Mario Brdar & Rita Brdar-Szabó: Metonymies we (don't) translate by
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Metonymies we (don't) translate by

The case of complex metonymies

Abstract

A discussion of metonymy in translation practice can mean two things. On the one hand, we may be interested in finding out how we (can/should) translate metonymic expressions in a given context (i.e. where metonymies constitute part of the object of the translation process). On the other hand, we may also be interested in finding out how and why something could/should be translated by means of metonymic expressions. In other words, metonymy can also function as a translation tool or strategy. Ideally, the two go hand in hand when we translate a metonymic expression in the source language text by means of a metonymic expression in the target language text. The two metonymies may be cognates, i.e. equivalents, but they may also be different, although related (e.g. one may replace a low-level metonymy by a high-level one). This is not the only possibility: in fact we have two other possibilities here: a non-metonymic expression can be translated by a metonymic one, and conversely, a metonymic expression can be translated by a non-metonymic one. In this article we concentrate on the translation of some complex metonymies. It will be demonstrated that here the situation is more complicated than suggested above, i.e. there is a fourth possibility, which is a combination of the first and the third possibility. There are namely many metonymic expressions that involve two or more metonymic tiers such that one of them may actually get lost in translation. In the final section we speculate on some possible reasons for this situation, and extend the perspective to consider the relationship between metonymy and word-formation in general.
Keywords: metonymy, complex metonymy, translation, word formation, compound

1 Introduction

A sort of naïve expectation that an article like the present one may give rise to is that the most appropriate ways of translating metonymy, say along the lines of strategies proposed by Newmark (1985) for translating metaphor, will be suggested. This is of course precisely what a single presentation of this length cannot provide, the most compelling reason being the fact that such an all-round recipe for the translation of metonymy is impossible. Instead of trying to provide an answer to the first question, in this presentation we propose to consider how cognitive linguistics can help us: (i) become more aware of possible problems, and therefore, (ii) more easily find appropriate solutions when dealing with metonymy and related phenomena in translation practice. Note that the two are, after all, very closely related. As noted by Feyaerts (2003: 7), metaphor and translation are two processes of semantic change, they face the same challenge, from an onomasiological point of view, of finding co(n)textually appropriate linguistic means to express complex content. We could also add that the same applies to metonymy.

However, it is also possible to turn the tables, and ask how translation practice, i.e. the use of translation as a method in data gathering, can help cognitive linguists in better understanding

metonymy. Our contention is that research on metonymy shows that cognitive linguistics and translation studies can cross-fertilize each other in more than one way, and that data gained through the translation method can be a very useful complement to other types of data, bridging the gap between intuition and some more empirical sources of data such as corpus-based research, the study of language acquisition, or contrastive and typological research. After all, it is well-known that translation was by far the most popular methodologies in contrastive linguistics, in particular in combination with a corpus of authentic data. These original data may be paired with their translations in a number of ways. The translation of authentic data can be elicited, which typically means working with a smaller number of small chunks of targeted data, e.g. individual sentences, but alternative translations can be provided for the same language, or for a number of languages, which may be very useful in some cases. We can even combine non-authentic, i.e. constructed, data with elicited translation, and we can even elicit back-translation.

While contrastive linguistics in general, and in particular the vertical (or more contrastive-typologically oriented) one is primarily intent on finding out whether there is a sort of global equivalence between linguistic systems, translation as one of the methods used to contrast languages can uncover a number of details that might otherwise go undetected if we relied on various other types of *tertium comparations* not based on direct translation equivalence of authentic texts. Applied to the study of metonymy, we could say that while cross-linguistic comparisons may detect which metonymy types are in principle available, exercises in the translation of metonymies can help uncover some conditions of their use at the token level, primarily seen in the cultural and discoursal context. Specifically, translation as a method complementing other types of contrastive analyses may provide insights into fine-grained differences and similarities between languages in this area.

Unless their source is specifically indicated, all the translational data used in the present article are elicited translations provided by native speakers of Croatian and Hungarian, respectively. They were all fairly proficient speakers of English enrolled at Josip Jural Strossmayer University (Osijek) and Loránd Eötvös University (Budapest), respectively.

A discussion of metonymy in translation practice can mean two things. On the one hand, we may be interested in finding out how we (can/should) translate metonymic expressions in a given context (i.e. where metonymies constitute part of the object of the translation process). On the other hand, we may also be interested in finding out how and why something could/should be translated by means of metonymic expressions. In other words, metonymy can also function as a translation tool or strategy. Ideally, the two go hand in hand when we translate a metonymic expression in the source language text by means of a metonymic expression in the target language text. The two metonymies may be cognates, i.e. equivalents, but they may also be different, although related (e.g. one may replace a low-level metonymy by a high-level one). This is not the only possibility, in fact we have three basic possibilities here:



Figure 1: Overview of the possibilities in translating (non-)metonymies by (non-)metonymies.

