Summaries

Márton Dornbach

Why Is Philosophical Anthropology Timely?

Philosophical inquiry into the human form of life finds itself caught in a pincer between unreflective anthropocentrism and its anti-humanistic overcorrections. My critical survey of the experiences and considerations that motivate the main variants of these antipodes aims to show that there is not only elbow room but also an urgent need for philosophical anthropology. Large areas of contemporary philosophical discussion are characterized by an unreflective anthropocentrism that attaches no importance to the fact that ours is one of countless forms of organic life. The marginalization of nature in late modernity and the preponderance of formalistic self-conceptions are to blame for this blind spot. Anti-humanistic overcorrections of unreflective anthropocentrism, in turn, deny that the human form of life is normatively significant, invariant, or unique in any fundamental, categorial sense. Similarly to the rise of humanism in early modernity, the contemporary proliferation of anti-humanistic positions responds to powerful historical experiences. I consider six variants of anti-humanism, which are due, respectively, to (1) scientism; (2) misanthropic reactions to our collective failures; (3) awareness of historical variation and cultural diversity; (4) posthumanistic and transhumanistic visions of scientific-technological progress; (5) ecological concerns; (6) and considerations of animal ethics. Although each of these positions has some basis in central characteristics of our life form and register radical challenges to our self-understanding, their proponents throw out the baby with the bathwater. Drawing on Helmuth Plessner's writings and a variety of contemporary arguments, I claim that some of the most pressing question we face today call for a philosophical theory of the human life form in its natural embeddedness and plasticity.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16321

Gábor Forrai

Epistemic Authority: Some Problems with Preemptionism

Linda Zagzebski has recently argued that epistemic authorities' judgments should serve as preemptive reasons for us, i.e., we should not merely regard them as especially weighty reasons, but we should accept the epistemic authorities' views simply on the grounds that they endorse them. The paper makes two major points. First, the only solution offered so far to a major gap in Zagzebski account – how to account for the fact that a putative epistemic authority's outstanding mistake threatens their status as epistemic expert – is wrong. Second, it discusses in some details cases which were largely ignored in the literature, namely the once in which we may actually communicate with the authority and thus explain our reasons to each other. It turns out that there are cases in which we should not preempt.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16322

Balázs Gyenis

Which Free Will Exists?

This paper investigates the concept of free will by engaging with László Bernáth's *Létezik-e szabad akarat?* [Is there Free Will?]. It introduces a methodological approach to clarify the conditions under which a person can act otherwise, emphasizing the necessity to specify the descriptive levels of reality being discussed. The study critiques Bernáth's arguments, demonstrating that they better align with the empirical free will thesis rather than his original intent. It explores the implications of empirical free will for moral responsibility, arguing that accepting empirical free will resolves Bernáth's epistemological challenges. The paper also addresses classical incompatibilist objections, showing they do not undermine empirical free will. Additionally, it examines the relationship between different determinism concepts and the potential for an empirically justified notion of free will. The conclusion considers the future of human freedom, positing that knowledge expansion could broaden rather than constrain empirical free will, despite potential technological threats.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16323

Lajos Horváth

The Affective Unconscious and the Unconscious Enclave

The aim of this paper is to examine the phenomenological concept of the affective unconscious and to supplement it with the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious enclave. The introduction of the paper distinguishes between the implicit and the unintegrated affective unconscious and argues that retroactive trauma could partially assimilate and render conscious those elements of the affective unconscious which are alien to the ego. In the first part, I will examine the phenomenological significance of Fletcher's and Laplanche's interpretations of retroactive trauma. In the second part, I will compare the unconscious enclave and the unintegrated affective unconscious. The common denominator between the two theories is that the unconscious is imagined as a temporally unfolding identity-building and identity-destroying activity and not as a static reservoir. Finally, the paper aims to demonstrate that the unconscious enclave is compatible with the affective unconscious and the temporal logic of afterwardness enables its partial integration.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16324

