The Transdanubian campaign of Mór Perczel and the battle of Mór (December 30, 1848)
Of the battles and engagements of 1848-49 mostly the great, decisive battles (Pákozd, Schwechat, Kápolna, Isaszeg) have attracted enough attention for monographs or essays, although recently minor engagements (Hatvan, Csorna, Ihász) have also been discussed more frequently. István Görgey published a separate booklet on Mór already in 1867 with the admitted purpose to clear his brother Artúr Görgey of the charges that blamed him for Perczel's defeat at Mór. The defeat has been the subject of lively debates ever since, and this also justifies another attempt to reconstruct its history on the basis of Hungarian and Austrian documents. With regard to its size, it was a minor battle since the total number of the forces deployed on both sized was less than 12.000; on the Hungarian side the Perczel Corps, on the Austrian side two brigades participated in the combat.
Since it is a well documented battle, the events are easy to reconstruct. The author has used numerous memoires besides the official reports for the Hungarian side; for the Austrian side, official documents plus the diary and the recollections of two Austrian officers have provided information. The battle can be divided into four stages:
1) The Perczel Corps repelled the Grammont Brigade attempting to advance from Kisbér.
2) Most of the infantry of the corps advanced into the forest to develop the advantage, but retreated before the counterthrust of the Grammont Brigade, and disintegrated in the process.
3) The Ottinger Brigade just arriving attacked the Hungarian left flank and centre wavering because of the retreating infantry, forcing both to retreat.
4) During the pursuit the brigade captured hundreds of prisoners and took five cannons.
The primary cause of the defeat was Perczel's carelessness. He had failed to inform of the plan of the attack either Görgei or Colonel Ferdinánd Karger, commander of the nearest brigade of the Army of the Upper Danube. He allowed the enemy to take the advantageous position before Mór, making possible the outflanking of his own left wing. The other cause was the composition of the two parties. The troops deployed by Jellačić did not exceed Percel's in number, but his heavy cavalry outnumbered the Hungarian hussars three to one. In addition, Jellačić used the bulk of his forces to attack the Hungarian left wing, thereby creating a local superiority. With the Hungarian left flank crushed, the centre and the right wing was forced to retreat as well. It should be noted, of course, that in case the battle were protracted, Jellačić could count on the arrival of at least seven hundred troops of the Hartlieb Division. The defeat was, therefore, inevitable.
The consequences of the battle were fatal. The Army of the Upper Danube led by Görgei had to undertake the defence of all the roads leading to the capital. Thereby his defensive line became so long that he had to concentrate his troops near the capital. This resulted in the resolution of the National Defence Committee and the Parliament to evacuate the capital and transfer the seat of government to Debrecen.
It is a different question that there was little chance of defending the capital even if Perczel's army had won or remained intact. The main Hungarian army to be concentrated before the capital would still siginificantly be outnumbered by that of Windisch-Grätz. What did make a difference, however, was whether a part of the Hungarian army executed its retreat relatively intact or thrashed to pieces.