The choice between these basic possibilities of handling a metonymic expression in a translation situation depends on a number of factors, such as the type of metonymy in question (in terms of its regularity, its complexity, the kind of relation involving parts and wholes, its cognitive and pragmatic function), the language pair involved in the translation situation (including their cultural background and structural givens), and the type of (con)text. In this article we will not be interested in the possibility in the upper right-hand corner of the table. We will not be primarily interested in the two possibilities in the lower right-hand corner either. Instead, we concentrate on cases when a metonymic expression is apparently translated by a non-metonymic one, i.e. we will be concerned with the possibility in the lower left-hand corner of Figure 1. More specifically, we focus on the translation of some complex metonymies. It will be demonstrated that the situation is more complicated here than suggested by the above, i.e. there is another possibility, which is a combination of the possibility in the lower left-hand corner and either of the two greyed-out possibilities in the lower right-hand-corner. There are namely many metonymic expressions that involve two or more metonymic tiers such that one of them may actually get lost in translation. We first illustrate in Section 2 some cases where a metonymic expression is apparently not translated by a metonymy in another language. While in some cases this may simply be due to the fact that the items involved are culturally less salient, i.e. less well-entrenched in the culture associated with the target language (Croatian or Hungarian in our examples), than in the culture associated with the source language (English), this may also be caused by the complexity of metonymies involved. In Section 3 we study some cases where regular metonymy-induced polysemy in one language indicative of two potential metonymic tiers is systematically translated into another language by means of morphological (word formation) constructions, exhibiting only a single potential metonymic tier. In the final section we speculate on possible reasons for this situation, and extend the perspective to consider the relationship between metonymy and word-formation in general.

2 Metonymies not translated by metonymies: the role of cultural entrenchment and of structural factors

In some recent works metonymy is claimed to be a cluster of related reference point phenomena (Langacker 1999). Croft & Cruse (2004: 47), as well as Paradis (2004), thus distinguish three types of construals that are commonly referred to as metonymy in the literature. Considering the fact that the conceptual distance between the meaning of the metonymic vehicle and the metonymic target in the case of metonymic expressions arising through facetization as well as those of the active zone type is minimal, with hardly any noticeable shift in the direction of what we might call figurative meaning, it is no wonder that these metonymies are so common. They are common in terms of the number of specific instances (both types and tokens) and they are also common in terms of their being wide-spread across languages. They are so common that they are virtually inconspicuous, and this also explains why they are also frequently so inconspicuous in a translation situation. Consider the following German example of an active zone from Günter Grass' novel *Blechtrommel* and its English translation (*The Tin Drum*) containing an equivalent metonymy. What is meant here by German *Flüsse* and English *rivers* is not the whole bodies of water but just their surface.

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(1) *Im Winter, wenn die **Flüsse** vereist waren…*[1]
in winter when DEF rivers frozen-over were
'In winter, when the rivers were frozen over'

(2) *In winter when the **rivers** were frozen over…*[2]

Sometimes the reason for not rendering a metonymy in the source text by means of a metonymy in the translation may be that the metonymy in question is culturally so specific that it would be lost in translation, i.e. the translated text would be in part less intelligible because the speaker of the target language cannot be expected to be able to draw rich encyclopaedic knowledge necessary to work out the metonymy, even though we might be dealing with an example of the active zone type of metonymy. As an example of this consider the following example from the TV serial *The West Wing*:

(3) *– It's **Korematsu** all over again. – And there's a reason Korematsu's never been overturned. – (Are) you defending Japanese internment?'*

The proper name *Korematsu* is used in this SALIENT PARTICIPANT FOR THE EVENT metonymy to refer to a court case known as Korematsu vs. United States. On May 19, 1942, during World War II, American citizens of Japanese descent were compelled to move into relocation camps by a Civilian Restrictive Order. Fred Korematsu, a U.S.-born Japanese American, decided to stay in San Leandro, California and thus knowingly violate a Civilian Exclusion Order of the U.S. Army. He argued that the orders were unconstitutional and that they violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He was arrested and convicted. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for evading internment, but it was challenged by Korematsu and finally overturned on November 10, 1983.

In the translation (actually in the subtitles) on one of the Croatian TV channels, the first mention of *Korematsu* was replaced by a phrase that can actually be seen as spelling out the metonymic target (literally 'Korematsu case'), the second was simply replaced by a lexical item *tužba* ('legal action/statement of claim, (com)plaint'):

(4) *Ponavlja se **slučaj Korematsu**.*
repeats REFL case Korematsu
'The Korematsu case repeats itself'

Alternatively, this might have been rendered as *predmet Korematsu*, literally 'case Korematsu'. Note that this would be translated into Hungarian by means of a compound, either as *Korematsu-eset* or *Korematsu-ügy*, literally "Korematsu-case'.