András Kardos

„You are Schizophrenic!"
Mihály Vajda and György Lukács's juvenile essay period

This paper discusses the following three issues: Firstly, there are no evidences. How is it still possible for them to exist? Secondly, Mihály Vajda wrote twenty-five individual books and co-authored numerous volumes. Knowing essentially the four hefty publications of his *Selected Works*, running approximately four thousand pages long, I declare that

his essay collection titled *Changing Evidences* (1992), which includes writings from the period between 1970 and 1975, is the peak of his philosophical life's work. Lastly, I argue that, considering all differences, *Changing Evidences* holds more or less the same position in the life's work of Vajda as does *The Soul and the Forms* in the extensive career of György Lukács. Both books represent the essence of the writers' thinking in their youth and, from the perspective of their lifetimes' achievement, mutatis mutandis, are their most important works. In my view, at least one of their main works.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16334

Lajos András Kiss

At the Intersection of Science and Phenomenology
Reflections on Mihály Vajda's First Productive Period

Mihály Vajda returned from time to time to the sensitive problem of the „abstract truth" of academic scholarship and the „prosaic experience of reality" of the so-called lifeworld in his oeuvre spanning more than half a century. In his first productive period, Vajda focused on the question of evidence and the truth criteria of analytic versus synthetic judgments. There are no eternal and unquestionable evidences, scientific truths, because science itself is part of changing social practice, and natural sciences, although they describe or attempt to systematize nature independent of man, *always represent nature given to man of a given epoch*. Philosophy cannot give up its original mission of universal understanding of the world, which is also closely linked to social practice, and therefore cannot accept to be forced into the role of being merely „one science among others". The last third of the paper analyses the chapter on the relationship between science and philosophy in the work of Erik Grigoryevich Yudin, who died tragically young, entitled *Systems Theory and Activity*, published in the 1970s. Yudin also argues for the autonomy of philosophical knowledge, and stresses that philosophy never loses its relationship with forms of knowledge that are essentially ideological and religiously rooted, such as folkloristic and other naïve constructions of reality.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16332

Csaba Olay

Elemér Hankiss's Theory of Culture

In his many-faceted oeuvre, Elemér Hankiss paid special attention to the questions of culture and civilization. This paper examines the theory of culture and civilization in the late writings of Elemér Hankiss. After conceptual clarifications, it will be shown that his basic assumption is that human existence cannot cope with its intellectual and emotional dangers. His functionalist approach to culture and civilization will be followed as well as his reading of the ancient experiences which are answered by culture. As a first step, Hankiss's conception of the human strangeness in the world is reconstructed. Afterwards, the idea that culture and civilization could be a kind of solution to this being alien in the world is critically examined. As critical summary, it might be stressed that, in con-

trast to Hankiss's argumentation, the consume of cultural products cannot be reduced to satisfaction of psychological, metaphysical needs. In this sense culture basically differs from biological, physiological needs. In addition, the functionalist approach suffers from a principal shortcoming that results from the concept of cultural products as symbolic protective shields. In this approach we cannot distinguish between different levels of cultural products, and so their essential differences cannot be taken into account either.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16325

Dénes Schreiner
The Twilight of Consciousness

The study aims to provide a phenomenological analysis of the experience of times of the day, especially afternoon and dusk. It starts from the indeterminacy of the time interval and then moves on to the presentation of the complex sensuality of the times of the day. Then, using the concepts of mood and sensual field, it explores the horizon of the time of the day. Finally, it analyses the specific experience of time at various times of the day and reveals a hidden source of the genesis of time consciousness.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16326

Krisztián Serfőző
On the Possibility of a Pluralist Theory of Justice

Recent theories of justice were mainly relational, as opposed to distributive theories. Although there has been an emphasis on that relational and distributive equality does not exclude one another, so far, no one has pointed out the plausibility of a pluralist theory of justice – pluralist, in the sense of the ultimate distributive and relational principles. In this paper, my aim is twofold. First, I attempt to give a brief sketch of distributive and relational equality – of which I regard as two families of theories. Second, drawing on that sketch, I give a modest account of the distributive and relational principled foundations of justice. This is indeed, only one possible starting point for a possible theory of justice.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16327

