HStud 20 (2006) 2, 209–222
DOI: 10.15566/HStud.20.2006.2.2

CAPTIVE MINDS AND SCAPEGOATS IN STALINIST HUNGARY

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Mottos:

"For a member of the middle class the existence of people who live a more miserable life than he does is a cause for his own reputation, pride – for an intellectual: guilty conscience and responsibility". (*László Németh,* quoted by Tibor Huszár in: "Az értelmiségszociológia és szociográfia hazai történetéhez." In: *Tibor Huszár: Nemzetlét – nemzettudat – értelmiség.* Magvető, Budapest, 1984, 245)

"When someone is honestly 55% right, that is very good and there is no wrangling. And if someone is 60% right, it's wonderful, it's great luck and let him thank God. But what's to be said about 75% right? Wise people say this is suspicious. Well, and what about 100% right? Whoever says he is 100 % right is a fanatic, a thug, and the worst kind of rascal." (Quoted from An old Jew in Galicia by Czesław Miłosz in *The Captive Mind,* Vintage International Edition, New York, 1990, V)

"And to the angel of the church at Laodicea write thus... I know of thy doings, and find thee neither cold nor hot... I would thou wert one or the other. Being what thou art, lukewarm, neither cold nor hot, thou wilt make me vomit thee out of my mouth." (*The New Testament. The Apocalypse of the Blessed Apostle John.* Part 3)

This paper makes an attempt to analyze the mindset of creative Hungarian intellectuals who accepted various influential roles in Stalinist Hungary. It uses contemporary and other Hungarian and non-Hungarian patterns of intellectual behaviour as a basis of comparison. The argument is shaped with the help of the conceptual framework of scapegoating.

Keywords: Cold War, communists, anticommunists, scapegoating, dictatorship

I. Introduction

Captive Minds and 1956. Liberators and Stabilizers

One of the basic scholarly issues regarding the global, world historical significance of the 1956 revolts in Poland and the revolution in Hungary relates to the carriers of the revolutionary fermentation. Did these movements express overall national discontents, both politically and economically motivated, or were they more the results of the activities of a small but loud and influential group of local intellectuals and/or Western efforts aimed at the liberation of "captive nations"? Did "captive minds" succeed in ridding themselves of their intellectual bonds that in turn shook the edifice of the whole system, or rather was the system simply unable to function any more? If one subscribes to the the second view: did this mean that economic failure or perhaps the lack of proper legitimacy for the political system and an insufficient social base led to an inevitable deep crisis and a temporary collapse?

As the economic, political and social institutions of the countries of the Soviet Bloc showed *structural similarities* but *huge differences* in their resistance and opposition to the Soviet system that had been imposed on them, I am inclined toward attaching great significance to the role, and impact of the intellectual actors, to the more and less captive minds in this process. From this perspective it logically follows that these minds then also had an important role in the temporary stabilization processes of these systems. Stalinism was not simply forcefully imposed but also built and constructed from inside. In terms of scapegoating, the conceptual framework that I should like to use refers to what an extent can we transfer responsibility for Stalinism on the local captive minds?[1] Namely, if we assume that liberated minds helped considerably to weaken the global and local edifice of Stalinism, we cannot deny the role of these minds in building, constructing this monster either.

Here I would like to address this issue by putting the case of these Hungarian minds into the Euro-Atlantic political-cultural-intellectual context of the post World War II decade and into the context of twentieth-century Hungarian political thought.

Sources and Method

Before starting my argumentation, permit me two preliminary remarks: one about my methodology, the other about my sources.

The methodological remark concerns my use of the concept of *scapegoating.* In my interpretation this is a social and social psychological phenomenon found in

all societies and not some kind of a deviation. It cannot be ignored. Rather, a social scientist should learn about its peculiarities. There are *three peculiarities* of this social psychological phenomenon that are essential. *First:* contrary to the original Old Testament interpretation that considered scapegoating as a process of atonement by consciously transferring guilt on the innocent goat, modern scapegoaters are convinced that scapegoats are indeed guilty. *Second:* scapegoating serves the interest of *enforced attribution,* i. e., easing social tensions by giving simplified monocausal explanations to most complicated phenomena and processes. *Third:* This scapegoating is essential in creating social cohesion and can effectively mobilize social groups or complete societies, especially in post-crisis situations.