3 Complex metonymies

The reasons for not translating a metonymy by means of a metonymy may be of structural nature. Metonymies may be lacking or be less well-entrenched in a given language due to the structural givens of the language in question and because the target language prefers the use of

[1] Grass, Günter: *Die Blechtrommel*. Frankfurt am Main & Hamburg: Fischer Bücherei KG, 1964.
[2] Grass, Günter: *The Tin Drum*. Transl. by Ralph Manheim. London: Secker & Warburg, 1962.

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certain explicit means of resolving polysemy. This is particularly true in cases of complex metonymies.

It has been noted that multiple conceptual shifts are possible, breaking up "complex conceptual mappings into simple, well-motivated mappings with a strong experiential basis" (Hilpert 2007: 80). These are cases of metonymic operations stacked onto each other, producing double or even triple metonymies (Ruiz de Mendoza & Mairal 2007). Such metonymic chains are referred to as multi-level metonymies (cf. Barcelona 2007), or as metonymic tiers in Brdar & Brdar-Szabó (2007).

Such double complex metonymies may be in actual fact much more common than usually supposed. Discussing one of the notorious examples of referential metonymy:

(5) *The first **violin** has the flu*.

Panther and Radden (1999: 9) note that

> [a]s a musical instrument, a violin is immediately associated with a violinist as the player of that instrument. Moreover, the first violinist is defined as a member or a larger group of musicians, the symphony orchestra. Among the musicians or the orchestra, the first violinist is the most outstanding member. Finally, our knowledge of orchestras includes, among other things, the notion of music and its representation in scores. The predication *has the flu* as well as the attribute *first* trigger a non-literal interpretation of the noun phrase *the first violin.* Thus, the metonymic reading in [12] involves a shift from the instrument to the musician as the most readily available element in the frame. Through this metonymic shift, the reference point ('the first violin') is backgrounded and the desired target ('the first violinist') is foregrounded.

A sentence like (6) is a clear example of the expression in question referring to the musician (note the feminine personal pronoun as anaphor):

(6) *... and then a moment later I realized that **the first violin was playing** it with an intensity that had **her** practically flying out of her chair*.

The same expression could in (7) be construed as referring to something more abstract, viz. the function or the role of the instrument in the orchestra:

(7) *Of course, I adore playing **the first violin** again, particularly live, but I…*

The expression "the first violin" could also be used to refer to the section of the orchestra. This means that we in fact may have more than one metonymic layer in some examples, the shift goes from the function of the instrument and/or the scores intended for the instrument or its sound to the instrument, and then to the musician performing on it, in the usual way, as in *The sax has the flu*.

Assuming such a framework, we note that *black belt* in (8) below qualifies as a double-tiered metonymy here because we first have an object which in karate or judo stands metonymically for a certain level of expertise and skill in these martial arts. On top of this first tier, we have an object standing for its possessor, i.e. the belt stands for the person having it, thus linking the skill with the person.

(8) *A lot of people used to think I* was ***a black belt*** *just because I was a professional athlete…* (http://goodmenproject.com/featured-content/heart-of-a-beginner/, accessed May 12, 2014)

Such complex metonymies may be reduced in translation to a single metonymy. Consider example (8) and its Croatian translation in (9):

(9) *Puno ljudi je mislilo da* ***imam crni pojas*** *samo zato što*
many people AUX thought that have black belt just because
sam profesionalni sportaš.
am professional athlete
'Many people thought I had a black belt just because I was a professional athlete'

The second metonymic tier, where the object stands for the possessor, is missing in the Croatian translation, the expression in question cannot normally be used in the predicative position following the subject and the copula verb. Rather, the same idea is expressed by means of the verb of possession followed by a simple metonymy, literally 'that I have a black belt'. Equivalent double metonymies are in this case only attested in the jargon of the martial arts insiders, not even in a sort of common sports jargon, let alone in everyday speech. Interestingly, it is hardly found in subject position in Croatian as a double metonymy, referring to a person, not even in the specialized jargon.

Note that suffixation with the relational suffix *-s* is found as the counterpart of ***black belt*** in Hungarian:

(10) *Ki is az a* ***Fekete Öves****?*
who really that the black belt.SUFF
'Who is after all that Black Belt?