István Sümegi
Impersonal Reflections upon the Personal

This piece of writing consists of brief thesis statements, each of which is followed by closer examination and interpretation, in order to enquire into the possibility of postulating impersonal, i.e. objective knowledge. As it appears nonsense to suggest the existence of knowledge without the holder (i.e. subject) of that knowledge, the correct point of departure for our investigation is not the question whether there is such a thing as objective knowledge; rather, we should focus on the potentials for disregarding the knowledge creator/ holder's subjective personality. Several different aspects may be combined to define these potentials, which, following the arguments of various philosophical cur-

rents (e.g. scepticism, nominalism, post-empiricist philosophy of science, among others) that deny the possibility of subjective knowledge, also allow for the existence of an extreme, non-transferable form of solipsistic knowledge. Nevertheless, since such a form of knowledge is entirely useless, it is worth reversing the traditional approach: instead of starting with some putative objective knowledge (usually still stained with subjective elements) independent of the knowing subject, we should recognize that the various individualized bodies of knowledge can be connected along various dimensions, and this makes communication possible.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16328

Gábor Szabó
Quantum Theory and Interpretation

In this paper, I will give a brief overview of the interpretations of quantum theory. I will classify the interpretations according to their position towards the measurement problem, which can be formulated as an inconsistency of the following three statements: 1) The quantum state is an ontic state completely characterizing individual physical systems. 2) The dynamics of quantum theory is universal. 3) Quantum theory accounts for the measurement results. Thus, the interpretations of the theory can be grouped according to which of the above three statements are accepted and which are abandoned.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16329

Gábor Szécsi
Self, Narrative, Understanding
Additions to a Philosophical Theory of the Narrative Self

In this article, I consider narratives to be both self-constitutive structures and interpretive frameworks that ensure the effectiveness of communication processes. Through the model developed for the foundation of this conception, I try to position this idea in the epistemological and psychological debates that determine the theory of the narrative self, and in the series of hypotheses that mark the different directions of the philosophy of narrativism. This study argues that these debates basically stem from a different perception of the relationship between the self and the narrative, and two clearly distinguishable positions (the concept of narratives constituting the fictitious self, the hypothesis of narratives shaping the embodied self) are outlined by the philosophy of consciousness, cognitive sciences and in the field of psychology. After reviewing the philosophical positions related to the theory of the narrative self, I will argue that the intersubjective and self-constitutive function of narratives can be traced back to the coexistence and interaction of explicit and implicit narrative levels. In my study, I am also looking for an answer to the question of how the simultaneous operation of the assumed narrative levels can become a pillar of the everyday practice called folk psychology, through which the individuals attribute intentions, desires, and opinions to each other in a given situation in the light of recognized behavioral patterns. In other words, I am trying to highlight how the use of interpretive schemes that also assume implicit narratives can enable us

to endow others with beliefs, desires, hopes or fears during communicative actions, and in the light of this to understand the communicative intentions behind their transmitted messages, and classify the actions of others as rational and therefore predictable under certain conditions.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16330

Tamás Valastyán

Per-Scription – Spontaneous Events and Order of Thought
Contributions to Mihály Vajda's View of Husserl

Mihály Vajda's thinking was fundamentally influenced by two philosophers: Georg Lukács and Edmund Husserl. At first, this influence determined not only the themes of Vajda's philosophy (the renewability of Marxist thought, the critique of science), but also his approach. In this paper I will examine the way in which Husserl's phenomenology is present in Vajda's thought. I argue that Husserl is not only present as a source of inspiration in the first two books, but Vajda actually struggles and argues with Husserlian phenomenology throughout his life. Behind Vajda's direct or indirect references to Husserl, there seems to be a question of how to reconcile the spontaneity of the Being's destiny and the arrangement of thoughts.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16333

János Weiss

The Death, Funeral and Aftermath of György Lukács

My paper aims to answer the fundamental question of how the death of György Lukács can be considered a milestone in the history of Hungarian culture. To start with, I will recall the memories of the funeral: one is by István Eörsi, the other by György Dalos. None of the members of the Budapest School were allowed to speak at Lukács's funeral. It seemed that the powers that be had not only integrated the great philosopher, but were also trying to separate his disciples from him. The early seventies were the beginning of a threatening era, but it was also the time when versions of a critical theory of Central and Eastern Europe were being born. This aqua-blossom era soon came to an end: in early 1973, the powers that be struck down. The second great philosophical persecution after 1945 began.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70510/mfsz.16331