Summaries

Ought We to Compensate the Losses of Citizens due to Economic Crises? Interpersonal Comparison and Responsibility in Analytic Philosophy of Economics

Judit Gébert

In my paper I examine the question whether we ought to compensate people who suffer losses due to economic crises. I will approach the problem by examining two related questions, namely: what does it mean to suffer losses, to be in a worse-off position than others? Should the obligation to compensate cover all those affected, or only persons who are not responsible for their losses? First, I clarify the scope of philosophy of economics, normative and positive economics and how my paper contributes to them. Then, I discuss three theories of well-being deployed in terms of preference-satisfaction, resources and capabilities. Lastly, I argue that different theories of well-being offer different answers to these questions; and this poses a problem, since in the practice of economics all three theories are present and different policies are implemented based on them without reflecting on the ethical values they are committed to.

The Myth of the Distinction between Continental and Analytic Philosophy

István Fehér M.

That there is something wrong with the analytic–continental distinction has been known for quite some time, and since the distinction originates from English speaking authors it is appropriate, when looking for objections and critical considerations, to draw on their arguments. (1) The first problem with the distinction is that „continental philosophy" is not a self-characterization but an „other-designation", a „*Fremdbestimmung*", it presupposes the perspective and viewpoint of islanders. (2) The distinction between analytic and continental philosophies contrasts a geographical characterization (philosophy done on the European continent) with a methodological one; it is like dividing cars into four-wheel-drive and made-in-Japan (Bernard Williams). (3) The distinction between analytic and continental philosophies is inappropriate even as a geographical characterization, for there is analytic philosophy done on the Continent, just like continental philosophy done in English-speaking countries. (4) „Continental philosophy" contains the most heterogeneous philosophical currents, some of which have nothing common with others. Altogether one can say that continental philosophy does not exist; it is but an invention of analytic philosophy with the help of which it attempts to define itself and to exclude everything else. Inherent in the distinction are historical and sociological circumstances as well, so e.g., England's historical tendency to „splendid isolation". – An Appendix investigates finally the question whether and in what sense analytic philosophy, in contrast to continental philosophy, can be said to exist.

The Crisis of Sovereignty and Anti-Sovereign Politics
Zsolt Kapelner

The crisis of sovereignty is one of the most topical issues of contemporary politics. In the light of globalization, the emergence of international governmental organizations, the growing prominence of multinational corporations, etc., the idea of a sovereign state exercising supreme authority over all matters within its jurisdiction seems less and less accurate as a description of political reality. Is this a worrying phenomenon, and if so, why? To answer this question, I examine the question of the value of sovereignty, particularly in relation to self-determination, legitimacy, and democracy. I argue that sovereignty is not constitutive of, but rather merely instrumental to the realization of these values. This suggests that sovereignty, generally speaking, only has instrumental value and with the fading of sovereignty nothing disappears that has value in and of itself.

Agent-Objectivity: The Replication Crisis of Science
János Laki

Standard proposals (aggravation of rules; implementation of a compliance-monitoring system) concerning how to solve the current replication crisis take it for granted that the methodological norms of science are given once and for all. Contrary to this, I seek to demonstrate that these norms depend on the concept of objectivity we work with. Based on a historical case, I introduce the notion of "agent-objectivity" as a rival of the subjectless mechanical objectivity philosophers of science usually rely on. I argue that such objectivity entails different rules and prospects for replication.

Trends and Dilemmas in Environmental Philosophy
András Lányi

This paper is an overview of the trends and dilemmas in the field of environmental ethics. According to the mainstream bioegalitarian, biosocial and biocentric theories moral considerations apply also to non-human beings or to nature itself. However, the various objections raised against such views inspired a modification of the ecological viewpoint. According to this alternative approach, the task is not to determine the place of nature in the realm of ethics, but, instead, to investigate the role of ethics in the self-regulation of biosphere – considering that the ecological crisis is not due to the imperfection of nature, but rather, it raises disturbing questions about humanity's identity and agenda. The paper discusses the views of various authors who set out to answer these questions by reinterpreting our ethical inheritance and traditions.

The Role of Crisis in the Early Heidegger's Thinking

Tibor Schwendtner

Heidegger, just like his contemporaries, experienced the post-World War I period as a crisis, yet his philosophical response to the situation can by no means be considered ordinary. Heidegger was not looking for ways out of the crisis, but he claimed that the crisis provided a resource for existence, philosophy and science to become themselves. Around 1929/30, during the Great Depression, the philosopher became radicalized in political terms: he came close to Nazism, and there was also a marked change in Heidegger's thinking during this period: questionability/crisis remained one of the driving forces of his philosophical thinking; however, emphasis shifted to activity, to the world-forming *(Weltbildend)* aspect of man and philosophy. The activist turn in Heidegger's philosophy culminated in 1933, when the National Socialist takeover gave Heidegger the illusion that the philosophy he represented could be one of the creators of the emerging intellectual world.