In other words, the person as the metonymic target is virtually impossible, i.e. complex metonymies are effectively pre-empted by the implementation of this word formation strategy. Hungarian, as a matter of fact, happens to systematically avoid metonymic bahuvrihi compounds, relying on the same mechanism. The same strategy is employed in the case of 'first violin'. While it is clear in (11) that the metonymic target is the function or role:

(11) *Ez után az* ***első hegedű*** *veszi át a dallamot,…*
this after the first violin.SUFF take.3SG over the melody.ACC
(https://sites.google.com/site/tardosbela/Home/nehany-murol, accessed May 12, 2014)
'After this the first viloin takes over the melody'

there is no metonymy in (12-13), in which we note the suffixed noun. In other words, there is a division of labour in Hungarian between the simple noun and the complex noun derived from the former by means of the suffix –*s*, and the latter is therefore not found in metonymic use:

(12) *Takács 1989 óta a Finn Rádió Szimfonikus Zenekarában* ***első hegedűs****.*
Takács 1989 since the Finnish Radio Symphonic orchestra-in first violin
'Takács has been the first violin in the Finnish Radio Symphonic Orchestra since 1989'

(13) *Öt perc múlva* ***az első hegedűs*** *ismét leteszi a hangszert,…*
five minutes later the first violin.SUFF again down.put.3SG the instrument.ACC
'Five minutes later, the first violin again puts down the instrument'

It could be claimed that there is a metonymy in the above examples, if we assume that the suffixation in question is a deadjectival conversion, i.e. it is originally an adjective used as a premodifier of a general noun such as *ember* 'man', *nő* 'woman', *fiú* 'boy', *mester* 'craftsman', etc., which is then used eliptically without the general noun and subsequently converted to a noun (cf. Kiefer & Ladányi 2000: 189-191, but also Laczkó 2000: 437-438). If we agree that they are outcomes of conversions they would also be analyzed as metonymies in the manner of Dirven (1999). However, it is also possible to assume that such a conversion may have taken place at a given point in time with a given number of suffixations, but that *–s* was in such complex words reanalysed at a later point as a noun-forming suffix. Note that there are a number of well-entrenched nouns suffixed by –s, such as *anyós* 'mother-in-law', *após* 'father-in-law', *játékos* 'player', or *kapus* 'goalie/goalkeeper', and even some among the nouns denoting professions (which are listed as one of the classes involving conversion in Kiefer & Ladányi 2000), such as *portás* 'doorman'. It would be very difficult to find a general noun functioning as their head, or their respective heads, in non-elliptical constructions if they were originally adjectives. The appropriate sense of *kapus* is defined in Pusztai (2003) as *kapuvédő*, literally 'goal.defender', i.e. there is no attempt to provide a general noun (corresponding to 'man' or 'player') that would be modified by the adjective *kapus*. Incidentally, *kapus* in its adjectival use is said to be rare and is defined as *vmilyen kapuval ellátott* 'provided with/having a gate'. This ornative sense is very far away from the meaning of *kapus* used as a noun. The adjectival sense of *kapus* needed for the paraphrases leading to conversion would need to be very general, and it is a real mystery why it should not be recorded in dictionaries. Another piece of evidence supporting the view that items like *hegedűs* in (12-13) are nouns formed from nouns or verbs rather than adjectives converted to nouns is the fact that in colloquial spoken language the final long vowel may get shortened. This is less likely to happen in the case of *hegedűs* used as a genuine adjective in:

(14) *… és mindig azt kéri, hogy a* ***hegedűs zene*** *szóljon.*
and always that requests that DEF violin.SUFF music sound.SUBJ
'… and always asks for violin music'
(http://www.magyarszo.com/hu/2247/Velemeny_Jegyzet_Ruzsfolt/107533/Anya-t% C3 %A1ncolni!.html)

This variation in the length of the vowel shows in the use of this lexeme as a family name, where both *Hegedűs* and *Hegedüs* are recorded.

The suffix *–s* is claimed to produce nouns directly from nominal bases in Keszler (2000: 318-320) and Keszler & Lengyel (2008: 128-131), as in *fazekas* 'potter', *gyümölcsös* 'orchard', *órás* 'watchmaker', etc.

All this points in the direction of nouns in *–s* being the output of suffixation rather than of conversion preceeded by suffixation. But even if we accept the conversion analysis and the metonymy accompanying it, the point we make above is in no danger. Metonymy or no metonymy in the case of *(első) hegedűs*, Hungarian still does not stack two metonymies, i.e. it does not produce a complex metonymy.

A similar phenomenon can be observed in the case of certain nouns denoting animals. They can be used metonymically to refer to the meat of animals. The term 'animal grinding' has been used to refer to specific cases of the phenomenon variably called logical metonymy, logical polysemy, or regular polysemy, i.e. to those cases in which one and the same label can be used to refer holistically to the animal species or specimen as well as to the flesh of the animal in question, not necessarily always conceived of as foodstuff, i.e. as the meat of that animal, as illustrated in the following English examples:

(15) a. *We did not always eat **turkey** for Christmas dinner.*
b. *Mom and dad got word that I ate goat and just thought, "Oh, that's such an Erika thing to do, eat **goat**.*" (http://www.dadamo.com/B2blogs/blogs/index.php/2005/01/22/holy-goat?blog=13, accessed May 12, 2014)

In the cognitive linguistic literature this is treated as a subtype of WHOLE-FOR-PART metonymy, specifically OBJECT-FOR-MATERIAL-CONSTITUTING-THE-OBJECT within the *Constitution ICM* (Radden & Kövecses 1999: 32). The lexical item labelling the concept of the whole animal stands here only for a particular aspect of the whole animal, i.e. its bodily substance/flesh/meat as processed and used as foodstuff. The substance that we use as food is only part of the whole animal's body, as animals are skinned, boned, etc., and usually it is not the whole carcass that is meant, but rather some smaller portion of it.

