PM Viktor Orbán (similarly to pulling down a Stalin statue during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution) in an opposition demonstration. (estimated attendance: max. 400,000).

'The Country Is One - April 6, 2014' (March 29, 2014, Budapest) – Reference to the 2014 National Assembly elections (estimated attendance: max. 450,000).¹⁴

¹³ <https://civilosszefogas.hu/ne-bantsd-a-magyart> (Accessed: 30-01-2015)

¹⁴ For estimated attendances I used numbers given by the webpage of Peace March (bekemenetegyeselet.hu), which are most likely over-estimations, but show the weight of the events. For the estimated attendance figures in media discourses more specifically see Bene's study (2014).

These messages reflected partisan and government politics explicitly. According to László Kövér, Speaker of the National Assembly and one of founding members of Fidesz, the Peace Marches defend the country. CCF cited even the PM Viktor Orbán 'if a few hundred thousand Hungarians did not stand at the crossing gate (...) then there is a possibility of not staying alive in this period.' (NSC, 2014: 54).

The movement was really active in defending the government from global actors called economic and financial oligarchies, "super empires" by CCF, and protecting the civil society from effects of mass media labeled as brainwashing by the "lackey media" by CCF.

'With occupying and invading troops camouflaged as civilians the giants of the bank sector built an institutional system similar to the empire of Nero, which is equivalent to dictatorship such as communism and Nazism.' (CEC, 2012: 15)

According to CCF, the "satanic" empires (IMF, USA, current EU, Bilderberg Group) take a stand against the classical view of democracy preparing modern slavery and trying to overthrow the Hungarian government. The movement repeatedly initiated negotiations with the IMF and sent open letters to several European and American politicians¹⁵ aiming to change their opinions about Hungarian government politics.

The CCF does not tolerate internal enemies either. Rivalry and differences of opinion between members of the movement are not tolerated. More specifically, the movement tries to avoid the negative consequences of the "divide and conquer" strategy of adversaries.

'If the person cannot convince companions with rational arguments about his counter opinion and the others cannot gain him over to the correctness of their point of view. The person can stand ethically convicted of leaving the organization. Staying in the organization is a destructive activity, and attacking the organization externally because of personal grievances is unethical behavior.' (CEC, 2012: 20)

In a recent case this problem had arisen. The CCF posted an announcement on its website, in which they deprecate Gábor Bencsik, the chief editor of the pro-government journal of Hungarian Chronicle, and organizer of the Civic Circle, and the Peace Marches to criticize the government and incumbent politicians' self-enrichment responding to the new wave of scandals:

'The CCF rejects the emerging phenomenon of the 'Stockholm syndrome'. We could not have become the victim of instigating post-communist and neo-liberal

¹⁵ For example José Manuel Barroso, the former President of the European Commission, Viviane Reding, the European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, André Goodfriend, former Chargé d'Affaires of Embassy of the United States to Hungary, Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, and President Barack Obama.

world vision and value system, which is intending to take us hostage.’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 04.12.2014)¹⁶

What do we want to achieve?

On the face of it, the CCF had a clear and detailed strategic vision in the first years. The movement saw that Hungarian civil society is openly “political”, therefore the goal was organizing a policy-centered civil sector. ‘Playing a leading role among civil organizations, the CCF has already stepped onto the road of policy questions.’ (CEC, 2012: 109) In the first Social Contract¹⁷ (civilosszefogas.hu 10.09.2009)¹⁸ they declared six main points on what they expect from the government:

1. Constitutional responsibility and accountability of the executive branch (e.g., a more “traditional” form of no-confidence vote).
2. Stronger role for the current President of the Republic, who has the exclusive and factual right to dissolve Parliament.
3. Commencement of preparation for a future bicameral parliament.
4. Increasing the autonomy of local governments and ensuring the representation of provincialists such as civil associations in local government bodies.
5. An Administrative Court (as a special court).
6. Strengthening the institutions of direct democracy and disposing their conditions precisely.

Most of these proposals (with the exception of administrative courts) have not been fulfilled by the government. Moreover the movement has created round tables (for health care, social, culture policies) to prepare policy suggestions for the government, but the results have not been made public. Eventually, their policy-centered (foreign currency loans, discriminating state language law of Slovakia, school meals etc.) mobilization causes have almost disappeared since 2012.