Scapegoating is a form of systematic hatred that frequently results in aggression. If a historian is tracing the origins of aggression, this concept can be most helpful. Namely, it can help in shifting the focus of research from looking at the expansion of freedom in modern societies to the eruptions of individual and collective aggression. Peter Gay suggested that modern European intellectual and political history can also be described as a series of attempts at curbing these outbursts of aggression.[2] The great challenge for a historian venturing into this realm of social psychology is to try to contribute, through the analysis of numerous case-studies, to the debate on the degree of responsibility of "nature and nurture" among the causes of aggression.

As to the sources, in addition to primary sources (works by and documents related to the activities of leading Hungarian intellectuals in the late 1940s and early 1950s) for the Hungarian context I used especially the results of Ferenc Glatz, Tibor Hajdú, György Litván, György Péteri, János Pótó, Árpád Püspöki, János Rainer M., Ignác Romsics, Éva Standeiszky, Domokos Szőke, Gábor Vermes, and for the international context primarily the works by István Deák, Peter Gay, Tony Judt, Mark Lilla, Jeffrey K. Olick and Fritz Stern.

II. The International Context

Cultural Hatreds and Political Passions. From Natural Explosions of Instinct to Political Passions of Strongly Woven Doctrines

Revolutions are about clearly defined confrontations. The clash between two strongly opposed poles (the contents generally formulated by intellectuals) can no more be resolved in a peaceful way. What were these two poles in post World War II Hungary, to what an extent did they reflect the broader international scene? The search for an answer to this question has to start with another question on the connections between political and cultural hatreds. Namely, in bipolar con-

frontations the relationship between the poles is characterized by extreme mutual hatred. Is it political issues that awaken culturally expressed, intellectually organised passionate hatred or the causal relationship is just the opposite: it is the deeper lying cultural hatreds, resentments that are politically manifested?

This is an old research question of intelllectual history, first powerfully formulated in the aftermath of World War I by two very different but very influential thinkers, *Julien Benda* (1867–1956) and *Carl Schmitt* (1889–1985). By sheer coincidence it was the same year, 1927, that the two authors published their respective works addressing this issue. In his *The Betrayal of the Intellectuals* Benda pointed out that, "Our age is indeed the age of the intellectual organization of political hatreds."[3] He arrived at this conclusion by analyzing the race, class, party and nation based passions of his day. Historically he sees a marked borderline at the aftermath of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. According to his argumentation before this time political passions were basically natural explosions of instinct. Since this watershed political passions – permeating an ever increasing percentage of the population – had been furnished with a network of strongly woven doctrines. The decisive element is the blending of national and other political passions, the best example being Hitler's National Socialist Party. Benda might have read the reports on a Hitler speech in Munich in April 1927 in which the thirty-seven-year old ambitious and charismatic politician pointed out that "our young, socialist nationalism has nothing to do with the old antiquated patriotism."[4]

Defining One's Enemy is Defining One's Inner Self

These reports might have also been read by Carl Schmitt when formulating his essay on the concept of the political. The recently most fashionable anti-liberal, devout Nazi political scientist gives a very simple, straightforward definition of what politics is about, "The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy." For him, "defining one's enemies is the first step toward defining one's inner self."[5] For Schmitt enmity transformed into fighting (and not peace) is the natural state of affairs. In Mark Lilla's succinct summary, " A world without war would be a world without politics, a world without politics would be a world without enmity, and a world without enmity would be a world without human beings."[6]

The Contents: The Politics of Cultural Despair: the "Conservative Revolution of Dostoevski and Nietzsche". The Ideology of Resentment

From the answers to the question on the relationship between cultural and political hatreds based also on the experiences of the Second World War I should like to point out two: a German-American and an American one, *Fritz Stern* and *Richard Hofstadter*. Fritz Stern in 1961, in his search for the intellectual roots of national socialism, distancing himself from Benda, argued that his own post World War II age was the age of the political organization of cultural hatreds and personal resentments. In his attempt at understanding the origins of political hatred he explains how nationalist attacks on modern (liberal, secular, industrial-urban) culture shaped the "conservative revolution". In European intellectual history Dostoevski and Nietzsche can be considered as the key figures of this movement. Their chief target is liberalism in the broadest sense of the word. In Fritz Stern's words, "Man is not primarily rational, but volitional. He is not by nature good nor capable of perfectibility, the politics of liberal individualism rest on an illusion, evil exists and is an inherent aspect of human life...the idea of historical progress is false ands blinds men to the approaching catastrophes...."[7] The deepest roots of the conservative revolution reach back to Rousseau and his followers' criticism of the naive rationalism of the Enlightenment. Their ideologists (including Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn, Moeller van den Bruck, Maurras and Barres, D'Annunzio and Enrico Corradini, the Action Francaise and the anti-Dreyfusards, the Christian socialists of Lueger's Vienna, the pan-Germans) "superimposed a vision of national redemption upon their dissatisfaction with liberal culture and with the loss of authoritative faith".[8]