Although this metonymy may appear fairly productive as far as English is concerned, which is also suggested by the terms used in some unification frameworks, such as logical metonymy/polysemy, or regular polysemy, an examination of cross-linguistic data reveals a slightly different picture. While this sort of conceptual conversion is certainly more or less always available in theory as an open pattern, the fact is that it is not so regularly made use of. Of course, one of the factors diminishing the productivity of this metonymy is the well-known historical incident in the course of which a number of lexical items were borrowed from Norman French that denoted the meat of certain domestic and wild animals, thus effectively blocking the polysemy from obtaining in a series of native Anglo-Saxon items (e.g. *cow – beef, calf – veal, pig – pork, sheep – mutton, deer – venison*). In many other cases, we have a replacement by a N + N combination, with *meat* as the second noun.

As might have been expected, French exhibits regular metonymy in the case of the exceptional items listed for English above. *Mouton* is used, similarly to English *hogget*, to refer to sheep, its meat, and also to sheepskin. *Vache* in addition to functioning as the counterpart of *cow* is also used to refer to 'cowhide', *boeuf*, on the other hand, not only means 'beef' but also 'ox/steer' (note also the use of both *viande de vache* 'meat of cow', and *viande de boeuf* 'meat of ox'). *Porc* denotes both 'pig' and 'pork' (next to *viande de porc*, 'meat of pig'). Finally, *veau* denotes both 'calf' and 'veal' (next to *viande de veau* 'meat of calf').

The pattern of the replacement of metonymy by means of the N + *meat* combination, realized as a compound noun, is quite wide-spread in German (with *Fleisch* 'meat' as the second constituent, i.e. as the compound head):

(16) *Schweinefleisch* 'pig-meat', *Rindfleisch* 'cattle-meat', *Schafsfleisch* 'sheep-meat', *Ziegenfleisch* 'goat-meat'

A word for word translation of the English examples in (15) into German would be decidedly odd, as the examples would convey the idea that the unprocessed animal as whole was eaten,

complete with bones, skin, innards, hoofs, horns, etc, which would be more appropriate if the subject were a carnivorous animal, but it works with *Lamm* 'lamb' or *Ente* 'duck', even if *-fleisch* is ellipted.

Hungarian exhibits the same behaviour, i.e. it has compounds with *hús* 'meat' as the second constituent, i.e. as the compound head:

(17) *sertéshús* 'pig-meat', *marhahús* 'cattle-meat', *birkahús* 'sheep-meat', *kecskehús* 'goat-meat'

Cases of ellipsis with the ommision of *hús* may be observed in some ostensive contexts (just like in Croatian), but this does not work all the time. In order to check this we performed a Google search for the exact sequence "*egy kiló sertés*" 'one kilogram pig'. It retrieved 6,510 hits, out of which we perused the first 100 items, including repetitions which appeared after the 40 most relevant results were displayed). It turns out that the lexeme *sertés* alone was not used there to metonymically refer to the meat of the animal. Instead the lexeme was followed by *hús*, either spelt as a compound or misspelt as two words. In a number of instances it was followed by words denoting certain chunks of meat such as *karaj* 'chop', *comb* 'leg/ham' or *pecsenye* 'roast joint', by *darálthús* 'minced meat', or quite irrelevantly by *zsír* 'fat' or *ára* 'price'.

A language such as Croatian, which unlike Germanic languages or Hungarian, virtually lacks compounding as a word formation process, resorts to other syntactic or morphological means. First of all, for all cases of animals that are, culturally speaking, less usual or unusual as potential foodstuffs, there is the phrasal expression *meso (od)* X_{gen} 'meat of X'. However, the most important strategy is suffixation, with a cluster of related suffixes, *-ina*, -V*tina* and –V*vina*, used to derive the names of meat of various animals:

(18) a. *govedina* 'beef'
b. *svinjetina* 'pork', *prasetina* 'piglet meat', *teletina* 'veal', *ovčetina* 'mutton', *koz(l)etina* 'goat meat', *guščetina* 'goose meat', *piletina* 'chicken meat', *konjetina* 'horse meat', *jeletina* 'deer meat', *jaretina* 'kid meat', *janjetina* 'lamb meat', *zečetina* 'rabbit meat', *nojetina* 'ostrich meat'
c. *tunjevina* 'tuna meat', *veprovina* 'boar meat', *kitovina* 'whale meat', *jelenovina* 'deer meat'

It is interesting to note that, if required, names for the meat of almost any animal can be coined by using one of these suffixes, e.g. *tigrovina* 'meat of a tiger', *zmijetina* 'meat of a snake', *slonetina* "meat of an elephant', i.e. it is at least as productive as reclassification in English (cf. Brdar 2007).