In most of its posts the CCF emphasized actual political issues. They have not formulated criticism about the politics and policies of the government, even though, for instance, the civil sector got less financial support (Ca. 1.3 billion HUF / 4.2 million Euro) from the state in 2012 than in former years (Ca. 3.4 billion HUF / 11 million Euro). In contrast, when the plan of an Internet tax was withdrawn by the government after mass protests in 2014, one of the movement’s spokespersons (in fact, leaders), Tamás Fricz commented the decision: ‘Well done, Viktor Orbán!’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 04.11.2014)¹⁹. Essentially the movement has become reactive and drifted with the flow of politics. They explicitly supported István Tarlós in his two campaigns to be elected Major of Budapest. Moreover they support the deep personnel changes in the administration. All in all, the movement has lost its ability to

¹⁶ <https://civilosszefogas.hu/cszmadia-laszlo-a-valodi-civil-szferarol> (Accessed: 30-01-2015)

¹⁷ The original text was not available at the time of this research work.

¹⁸ <https://civilosszefogas.hu/a-civil-osszefogas-tarsadalmi-szerzodese> (Accessed: 30-01-2015)

¹⁹ <https://civilosszefogas.hu/fricz-tamas-bravo-orban-viktor> (Accessed: 30-01-2015)

reach and create its own policy goals, which makes the movement's initiatives subordinate to the government and Fidesz.

How do we want to achieve it?

The movement of CCF is well organized and well prepared to maximize the resources of his political environment. The movement has become the center of a network of protest events, actions and other organizations. They organized the previously mentioned Peace Marches, the Intellectual Defense of the Nation and founded the Civil Cooperation Conference (Civil Együttműködési Tanácskozás, CCC) and the Civil Cooperation Public Benefit Foundation (Civil Összefogás Közhasznú Alapítvány, CPBF). The CCC consists of communities of trans-border Hungarian regions and the CCF itself with the aim to stimulate cooperation in the Carpathian Basin. The place of its foundation was symbolic: the Parliament's chamber of the former upper house in 2011. The financial background of the CCC and CCF is provided by CPBF, which creates a legal personality for the movement. These organizations are not the same, but their activities point in the same direction. Officially, the CPBF coordinates the movement, but its real core is a group of CCF's leaders.

Moreover CCF and some right-wing Polish civil organizations founded the Patriotic Europe Movement in 2012 to respond to the criticism of the Hungarian government by EU actors. According to this movement's credo, they are aiming to facilitate the Europe of values and nations instead of the power of money and the bureaucrats' Europe.

After the elections of 2014 the circumstances of pro-government actions have changed. Public support for the Fidesz government decreased; some new scandals and new waves of protest events with new anti-government (antitax) narratives arose. The idea of another Peace March arose among supporters of the movement, but it was considered ill-timed by the movement's elite. However, it was made clear that Fidesz never gave any instructions not to organize a Peace March, nor to postpone one. Fricz and Csizmadia describe the affair in the following way.

'It is not worth it to organize a Peace March against them, because, as they say, eagles do not hunt flies. In the recent weeks protests organized by more or less civil groups have become more active indeed; their occasional violent and aggressive actions are deeply reprehensible. But just because of them it is not worth it to organize a Peace March procession. They are not an organized political force, even though the rest of the world tries to help them in many ways' (civilosszefogas.hu, 13.11.2014).²⁰

'The Peace March is the means to national sovereignty, identity and the right of subsidiarity. We do not intend to show off force and as light cavalry take apart provocation in the streets. The Peace March has won the esteem of society, its

²⁰ <https://civilosszefogas.hu/fricz-tamas-sajtotajekoztato-beszede> (Accessed: 30-01-2015)

power counts as 'heavy artillery', reasons for deploying it are determined only by what lies in the name of the movement.' (civilosszefogas.hu, 16.12.2014)²¹

The movement proclaimed civil radicalism in 2009, which means the reconstruction of civil society as a fourth branch of government. In opposition, the movement opposed redefining the relationship of the state and civil society. However, after 2010 they initiated a similar institutionalization in the civil sector. The quasi-leader of the movement, László Csizmadia, who has a formal/informal position in every organization related to CCF, became the president of the National Civil Fund, the Hungarian governmental civil fund, which was reorganized and renamed as the National Cooperation Fund in 2012. As a result, the CCF as the representative of civil society became institutionalized and formally connected to the state and the government. However, the movement was quite antagonistic toward this topic:

'[I]t must be emphasized, that the independence of the civil society has not just legal-constitutional, but also financial and substantive requirements as well. It's important that the distributional mechanism of public funds serving civil organizations being neutral and transparent (...) [I]t is at least as important. The civil society will not become the echo of state, rather it is an independent and autonomous discourse with the state on shaping goals, themes, conflicts and dialogues of civil society.' (CEC, 2012: 93)

'This is dangerous, because the civil sphere of a given country could easily turn from being truly independent to just formally independent, seemingly autonomous, but in fact, under the influence of political parties and governments controlling it as their tool.' (CEC, 2012: 97)

With the overlapping organizational network and institutionalized linkage to the state, CCF is able to utilize and monopolize the resources, (seemingly) able to maximize the number of reachable participants, followers, and able to give ever newer impulses to mobilization, which makes their campaign almost permanent.