The Form: the Paranoid Style

In his 1963 *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* Richard Hofstadter explained how extreme radical political passions show the signs comparable to clinical paranoia. The spokesman of the paranoid style focuses on the destructive conspiracies in the hostile world in which he lives, she or he points out how these clandestine or quite conspicuous activities threaten a whole nation, a culture or a class. The paranoid search for conspirators, for enemies of the people is far from being reserved for just rightish or just leftish ideologists or politicians on the American continent (and elsewhere). Even if the paranoid style seems to show greater affinity for "bad" causes, a sound issue can also be presented in the paranoid style. The paranoid style makes great use of enforced attribution, a major feature of scapegoating: the enemy has permeated our sound society, reaching up

to the top level decision makers. It is also a powerful means of creating social cohesion: fear and hate drive concerted action against the enemy.

The Proposal: Nature and Nurture among the Causes of Modern Hatred and Aggression

Traditional intellectual histories and political rhetoric of all kinds present the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as an age of expanding freedom, an age of triumph over all kinds of attempts on limiting individual and collective liberties.

All the above, seemingly too far reaching excurses were necessary to come to my point. I propose that in addition to this traditional, widely accepted though not unchallenged approach the same series of events can also be described – as Peter Gay did[9] – as the series of attempts at curbing the eruptions of individual and collective aggression.

Speaking about *Captive Minds and Scapegoting in Stalinist Hungary* is such a case-study. If we approach the issue from this perspective, what we are talking about is not something particularly Hungarian, but rather a chapter in Europan intellectual and political history. Keep in mind that this phenomenon is European, not East European, in spite of the quite complete, hardly permetable isolation between Eastern and Western Europe during the years preceding 1956.

The Major European Intellectual Frontline between 1945 and 1956: Communists versus Anti-Communists

I think that Tony Judt[10] is absolutely right when he argues that the major intellectual and political frontline in post World War II Europe was not between East and West but between communists and anti-communists. Neither side could think in terms of compromises, or nuanced shades. Numerous outstanding creative minds on both sides have been captivated by this bipolarism. The aftermath of the Munich Conference in September 1938, when Britain and France seemed to have achieved a reasonable deal with Germany, (from a mid- or late 1940s perspective) unambigously showed that looking for reasonable compromises, for a third way is politically useless and morally discredited. The platforms had to be clearly defined: Good versus Evil, Freedom versus Slavery, Resistance versus Collaboration. It was a political expression of this cultural climate when at the end of September 1947 the Information Bureau of the East European Soviet vassal parties declared: the world had been split into two camps (imperialist and anti-imperialist) and that the new war could not be avoided.

The political developments, including Churchill's March 1946 Fulton speech and Stalin's reaction of comparing the mastermind of the anti-Hitler coalition to Hitler, had clear intellectual parallels. They can serve as a basis of comparison for the Hungarian case. Here I can certainly only refer to them without going into an analysis.

The *Italian* Communist party attracted a great number of intellectuals. In fact, respect for an openness to intellectuals was a tradition established by the great founding fathers, Gramsci and Togliatti. Togliatti defined Italian communism as "half Croce and half Stalin".[11] At the same time post war Italy had to face many intellectuals' long term association with Fascism.

France showed a longstanding tradition of bipolarism, cherishing the great revolution's myth: worshipping violence as a tool of public policy. The famous Radical Party politician, Edouard Herriot argued after the war that without a blood bath normal political life in France could not be restored.[12] Working, writing in the cultural, intellectual capital of the post World War II world many outstanding and influential members of the Paris elite cherished communist theory and practice. The impressive performance of the French Communist Party in the first elections certainly played a decisive role here, the communist political success needed to be understood, to be interpreted.