Summing up what we have seen in the case of animal grinding, we can say that the application of this metonymy is seriously constrained in a number of languages and that this also appears in translation, so that translating English utterances using the items in (15) would in languages such as German, Hungarian or Croatian (just like in many other Slavic languages, cf. Brdar 2009), result in the loss of this facetization type of metonymy. The concepts in question are expressed by means of compound nouns or suffixations.

It is interesting, however, to note that these nouns can in special contexts be used as complex metonymies. They can also easily be used as double or two-tiered metonymies, e.g. when we have an ostensive context in which a dish made out of the meat of one of these animals is contrasted with dishes prepared from the meat of other animals, as in:

Mario Brdar & Rita Brdar-Szabó: Metonymies we (don't) translate by
Argumentum 10 (2014), 232-247
Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó

(19) … *so we headed there where, yes, I ordered* ***turkey****… and loved every single bite…*

Here the name of the animal stands for the meat of that animal, which in turn stands for a dish made using that meat. Translating this into Croatian, we get, as might have been expected, the suffixation that is normally used to denote the meat of the animal, but is now used as a metonymy:

(20) … *da, naručio sam* ***puretinu****,… i uživao u svakom zalogaju…*
yes ordered.1SG AUX turkey.SUFF and enjoyed in every morsel
'Yes, I ordered turkey, and I enjoyed every morsel'

This means that instead of a series of two metonymies, we may get a single metonymy in the translation, which qualifies as a translation by means of a different metonymy, considering the fact that the single metonymic vehicle in the source language is matched with a metonymic vehicle in the target language, which is normally not its default translation equivalent.

Let us now turn to some instances of the reverse of the OBJECT-FOR-MATERIAL-CONSTITUTING-THE-OBJECT metonymy, viz. to MATERIAL FOR OBJECT MADE OF THE MATERIAL. It is quite productive in English, as shown by the fact that numerous lexical items that primarily denote substances, e.g. lexemes for metals, which are inherently non-count, can be used to refer to a whole range of objects made of that metal. Cf. the following series of examples with *silver*. In (21), the lexeme is used to refer to the substance, but in (22) we note a metonymic shift whereby the noun comes to denote some unspecified piece of that metal, which Oxford English Dictionary (Simpson & Weiner, 1992) glosses as "a piece or strip of silver".

(21) a. *Silver is the top pick for 2007 but trade carefully*
If 2007 proves to be a stormy year in financial markets, as this column predicted last week, then precious metals look the most solid investment choice. However, precious metals would likely also tumble in a global capital market sell-off, along with oil and other commodity prices. (http://www.ameinfo.com/blog/financial-planning/silver-is-the-top-pick-for-but-trade-carefully/, accessed May 12, 2014)
b. *But industrial* ***silver*** *is used for its physical properties, corrosion resulting in failures; in museums, when corrosion products change the visual appearance of the art objects, they also form a protective coating, slowing down the corrosion process.* (http://www.iaq.dk/iap/iaq2003/2003_15.htm, accessed May 12, 2014)

(22) *They are connected, all the zincs by one wire, and all the* ***silvers*** *by another wire*. (http://www.forgottenbooks.org/readbook_text/Theory_and_Practice_of_Electro-Deposition_Including_1000757765/117, accessed May 12, 2014)

In addition to (21-22), the same dictionary lists *silver* as having a series of derived meanings. It can be used in the sense of 'silver medal', 'silver coin' (which is further metonymically extended to mean "price of something in silver'), 'silver thread':

(23) a. *To have won one gold medal and two* ***silvers*** *in those Games was not only phenomenal, it was historic.*

b. *The only US gold coins that he has are a 1883 $20, an 1898 $10, an 1897 $5 and some **silvers** that we still need to sort through*. (http://www.coincommunity.com/forum/topic.asp?ARCHIVE=true&TOPIC_ID=7501, accessed May 12, 2014)

Silver, sometimes pure, but more usually as alloy, i.e. mixed with other metals, is used to produce a range of jewelry and valuable household items. Even the artifacts made from materials other than silver but which have a silver coating or plating layer on the object are referred to as *silver(s)*:

(24) a. *Too much polishing can wear down the finish on some **silvers**. Items which are coated or plated should be washed by hand often and polished only once or twice per year. As long as silver is cleansed regularly and stored properly, there's no need to polish **silver** more than once a year.* (http://www.essortment.com/clean-polish-silver-46603.html, accessed May 12, 2014)
b. *Dip your **silvers** (jewellery, cutlery, etc.) in water used for boiling potatoes. Wash with soap after an hour. This will bring back the sparkle.* (http://www.gujaratplus.com/food/fd/kitchen/tips/index.html, accessed May 12, 2014)

In the domain of colours (colour being a very salient property of this metal) *silver* can be used to refer to 'silver tincture' (in heraldry), or 'silvery colour or lustre':

(25) *DEEP Chocolate beauties should steer clear of ashy shades (light pinks, pale blues, some **silvers**) that leave behind a fake frosty finish. Warm it up with 1. Becca Eye Colour Shimmer in Jacquard*;…

Probably the most exotic use of *silver*, clearly a metonymic shift based on the colour aspect of silver, is to refer to particular varieties of various animals, fish and insects that have silvery colour or markings making them distinct from other (sub)varieties. This is again a complex metonymy (metal → color → animal phenotype). Cf. some examples of this use:

(26) a. *The exquisite **silvers** are considered the most ethereal of all Persian* (http://www.cfa.org/Breeds/BreedsKthruR/Persian.aspx, accessed May 12, 2014)
b. *There are two very different silver salmon this month. Early in the month, trolling the deep cold waters off Admiralty and Shelter Island and Icy Strait, we find huge schools of **silvers**, running from a few feet to a few hundred feet deep, following the schools of bait on the way to those creeks where they will eventually spawn and die.* (http://www.capitalcityweekly.com/stories/091405/boatbroker_20050915003.shtml)
c. *June bugs with panache, jewel scarabs come in colors that rival gemstones. Heat and humidity during their development may influence color: Some green species produce a pink form, and some **silvers** turn gold*. (http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0102/postcards2b.html, accessed May 12, 2014)

As might be expected, these again do not lend themselves to translation into Croatian or Hungarian as complex metonymies. The Croatian equivalent of *silver* in (26a) is *srebrno osjenčana perzijska mačka*, lit. 'silver-ly shadowed Persian cat,' while the counterpart of *silver* in (26b) is *srebrni losos* 'silvery salmon'. The Hungarian counterparts are *ezüst perzsa (macska)* 'silvery Persian (cat)', and *ezüst lazac* 'silvery salmon', respectively.

Mario Brdar & Rita Brdar-Szabó: Metonymies we (don't) translate by
Argumentum 10 (2014), 232-247
Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó

4 Concluding remarks on possible motivation

In the introductory section we stated that data gained through the translation method can be a very useful complement to other types of data in cognitive linguistics, bridging the gap between intuition and some more empirical sources of data such as corpus-based research, the study of language acquisition, or contrastive and typological research. Naturally, this applies to the research on metonymy as well. We are of course aware of the fact that translation data may contain a certain amount of "noise", i.e. they may be skewed due to some intrinsic aspects of the translation process, e.g. the parallels between languages, or their lack, may be distorted due to a whole range of reasons, among which stylistic factors may be very important. However, when we discount such "non-systematic" causes of variation we may be able to observe interesting correlations.

Mandelblit's (1995) *Cognitive Translation Hypothesis* provides for two possible scenarios in the translation of metaphors. *Similar Mapping Condition* obtains if no conceptual shift occurs between languages, while in the case of *Different Mapping Condition* a conceptual shift takes place from source language to target language. In order to check the difference between the two scenarios, Mandelblit (1995: 493) used the time parameter, and concluded that "the difference in reaction time is due to a conceptual shift that the translator is required to make between the conceptual mapping systems of the source and target languages." She has found that metaphorical expressions take more time and are more difficult to translate if they exploit a cognitive domain quite different from that of the target language equivalent expression. This was also confirmed by Tirkkonen-Condit's (2002) study.

Taking into consideration the fact that by definition the conceptual distance between the source and the target concept is much smaller in the case of metonymy than in the case of metaphor, we have a natural explanation for the relative ease with which many utterances with metonymic expressions can be translated. In addition to the fact that the conceptual distance between metonymic sources and metonymic targets is much smaller, as they are both within the same domain, the search in the target language is, as a rule, reduced to establishing whether there is an equivalent domain available in the target language or not. This, however, also implies that if the conceptual distance is increased in the case of metonymy, and this is what happens in the case of complex metonymies, translation equivalence may be more difficult to achieve.

It has been claimed in Brdar-Szabó (2009: 334) that the complexity of metonymic layering (resulting from a combination of several superimposed metonymies of the same functional type, or from a mix of functionally different types) has to be considered as another important aspect in metonymy typologies and also as a new factor in motivating certain cross-linguistic differences. Individual languages may vary with respect to how many such layers or levels they allow under certain circumstances.