Why do we want to achieve it?

At first glance, persuasive communication is the weakest point of CCF. Without any doubt the leaders of the movement, who are mostly political scientists, columnists or lawyers, are not great orators. Their mainstream communication has relied almost exclusively on printed media. After 2012 most of their posts were either open letters or essays taken from newspapers (even in scanned form). As opinion leaders, they focused on constructing public opinion and not the collective actions of the movement.

Despite the lack of sufficient reasoning, the appropriate answer (to challenges of persuasive communication) is essential for keeping the movement identity alive, achieving its visions, and making sense of organizational tactics. The answer to the

²¹ <https://civilosszefogas.hu/csizmadia-laszlo-a-valodi-civil-szferarol> (Accessed: 30-01-2015)

“why” comes from outside of the movement. In 2010 the CCF was already eager to stand by the new PM:

‘The new Social Contract is signed (...). He [PM Viktor Orbán] undertook to take the lead, and asked us to follow him. It is a serious statement, a beautiful and difficult pledge and much to ask for. He needs us.’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 24.06.2010)²²

The party leadership and government dominated the reasoning of aforementioned movement activity. Previously mentioned messages of protests suited the communication of the party and the government. Moreover the Peace March is usually attached to partisan events (mass meetings, commemoration of government) with speeches delivered by PM Viktor or others from the top rank of the party. Essays, speeches and the two books of the movement were just supplementary in their nature and clearly not enough to mobilize. These are more likely to underline existing party messages rather than to create their own ones.

Summary of the Findings

The world is full of existent forms and ideas already created (Schabert, 2005: 242-244). Thus complete independence and essentiality in creating an own identity, objectives, and organizational entity cannot be expected from any movements (and from parties either). They can borrow or even inherit ideas (Castells, 2010: 7) and organizations. In short, a movement can never truly be created freely. Even though movements (just like any other political actors) try to push and stretch these boundaries by trial and error.

Looking at the case, CCF (seemingly) does not even try to step onto this route. The movement was born into the world fed by the political right wing, especially by Fidesz after 2002. The movement’s identity is broader than expected. Literally, the movement occupied the civil sphere and bridged the gap between civil society and government. Identity cannot change dramatically. Deciding on who is our enemy and friend was running in parallel with the political challenges and background of Fidesz. At an early stage, the movement had clear and strong initiatives, but later on their strategic vision served and followed government interests. Formally, dual membership does not exist, but the CCF has institutionalized initially and externally creating linkages to society and the state. Despite their dominant position, the network depends heavily on the government and the party. Their reasoning (persuasive communication) relies on partisan commitments letting the party control the mobilization.

If unconventional/extra-institutional and conventional/institutional worlds exist as assumed by many scholars (Hutter, 2013; Joyce, 2002; Kalyvas, 2009), then the activities of the movement would overlap in these spheres to different extents (see Figure 1). The figure illustrates the construction of CCF and the stratification of the

²² <https://civilosszefogas.hu/qkovess-engemq> (Accessed: 30-01-2015)

relationship between the movement and the party. The movement does not have the opportunity and/or the proper will to be created more independently. In another perspective, Fidesz could stabilize and recreate, redefine its linkages to groups of potential voters. Moreover this border has nearly completely vanished in the narrative of CCF. However, the movement can act more freely in organizations and network building than in the other critical points; this relationship seems to be very close without any formal organizational connection. As a consequence of this seemingly inseparable relationship, the movement stands closer to ancillary organizations than to affiliated ones.




Figure 1: The stratification of relationship between Fidesz and CCF

Discussion

In this descriptive case study, I made an attempt to investigate the top-down relations of Fidesz and CCF through four activities. My questions were: *How do CCF and Fidesz connect to each other? How was this top-down mobilization set up?* The research relied on analysis of texts and documents published by the movement to show its relations to the party and dependency or interdependency in constructing its actions. The results made clear that: CCF has no autonomy or enough political will to construct its own reality. Findings demonstrate the overlapping construction of this collective action, which is a more complex relationship than simple institutional connections. However, movements as ancillary organizations of parties could be extraordinary and strikingly particular; the case study shows the possible deepness of the relation between a party and a movement.