Let me refer to just a few French examples. The leader of existentialism, Jean Paul Sartre argued at the time of the East European show trials that one could choose only between the USSR and the Anglo-Saxon Bloc.[13] As editor of the *Temps Modernes,* he published Marcel Peju's fully understanding comments on the Slansky trial. Paul Eluard in Bucharest in October 1948 said: "I come from a country where no one laughs any more, where no one sings. France is in shadow. But you have discovered the sunshine of Happiness."[14] This was the case in spite of the rigid orthodoxy of Maurice Thorez' party. Anti-communism was considered to be pro-Fascism by a great number of influential intellectuals (as e.g. the writers Louis Aragon or Jean Bruller Vercors, the 1935 Nobel Prize awardee Fréderic Joliot Curie or the great painters Léger and Picasso).

Tony Judt goes perhaps a bit too far, but I think he is basically right when he declares: "Western intellectual enthusiasm for communism tended to peak not in times of 'Goulash communism' or 'socialism with a human face' but rather at the moments of the regime's worst cruelties: 1935 and 1944–1956."[15] Even if the anti-communists definitely outnumbered communists, the anti-communist platform was far too heterogeneous. An ultra-leftist critic of Stalinism could easily find him or herself on a common platform with neo-Fascists. As Arthur Koestler put it at a presentation in Carnagie Hall, New York in 1948: "You can't help people being right for the wrong reasons... This fear of finding oneself in bad company is not an expression of political purity, it is an expression of a lack of self-confidence."[16] Or as Abbé Boulier explained to Ferenc Fejtő at the time of the

Rajk trial, "Drawing attention to Communist sins is 'to play the imperialists' game ."[17]

On the communist side in the East the respective discourses had the same motives as on the communist side in the West: "youthful enthusiasm for a communist future was widespread among middle-class intellectuals, in East and West alike!"[18] These motives included the following main issues: terror is a necessary means of historical progress, the Soviet Union has sacrificed the most for the victory against Hitler, all the means for the implementation of socialism and communism under the leadership of the Soviet Union are legitimate, America's sins both in terms of a system of values and domestic and foreign policy outweigh the incidental mistakes committed by the Soviet Union. As Camus put it in March 1944: "Anti-communism is the beginning of dictatorship."[19] To illustrate the longevity of the last motive let me quote Claude Roy's editorial from the December 1956 (!) issue of *Esprit* under the title: *Les Flammes de Budapest:* "We reproach Socialist ideology with idealizing man and being blind to his fallibility, but the average American is blinder still. What can one expect from this civilization that mocks and caricatures Western spiritual traditions and is propelling mankind into a horizontal existence, shorn of transcendence and depth?"[20]

III. The Hungarian Context

Pro patria et libertate

This "synchronic" comparison, putting the post World War II Hungarian case into a European perspective has to be combined with a historical one, which includes the dilemmas of Hungarian intellectuals during earlier periods of modern Hungarian history. *Pro patria and libertate,* the early eighteenth-century slogan of Ferenc Rákóczi II's war against the Habsburgs, refers to a problem that has been with us ever since. Translated into modern, more recent terminology: how do national sovereignty and social emancipation or modernization relate to each other? Are they correlative concepts or can the two targets come into conflict? This was a great dilemma for many generations of creative Hungarian intellectuals and those active between 1945 and 1956 were not exceptions either.

Be it Oszkár Jászi or Ignác Darányi, Dezső Szilágyi, Mihály Károlyi or István Tisza or later Gyula Szekfű, Dezső Szabó, István Bethlen, Ernő Garami or Vilmos Vázsonyi, Kálmán Darányi, Gyula Hornyánszki, Gyula Gömbös, László Németh or István Bibó, i.e., politicians in power or in opposition, social scientists, political thinkers, writers or other leading intellectuals, when trying to come up with "national salvation programs" of all kinds, they were generally thinking in

dichotomies, basic cleavages. The most frequently counterposed concepts included revolution vs. counterrevolution, progressive vs. conservative, democratic vs. reactionary, "deep Hungarian" vs. "shallow Hungarian," "kuruc" vs. "labanc",[21] "small Hungarian" vs. "big Hungarian", Eastern orientation vs. Western orientation, "Realpolitiker" vs. prophets, false realists vs. Romantic essentialists,[22] emulating Europe vs. national egoism, healthy Hungarian temper vs. distorting foreign influence, gentlemanlike vs. not gentlemanlike,[23] or "urban" vs. populist.[24] They frequently attached as much or more significance to discrediting the other, the alternative program as to the formulation of their own agenda. There have certainly been alternatives to this dichotomous, occasionally even schisophrenic way of thinking: the idea of a "third way," the search for the "middle way" has been a well-definable trend in Hungarian intellectual history from the reform generations in the 1830s and 1840s through the "Hungarian Victorians," the "bourgeois radicals" of the early twentieth century to populists and reform socialists and reform communists of all shades.[25] Ideas of reasonable compromises were based on a systematic, scholarly exploration of the problems of Hungarian society in the spirit of serving the interests of both the homeland and liberty.[26] These views were generally expressed by personalities without influential positions in state or party administrations, outside political life and with a restricted scope of political action. One can observe that in the political thought of personalities closer to political power bipolarism was frequently gaining ground.

