Summaries

László Bernáth
Why Ought We not Ascribe Moral Responsibility of Any Sort to Artificial Intelligence Lacking Consciousness?

In this paper I argue for two claims. First, I argue that autonomous agents (or AIs) cannot be morally responsible if they do not have phenomenal consciousness because phenomenal consciousness is the condition for being capable of moral understanding. Second, I propose that anyone who thinks that autonomous agents without phenomenal consciousness may be morally responsible should support, instead, another view. Namely, she should embrace the idea that it may be useful to talk about autonomous agents in a fictional way as if these machines without phenomenal consciousness would be morally responsible.

Áron Dombrovszki
Fictionalism in Berkeley's and Hume's Philosophy

Due to the increasing importance of historical research in analytic philosophy, recently published books on fictionalism usually include chapters about the predecessors of the theory. Even though the idea of fictionalism seems to be quite a recent development – attributed to Hartry Field's and Bas van Fraassen's works published in 1980 – it is not uncommon to mention George Berkeley and David Hume among the examples of early fictionalists. These assumptions seem questionable. My paper aims to examine specific topics in their philosophy to point out certain features that would make their proposals an early manifestation of fictionalism. In the first part, I will develop the notion of proto-fictionalism, and after analyzing the relevant texts, I examine if their theory can or cannot qualify as a proto-fictionalist position. Areas under scrutiny are the discourse about physical objects, mathematics, and causality in Berkeley's *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*; and causality, identity, and religion in Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*. In the final section, I reach a mixed conclusion: Berkeley's alleged fictionalism appears to be a misunderstanding except for the area of causality, and it is best to remain agnostic about Hume's views – with the interesting exception of theological discourse.

Ákos Forczek
Georg Lukács' *Ontology* and the "*post festum*-rationality" of history

During the winter of 1968–69, members of the so-called Budapest School put forth a scathing "review" of Georg Lukács' late work, *The Ontology of Social Being*. In the wake

of the objections (but not in accordance with them), Lukács began to revise the text, but was unable to complete it: he died in June 1971. The disciples' critique, published in English and German in 1976, played a major role in the reception history of *Ontology* – or rather in the fact that the 1,500-page "philosophical fiasco" still has no remarkable reception history. The main criticism of the disciples is that Lukács' work mixes two incompatible ontologies and recalls the worst traditions of Soviet Marxism. In my paper, I will argue that the disciples' "review" is misleading (nevertheless, the historical circumstances may provide a sufficient explanation for this) because there are no "two ontologies" in Lukács' unfinished book. I will concentrate on the source of the misunderstanding, the Lukácsian thesis of the "*post festum*-rationality" of history, and in the light of this I will analyse how Lukács describes the open determination of individual and collective action in the process of the social reproduction of life.

Lajos Horváth

Retroactive trauma and the phenomenology of retroactivity

The aim of the paper is to achieve a partial synthesis between Freud's concept of afterwardsness and the phenomenology of retroactivity. The paper examines the phenomenological interpretations of Freud's retroactive trauma (i.e., Nachträglichkeit) and argues that the Husserlian metaphor of affective retroactive awakening can be employed to explain the associative and temporal structure of the deferred action of the traumatic past. The second task of the paper is to complement the idea of traumatic subjectivity with the phenomenological reformulation of the Freudian afterwardsness. The paper argues that we can differentiate between the bodily-implicit and conscious-narrative processing of the not yet fully understood traumatic memory traces.

Zsolt Kapelner

Structural Injustice and the Problem of Responsibility

Structural injustice is a special class of injustice which stems not from unjust or negligent governments, legislatures, groups of individuals, but from unjust social structures. Such social structures include the patriarchy, structural racism, and the class structure generating unjust social inequalities. Who is responsible for creating and abolishing such structural injustices? The most influential answer to this question is provided by Iris Marion Young's theory. Young argues that no one bears backward-looking responsibility for structural injustice, i.e., no one can be blamed or held to account for them, but everyone who is socially connected to unjust structures bears forward-looking responsibility to abolish them. Numerous challenges were raised against Young's theory in recent years. In this paper I argue that it can be defended against the most important challenges.

Attila Mráz

The Ethics of Political Advertising

This paper explores moral principles for political advertising in the context of democratic election campaigns. It criticizes two approaches to political advertising in contemporary campaign ethics. First, it critiques the approach which treats election campaigns as unmediated, thereby focusing exclusively on the duties of candidates, parties and voters but not on those of mediators such as the press or social media platforms. Second, the paper criticizes another approach which recognizes the presence and significance of mediators in election campaigns but merely requires them to operate transparently. The paper then argues that the ultimate gatekeeper role of mediators in elections campaigns, as well as the fact that they typically benefit from political advertising, both provide moral reasons for applying a more interventionist ethics to the mediators of political advertisements. This approach prescribes duties of action for mediators that go substantially beyond what an ideal of transparent advertising implies, including, for instance, a duty to take active steps against misleading political advertisements.

Réz Anna

Overblame in Social Media

This paper explores those high-profile cases of moral wrongdoing that have been intensively discussed in the public discourse, and where there is a suspicion that at a certain point of the discourse the alleged perpetrator has started to be „overblamed". First, the paper explores the theoretical assumptions under which it is conceivable that someone is blamed more than what they deserve, and then argues that paradigmatic cases of blame are intended to place some kind of burden or pressure on the person who has transgressed moral norms; it subjects the blamed person to negative psychological, social or existential impact. Réz argues that, while there are usually morally objectionable intentions and traits behind the blame game in the online space, blame can occur without the assumption of such, as long as a large enough number of people make a public moral judgment about the perpetrator. The phenomenon of overblame is to be explained, on the one hand, by widespread moral disagreements in the society and by the fact, on the other hand, that in online communication one can cause serious social harm to others with minimal personal risk. Consequently, the paper suggests that we should express our moral judgments less frequently and more deliberately in online activities, especially when they are specifically moral reproaches or criticisms of an individual.

Judit Szalai

Regulations for Sustaining the Principle of Equal Treatment in Autonomous Driving

The introduction of self-driving cars places us in a radically novel moral situation. According to the discourse dominant in the literature, this situation requires advance, reflectively endorsed, forced, and iterable choices, with yet uncharted forms of risk impo-

sition. The argument is meant to explore the necessity and possibility of maintaining one of our most fundamental moral-cultural values in this new context, that of the equal treatment of persons.

Anita Torma

Plant life and organic life in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl

This paper examines the concept of living being in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, because from a phenomenological point of view, it is not at all obvious whether plants can be living beings – as it is evident in empirical sciences – in the same sense as animals, including man. The paper categorizes the various contexts in which plants appear in Husserl's philosophy into five themes. These are: plants as simple examples of empirical objects (1), the context of their specific typical properties as living beings (2), plants in the context of the possibility of empathy, as borderline cases (3) plants as organisms understood in the phylogenetic and ontogenetic context of life (4), plants in the context of a teleologically constructed monadic universe as plant monads (5). The conclusion of the paper is that Husserl's thought on the subject not only abandons the mechanistic paradigm but gets close to a vitalistic, Aristotelian-Leibnizian paradigm, and that in Husserl's late conception, biological life and transcendental subjectivity are closely connected.