The findings implicate two theoretical problems: (1) the parties' reason for launching a movement entrepreneurship of parties; (2) the citizens' motivation for participating and expressing their preferences between elections through a collateral organization. Here, assisting future research I introduce two hypotheses to provide some possible explanations.

Hypotheses No. 1: Such movement entrepreneurship of parties is a strategy for reconstructing their background (realignment).

In present-day politics, which is characterized by presidentialization (Poguntke and Webb, 2005; Webb et al., 2012), partisan de-alignment (Dalton and Kuechler, 1990; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000), declining parties (Katz and Mair, 1995) and legislatures (Flinders and Kelso, 2011) the role of political movements and extra-institutional, non-conventional political activity has become re-valuated and collective actions get more attention than ever before. Due to the transformation of mass parties into catch-all and cartel parties the conventional political actors had slowly lost the monopoly and ability of mobilization between elections. Simultaneously, new movement parties have arisen over and over again as rivals. Conventional political actors lack legitimacy, or their legitimacy has become more contingent and personalized.

Spin-off entrepreneurship is not a new strategy. In the 1960s, Samuel H. Beer (1990) had already seen that the main task of conventional actors (modern politics) is "consent mobilization". This idea reflects the growing political contingency (namely declining legislatures), the delegating legislative power to the executive, and the strengthening new group politics (Beer, 1990: 62-71). In short Beer asks how can political trust and legitimacy be restored in changing political environments characterized by the proliferation of new non-conventional (i.e., movement parties) and weakened old actors (classes, mass partisan heritages etc.). Mobilizing consent is more than the periodical electoral authorization, because the decisions are made after the elections (Beer, 1990: 76). It assumes a permanent campaign for maintaining the majority in the legislature and making citizens accept the politics and policies of government.

The 'vacuum' of legitimization, contingency, which is caused by previously mentioned tendencies, has made consent mobilization even more intensive and necessary. If there are no other options for cost-effectively achieving political aims, political contests will easily find their way to the streets creating new formations to control popular consent. As conventional arenas of politics, legislatures dominated by parties cannot fulfill their role anymore. Thus the parties have expanded the arena borders by reoccupying, invading, and dominating the space (i.e., streets) which was abandoned by mass parties. The modern parties came from the street, why could they not return?

Hypotheses No. 2: Citizens commit themselves to party captured movements to express their identity.

The results show that party dominated movements and mobilizations are for demonstrating preferences and sympathies for a particular party. Conventionally, movements emerge from social or political conflicts, which directly (but not equally) affect citizens. Their goal is to change this situation. Without partisan interpretation, party dominated mobilization does not possess clearly defined conflicts and goals;

however, these tasks do not have primacy in this case. The already existing commitment and partisan identity are far more important for mobilizing people. Partisan slogans, badges and flags tell us that identity precedes the event. In other words, the participants know where and why they are going; they are already ready to accept the narratives about conflicts and aims. Collective identity better captures the pleasures and obligations that actually persuade people to mobilize. Identity is an alternative to material incentives has become a secondary element in mobilization dominated by parties.

The contingency of politics has another antecedent and consequence. From the side of citizens, conventional institutions lose not just legitimacy, but also the ability to provide collective identity (cognitions shared by members of groups) (Castells, 2010). Identity is usually described as a place in society. People occupy many different places; however ever fewer places can be shared collectively. Thus a new, alternative collective identity has been re-valuated.

Identity processes play a crucial role in the dynamics of mobilization. It has been used extensively by social movement scholars to explain how social movements generate and sustain commitment and group cohesion over time. (See, inter alia, Fominaya, 2010; Klandermans, 2014; Polletta and Jasper, 2001) Moreover Klandermans (2014) shows that the more someone identifies with a group, the higher the chances are to take part in collective action on behalf of that group. Group members urge them to support and defend their group. The partisan identification could easily become a self-generating process. The strong identities usually implicate a backlash, as those portrayed as the enemy may be angered or frightened into counter organization. The debates are characterized by strong emotional loadings to separate the liked in-group and the hated out-group. Consequently, the so-called movement/counter-movement dynamics (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; Zald and Useem, 1987) generated even further polarization and radicalization (as examined in the Hungarian case: Körösnéyi, 2013).

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