One of the major additional factors of the polarization of intellectual and political life in Hungary, in addition to the European agenda, was the total discrediting of German culture. The nation of Kant, Hegel, Goethe, Schiller, the Humboldt brothers or Thomas Mann was for centuries a major point of orientation for many Hungarian intellectuals. German was the lingua franca of the Central European region, most educational institutions followed the German model, many outstanding scholars and artists studied and gained experience in Germany. Just the same way as it was difficult to be communist and to be critical of the Soviet Union at the same time, Germanophile anti-fascism could hardly exist.

The Issues on a European Cold War Intellectual Agenda

The post World War II Hungarian intellectual landscape was thus not very different from the European one. Post crisis situations call for unambigous clear definitions of guilt and responsibility. Milovan Djilas' point, I think, has quite general validity, "Totalitarianism at the outset is enthusiasm and conviction, only later does it become organizations, authority, careerism."[27] During the short time

in the aftermath of World War II and the unfolding of the Cold War, the minds of the most creative intellectuals of both captive and non-captive nations focused basically on the following issues:

1. The role of the state. The all too powerful state without checks and balances can be a disaster but the weak state cannot protect its citizens. The conservative state can be a major obstacle to modernization whereas the state can be the major driving force of "progressive" economic, social, cultural modernization. In this interpretation the more progressive, the more modern the state, the more powerful the redistribution has to be.
2. Modern political elites have always neglected the fate of the working classes, both industrial and agrarian. If this issue is not resolved, outbursts of social dissatisfaction cannot be avoided.
3. Every nation, every ethnic community has to cherish its "organic" traditions and beware of institutions, habits, way of life imposed on them from outside.
4. Can true patriots report in foreign countries on the sins and crimes committed by their own kin? How do trans- or international class and group solidarities relate to loyalty to the nation and the national state?
5. Small nations, small states are just the toys or puppets of big nations, big countries with very limited scope of action, they are forced to move into directions defined by the great powers.
6. It was assumed that guilt and responsibility can be clearly defined politically-historically just as much as legally.
7. As I have already mentioned, the intellectual platforms on these issues were generally expressed in a complete bipolarity. Not once, more time and energy was devoted to refuting the other "false" view than elaborating one's own ideas. In numerous cases it was also proposed that "my right view" was the progressive and democratic one: if you share my resentment and my option for redemption you are a democrat, if you disagree you are a "reactionary." A powerful example for this rhetoric comes from a leading Hungarian communist intellectual, József Révai who in a *Szabad Nép*[28] article of December 14, 1947 wrote the following about the "third way",[29] "There is no third way but there are people who subscribe to it. They have to be named. That the "third way" does not exist is not a communist, not a leftish social democratic but a democratic view... The road of the struggle against Hungarian reactionaries and external imperialism is wide enough and can accomodate all who are patriots and democrats."[30]
8. When it comes to the criticism of the unveiled practices of the Soviet and other communist parties, for most of the communist or pro-communist "fellow-travellers" distancing themselves from communist parties or Soviet imperialist policy did not mean joining the anti-communist platform.[31]

The conflicting views, clashing political platforms in these debates can be well described with the conceptual framework of scapegoating: most opinions were expressed in an "all inclusive" way trying to give sweeping, comprehensive explanations to complex issues, i.e., enforced attribution, one of the key concepts of scapegoating.

