

Summaries

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Causation: A Dynamical Systems Approach

We present a new account of causation that aims to anchor causal claims of everyday parlance and of special sciences in terms of how the physical states of the underlying dynamical system evolves in time. According to our account, causal claims assert relationships between two sets of physical states: the truth of the causal claims depends on whether the time evolution of physical states connects these two sets such that the majority of physical states from one set evolve into the other set. Our account, contrary to former theories of physical causation, is not revisionist, and is able to explain e.g. negative causal claims without rendering them merely quasi-causal. The virtues of our approach are demonstrated by showing how it is able to account for causally relevant factors, being ‘the’ cause, and cases of overdetermination and causation by absences.

GÁBOR FORRAI

The Value of Responsibility Attribution or Why the Revisionist Argument Fails

According to the revisionist argument proposed by Zimmerman, Rosen and Levy, each blameworthy action is either acratia, i.e. committed in full knowledge of the fact that it is morally wrong, or derives from some prior acratia action the blameworthiness of which it inherits. Since acratia actions are very rare, we are much less often responsible for our actions than we normally believe. Therefore, our practice of responsibility attribution is flawed and needs to be revised. The paper argues that even if it is granted that we are seldom responsible for our actions, and we often blame unfairly, that is not sufficient to establish that our practice needs to be revised. The objection is based on two ideas. The first is that if our practice were revised in the way proposed, our moral regulation would be much less efficient in improving our moral agency, i.e. in leading us to think and act in accordance with the requirements of morality. The second is that the efficiency of moral regulation is more important than its fairness, because unfairness causes less harm than an inefficient moral regulation would. Therefore, maintaining our actual practice of responsibility attribution is justified even if the responsibility judgments it issues are often unfair.

INAN DÁNIEL HAYDAR

The Unity and Deep Nature of Consciousness

The article discusses the relation between consciousness and phenomenal content. By phenomenal content I mean that which (1) can be qualitatively characterized and (2) is a potential object of introspection. One option is to say that consciousness and content are two ontologically distinct things. I think this is wrong and will opt for the second view according to which they are but two aspects of an unbreakable unity. This view, however, can take two forms depending on to which aspect we ascribe ontological priority. Barry Dainton, apparently, is an advocate of the content-first view. I will argue for the contrary view according to which consciousness is the ontological foundation of experience. My aim is to show that contents must be understood as constituted of their respective experimental acts (that is, of consciousness). Combining the atomistic theory of the unity of consciousness with Dainton's conception is one way to arrive at this conclusion. I will argue that if this framework were right, then there could not be such a thing as a complex experience (with more than one content). Furthermore, I claim that if my argumentation here is on the right track, it follows that according to the proper understanding of complex experience the reason that its contents are experientially presented together is that they are the modifications of their underlying consciousness.

BENCE PÉTER MAROSÁN

On Individual and Collective Unconscious after Freud, Jung, and Husserl

The main goal of this study is to compare three concepts of the unconscious: Freud's, Jung's, and Husserl's theory on non-conscious phenomena, as well as to lay down the basics for further phenomenological analysis of the individual and collective unconscious. I try to point out that for Freud, the individual unconscious, and the biological-instinctive background, the desire-satisfying character of the unconscious are the leading motives, while for Jung the unconscious appears as fundamentally collective and culturally shaped, and the ability of the collective unconscious to create collective symbols and images is particularly important. The Freudian and Jungian psychoanalysis are two, essentially empirically related scientific theories.

By comparison, Husserl's mature phenomenology considers itself as the foundation of every positive and empirical science whatsoever, whose central concept is consciousness itself. I tried to indicate, however, that the concept of the unconscious can also be found in Husserl, which had gone through a particular and complex development in his oeuvre. If we take a closer look at Husserl's approach in this respect, surprisingly, we find parallels with Freud and Jung. I aimed to reveal that Husserlian phenomenology is flexible and adaptable enough to incorporate the main elements of the Freudian and Jungian psychoanalysis in a phenomenologically and transcendently legitimate way, and that moments, which indicate the outlines of a systematic phenomenology of the individual and collective unconscious, can also be found in Husserl's work.