Let us point out that, according to Thornburg and Panther (1997), as well as Panther and Thornburg (1998, 1999) the interpretation of indirect speech acts is based on the activation of a certain part of a cognitive model. Specifically, the interpretation of the indirect speech act is based on the metonymic evocation of the whole model or one of its parts through a previous activation of another part of the model. This idea about the metonymic motivation of indirect speech acts, first formulated by Gibbs (1994: 351ff.), has been worked out in more detail in a series of studies by Panther and Thornburg. Their speech act scenario model is based on the assumption that any element of an illocutionary scenario or a speech act scenario can stand metonymically for the whole of the associated illocutionary category. The central component

of the model is the idea that our knowledge about illocutionary categories is organized in the form of so-called illocutionary scenarios as an information package, stored in our long-term memory, and accessible to all members of a linguistic community, so that a brief hint at a particular component of the associated scenario suffices to activate the whole illocutionary category, or at least to point in its direction. As far as the productivity of illocutionary metonymies is concerned, Panther and Thornburg put forward the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1
The more distant a speech act scenario component is from the CORE, the weaker is its ability to evoke the scenario metonymically. In other words, the more conceptually removed a component is from the CORE, the less likely that component will be in a *stand for* (metonymic) relation to the scenario as a whole. (1998: 761)

Hypothesis 2
The more components of a scenario present in a discourse, the easier it is to identify the scenario and the more likely even a relatively peripheral component can stand metonymically for the scenario. (1998: 768)

It will be seen that their Hypothesis 1 is actually compatible with our claim about complex metonymies.

All this would imply that complex metonymies would in general be more difficult to translate across languages, i.e. this would be a universal phenomenon, and there would be no significant differences between languages. However, we have demonstrated that certain languages can more easily accommodate some complex metonymies, while some other languages are more prone to replace one of the ingredients of the complex by a non-metonymic counterpart. There are, in our opinion, several mutually related reasons for why some languages are, so to say, "more metonymic" than some others. Most of them have to do with some structural facts concerning the languages in question. Below we address just one of these, viz. the issue of metonymy-based polysemy tolerance and its avoidance in various languages by means of word-formation constructions.

Both metonymy and word-formation can be viewed as ways of packaging semantic material into words, i.e. as lexicalization strategies in the sense of Lehrer (1992: 249). They are both based on recycling existing lexemes. However, they are complementary in their function, as far as the functional notion of the elastic stability of the linguistic system is concerned (Mathesius 1976). In order to be able to function as an effective means of communication, ensuring adequate margin of intersubjectivity and mutual intelligibility among its speakers, language must be stable enough. On the other hand, the extralinguistic reality that language is used to communicate about is in a constant flux and change, with a continuous rise of new concepts that need to be lexicalized, as well as the potential need to talk about these and others in new ways. This means that language must be an open code, elastic enough to make possible certain changes, not only innovations, but also repairs if its stability is endangered by some innovations. In other words, language must be elastic enough to allow all this to take place. This elastic stability is also at work in human languages balancing between transparent and opaque coding strategies, i.e. between isomorphy and anisomorphy. Isomorphy is a one-to-one relation between meaning and expression, the form and the content, i.e. between word forms and concepts (Geeraerts 1989: 91), e.g. when an affix has only one meaning. Anisomorphy is a lack of one-to-one correspondence, its result being polysemy and homonymy. Of course, we find both

isomorphy and anisomorphy in all human languages, they come in a mix with varying proportions of the two. There is a natural tendency in human languages to strive for isomorphy, but things are more complicated than that. Isomorphy increases the burden on storage, as it leads to an increase of lexical items to be stored in the mental lexicon. Anisomorphy relieves this burden but increases the cost of the processing of ambiguity.

Metonymy and metaphor recycle already existing lexemes in a way that maximizes polysemy, i.e. new meanings are added that make the lexemes in question (more) polysemous. In terms of the meaning-expression fit, this results in a decrease of isomorphy in language as a one-to-one relation between meanings and expressions. On the other hand, word-formation as a lexicalization strategy that relies on the recombination of existing lexical items (either free or bound ones) increases isomorphy because it basically preempts polysemy.

The choice between maximizing lexical polysemy and decreasing isomorphy or relying on word-formation and thus increasing isomorphy is not random, but can be linked with the morphological and grammatical systems of the languages in question. Croatian clearly lacks articles, unlike English with both definite and indefinite. The latter seems to be indispensable for switching between count and mass senses of lexemes, as in (15) or (21). This also facilitates sense extensions like the ones exemplified in (26) above. On the other hand, Hungarian and Croatian resolve the issue by resorting to their word-formation system, specifically to their rich networks of suffixation.

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