Hungarian Case Studies

In a 1987 interview the sixty-seven-year-old literary historian Péter Nagy said that in his generation intellectuals had approached the Communist Party for two reasons. One group did so because for them during the Horthy period there was not enough democracy, the other group approached the communist party because for them Horthy's political system was not dictatorial enough.[32] Different as these approaches might have been, they shared the view that the arch–conservative Horthy and his associates ruined Hungary, they shared a scapegoat. It was this scapegoat function of the Horthy regime (that in many cases also included a more or less powerful criticism of its social democratic and liberal opposition) that served as a common platform for them. Serious intellectuals with very different expectations and backgrounds met as members or fellow travellers of the Communist Party and became (without, of course, having that intention) co-architects of the totalitarian regime. Typical situations are frequently best presented by extreme cases, so with the help of the extensive literature on the activities of leading Hungarian intellectuals following 1945, let me try to prove my point by a few examples.

1. The careers of two literary historians who from the early 1950s to the mid 1980s were key figures not only on their field but also in Hungarian intellectual life at large. They developed a very close relationship that was greatly shaped by their shared faith in communist ideas. One of them, István Király (1921–1989) came from a family of protestant clergymen, the other Pál Pándi (1926–1987) from an upper middle class Jewish intellectual family. For Pándi his humiliation during the Holocaust, for Király the intellectual impact of the Hungarian populists, who emphasized the utmost misery of rural Hungary, gave an impetus to join the communist movement. Communism promised quick and comprehensive redemption, fast and efficient solution of all major Hungarian social, economic and political problems for them. As bright and well-informed minds, they were fully aware of all the evil that communism was responsible for but they never gave up their loyalty to the movement and the party. Their frequent quarrels were a never ending series of debates on how to be a proper patriotic communist... A patriot who is fully aware of and pays

tribute to the great values of the national cultural heritage and a communist who wants to transform, to educate his people in the spirit of a universally valid theory and its Soviet type incarnation. A hardly reconciliable contradiction that has consumed much of their creative energies and might have contributed to their relatively early deaths.[33]

2. László Németh (1901–1975), the great populist[34] writer, who had done a lot for exploring options for dealing with key issues confronting Hungarian society during the interwar period, described a unique meeting in late March 1947 in Budapest. The other great populist writer, Gyula Illyés organized this encounter with the leading communist party expert of cultural policy, József Révai (1898–1959), inviting also the internationally well-known Marxist Communist philosopher György Lukács (1885–1971). In the course of the conversation Lukács is reported to have offered cooperation to Németh who responded: "Use my brain for concrete tasks as Lenin prescribes it for bourgeois brains!"[35] The conversation had no follow up and the significance of a statement in the course of a private exchange certainly should not be overestimated but this minor episode sheds light on how during the aftermath of World War II communist ideas could occasionally appeal to great intellectuals.
3. On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the death of one of the greatest twentieth century Hungarian poets, Endre Ady (1877–1919), who in his poetry (and journalism) was passionately critical of the political-social establishment of his times, József Révai raised the issue of the politics of hatred. He asked the rhetorical question: how can Ady's mythological hatred against István Tisza (prime minister from 1903 to 1905 and 1913 to 1917, Speaker of the lower chamber of the Hungarian Parliament in 1912–1913, symbol of the political establishment), his pathetic call for revolution, help the simple workers of the day. How can this powerful passion help the realization of day-to-day and longer term plans of peaceful construction? Révai's answer: "...let us not believe that we have finally defeated the forces of the Hungarian Hell and we can dispose of Ady's passionate democratic hatred. It is not our merit but our weakness that we cannot hate the same way as Ady did. We are building socialism, but the forces of the Middle Ages are still with us, and if Ady's great hatred is alien to us, that means our being defenceless against Hunnia's former, not gigantic but insidious and dangerous lords."[36] It was this powerful, "constructive" hatred that appealed to numerous contemporaries who believed in the feasibility of a fast, sweeping rebuilding of Hungarian society.

IV. Conclusion

The 1956 Hungarian revolution played a major role in the liberation of captive minds all over the globe and creative Hungarian intellectuals played a decisive role in preparing it. In this short paper I was trying to outline the contemporary international and the twentieth century Hungarian intellectual context of the making of Hungarian captive minds. Hungarian captive minds shared the fate of many of their predecessors and contemporaries. The fate of those who under the spell of powerful ideologies and scapegoating fantasies[37] were more attracted to political forces promising fast and efficient action than to moral principles calling for tolerance and empathy, is the true legacy of these creative intellectuals.

In 1956 for a quickly vanishing historical moment it looked as if not bipolarity fed by hatred but free, reasonable minds, echoing the best traditions of universal humanism, with a call for liberty and empathy, will become the main driving forces of political action. Both in overall European and Hungarian history this was a most unusual situation and as such was unlikely to last. We have to pay tribute to those creative captive minds who succeeded in ridding themselves of Stalinist captivity and contributed to making the 1956 Hungarian revolution a radiating event of universal history.