MIKLÓS NYÍRÓ

Cultural Politics versus Dialogue

Richard Rorty's Metaphilosophy within the Context of Hermeneutics

The paper accomplishes two tasks, namely, it offers an overview of Rorty's metaphilosophical considerations developed over the period of forty years – from the publication of *The Linguistic Turn* (1967) to that of *Philosophy as Cultural Politics* (2007) –, and then, it positions Rorty's overall metaphilosophical stance with regard to the hermeneutical metaphilosophies of Heidegger and Gadamer. It argues that Rorty's pertaining views evolved over the years as a consistent attempt at re-enforcing 'metaphilosophical pragmatism' in more and more comprehensive contexts – philosophies of language, the whole history of analytic philosophy, the entire Western history of ideas – and remained, for the most part, a 'domestic, therapeutic affair' of philosophy, seeing it as one of the voices within the broad arena of historicist culture criticism. It also shows, however, that the late notion of 'philosophy as cultural politics' marks a turn toward the 'foreign affairs' of philosophy coupled with assigning a crucial role to it in culture as a whole. The paper, then, points out, first, that Rorty's project is underpinned by an ultimate conceptual distinction between a 'norm-free order of causation', on the one hand, and a 'norm-free order of justification' (i.e. 'conversation') among norm-governed vocabularies, on the other; and second, that the latter is a variant of 'hermeneutic universalism'. This leads to differentiating between two notions of 'conversation', namely, a truly dialogical one governed by so-called 'historical universals' and a competitive-agonal one requiring a nominalized notion of conversation. In embracing the latter kind of 'leached hermeneutics', Rorty is motivated, I maintain, by his hopes for radical cultural change – hopes that he shares, even if different kinds, with the late Heidegger –, wishing to get rid of the past, which in turn necessarily leads to violence against true dialogue. The paper concludes by claiming that philosophy becomes cultural politics when dialogical conversation – the *terra firma* of human co-existence according to Gadamer – is turned into a goal-governed enterprise, such as, e. g., 'defending the case of democracy' (Rorty), or 'preparing for a second beginning in the history of Being' (Heidegger).

GÁBOR TORONYAI

A Phenomenological Approach to Death – Tracing Husserl's Views

In this writing the author presents a brief but nevertheless systematic attempt at a clarification of different meanings of *death* that can be found in Edmund Husserl's rare phenomenological investigations concerning this problem. As an initial step, the methodological problem is explicated: phenomenological epoché, reduction and constitution as a form of philosophizing and *death* as a limit-problem of phenomenology. Then the different meanings of death are explored from the four different standpoints of the phenomenological methodological approach. From the standpoint of the natural attitude of thinking death is understood by the *worldly events of the deaths of others*. After the first stage of the transcendental phenomenological reduction – that is suspending and separating by way of the *primordial reduction* and thus objectifying and highlighting the intersubjective layer of our thinking – *death* gains the core meaning of a *secession from the*

community (more exactly from the communicative normalizational communal processes). After the second move of the phenomenological reduction – suspending our ability to have both our personal past (and future) and personal habitualities – *death* mainly refers to a *disintegration of the personality*. The ultimate move of the phenomenological reduction leads us to the always actual core of our life, to the *living present* of our *transcendental ego*. From this innermost point of view *death* turns out to be the problem of the *unthinkability of the death of the transcendental ego*, which, at the same time, constitutes the fundamental condition of the *thinkability of death* from those lower standpoints. Beyond the analysis of the existential and intersubjective layers of meaning, the author also briefly outlines Husserl's thoughts on the metaphysical constructive-speculative dimension of death. The short study closes with a consideration of the respective ideas of James Dodd and Saulius Geniusas concerning a comparison of the Husserlian and the Heideggerian approaches of *death*.