Notes

1 I borrowed this concept from Czesław Miłos who used it to describe the state of mind of intellectuals who got under the spell of communist ideas.

2 Peter Gay, *The Cultivation of Hatred.* W.W, Norton & Company, New York–London, 1993.

3 Julien Benda, *The Betrayal of Intellectuals.* The Beacon Press, Boston, 1959, (second printing) 21.

4 *Völkischer Beobachter,* 8. April, 1927. Cited in Hungarian by John Lukács in *Népszabadság,* 6 June 1998, 33.1

5 Cited by Mark Lilla from a 1996 English edition: *The Reckless Mind. Intellectuals in Politics.* New York Review Books, New York, 2001. 57.

6 Cited by Mark Lilla, *op. cit.* 58. This idea was previously also well-formulated by the great late 19th century politically active Prussian historian, Heinrich von Treitscke: "This consciousness of themselves which the nations are acquiring and which can only be strengthened by culture, this conscoiusness means that that war will never disappear from the earth." (Quoted by Benda, *op. cit.,* 14.)

7 Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair. A Study in the Rise of Germanic Ideology.* Anchor Books. Doubleday&Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1965. (First published by the University of California Press in 1961) 8–9.

8 Fritz Stern, *op. cit.,* 11.

9 See footnote 2.

10 Tony Judt, *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945.* The Penguin Press, New York, 2005. 197.

11 Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, 207.
12 Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, 211.
13 Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, 214.
14 Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, 212.
15 Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, 216.
16 Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, 217.
17 Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, 217.
18 Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, 199.
19 Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, 219.
20 Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect. French Intellectuals. 1944–1956.* University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1992. 196.
21 *Kuruc* meaning anti-Habsburg, radical Hungarian nationalist, *labanc* pro-Habsburg, traitor of the Hungarian national cause.
22 In Hungarian: túlfeszült lényeglátók, cf. Dénes, Iván Zoltán, *A "realitás" illúziója. A historikus Szekfű Gyula pályafordulója.* Budapest, 1976.
23 *Úri* és *nem úri* in Hungarian.
24 *Urbánus vs. népies* in Hungarian.
25 Cf. an interesting article by one of the most influential politicians in Hungary between 1920 and 1944, István Bethlen on tradition and revolution in politics: "Hagyomány és forradalom a politikában", *Magyar Szemle,* 1934 február (XX/ 2), 105–118, republished in Romsics, Ignác (szerk.), *Bethlen István: Válogatott politikai írások és beszédek.* Osiris, Budapest, 2000, 158–173. A survey from a reform socialist perspective: Huszár, Tibor, "Az értelmiség-szociológia és -szociográfia hazai történetéhez". In: Huszár, Tibor: *Nemzetlét – nemzettudat – értelmiség.* Magvető, Budapest, 1984. 109–311.
26 "Haza és haladás"
27 Cited by Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, 200.
28 Hungarian communist daily paper.
29 The concept originated from the French socialist politician, Léon Blum and was also frequently used by the Austrian socialist, Oskar Pollak and the Swiss economist, Wilhelm Röpke. The third way was generally identified as a political option betwen the US and the Soviet Union or between communism and "reactionaries".
30 Révai József: "Harmadik út?" In: Révai József: *Élni tudtunk a szabadsággal.* Szikra, Budapest, 1949. 217.
31 Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, 217.
32 In: Csáki, Judit – Kovács, Dezső (szerk.): *Rejtőzködő legendárium.* Szépirodalmi és Szemtanú, Budapest, 1990. 222.
33 Cf.: Csáki, Judit – Kovács, Dezső (szerk.), *op. cit.*, for a series of insightful interviews on Pándi's life and work.
34 I use the term populist (in Hungarian *népi* or *népies*) to describe the group of Hungarian writers and intellectuals who argued that the poverty of the agrarian population, the anachronistic but huge social, economic and political influence of the big latifundia is the greatest obstacle to progress in Hungary.
35 Cited by Huszár Tibor, *op. cit.*, 364.
36 Révai, József: *Élni tudtunk a szabadsággal.* Szikra, Budapest, 1949. 679.
37 Cf. Chapter Four in Vladimir Tismaneanu's *Fantasies of Salvation.* Princeton University Press, 1998. 88–110.