

Summaries

„Abschrift der Natur”

The Copy of Nature II.

SÁNDOR RADNÓTI

The first part of this study examined the Jena Romantics' philosophy of painting and of landscape; primarily through A.W. Schlegel's *The Paintings*. In the second part, its scope of analysis is extended to Goethe, the Classicist; attention will be devoted to *Simple Imitation of Nature, Manner, Style*, as well as *The Collector and his Circle* and other writings. Regarding the relationship between art and nature, Goethe was compelled to muster a complex theory which is not devoid of contradictions. He had rejected the historical critique of nature (i.e. that art compensates for the deformity of nature), as well as the morally driven Naturalist argument (that there is a place for the 'ugly' in art), and the appreciation of nature stemming from a critique of civilisation. The stumbling blocks Goethe encountered included the ahistorical quality of his conception of nature and his 'Greek' ambition to universalize it, leaving no space for counter-concepts. Objective reality is, to Goethe, the universal Nature. The work of art itself is 'nature,' imitating nature on a lower plane and modelling it on a higher one. To do away with the misconception that the final objective of all art is to imitate nature, on the other hand (and, at the time of writing *Propyläen*, Goethe invested the bulk of his energies into a denial of Naturalism), he had to present art as a counter-concept to nature. The basic mimetic principle, conserved on the level of words (that nature should be imitated not as it is, but as it is true – that is, according to its spirit) became its anti-mimetic opposite. It was in Goethe's spirit that Schelling wrote that art, to be properly so-called, has first to distance itself from nature; its agenda cannot be either to imitate or to supersede it.

Transcendental Logic of Kant as General Logic

TAMÁS HANKOVSKY

It is difficult to exactly locate transcendental logic within Kant's 'logic', despite the fact that in the *Critique of Pure Reason* he obviously tried to place it against other types of logic. Some interpreters considered it as a third independent type along with general and particular logic. In recent papers it has been suggested that transcendental logic is

one of the particular logics, and as such it has a specific subject area. Alternatively, the idea is also put forward that transcendental logic ought to be considered as one of the general logics. In this paper I analyze the chapter *The Idea of a Transcendental Logic* and argue for the latter view. However, I also show that transcendental logic can only be seen as general logic, if we regard logic according to Kant primarily as a science of the rules of thought (independently of the question whether we can gain knowledge through thinking or not), and if we use the term ‘general’ only for a logic which investigates thinking independently from its objects (but not its types).

The *Nescio Quid* of Ficino’s Frenzy Theory

DÁVID MOLNÁR

The *je-ne-sais-quoi* (or *nescio quid*) is a well-known concept in the history of aesthetics. This paper draws attention to a part of Ficino’s *Platonic Theology* which refers to a ‘certain something’ that is experienced as an undefinable power of sensual beauty and love’s attraction.

My starting point is Ficino’s answer to the question of what is the difference between beauty and enrapturing beauty: ‘nescio quid’. I outline the history of this *nescio quid* (or *je-ne-sais-quoi*) until the 16th century and I lay out the three components of Ficino’s theory of beauty. In my interpretation the third and probably the most important divine component is the enrapturing ‘something’ or *nescio quid* which is responsible for the appearance and experience of sensual beauty.

The Theological Presuppositions of the Idols of the Mind in the Philosophy of Francis Bacon

MÁRTON KORÁNYI

The idols of the mind are usually interpreted in the context of Bacon’s main work, the *Noëum Organum*. However, in his other works there are many theological allusions which allow for an interpretation from a broader perspective. In this paper I start from Bacon’s ideas concerning the fall. In the prelapsarian state humanity possessed perfect and clear knowledge which was free from influences of the idols of the mind. After the fall human nature corrupted but not completely, hence its deficiencies may be ameliorated by the science based on the method of Bacon. From this perspective the ultimate purpose of Baconian philosophy is to return to the more harmonic relation between man and nature which has once existed. Consequently, his intention was not simply utilitarian, but metaphysical; he wanted to uncover the principles of things, which he called the forms. Finally, I emphasize the importance of the morality of charity in Bacon’s programme, which may ascertain that humanity does not use the new inventions of science with bad intentions.

Two Historical Patterns for the Study of Self

CSABA PLÉH

The paper reviews mainly the psychological tradition of the study of the Self. One trend, the *centripetal vision*, starts off from inside and builds up the notion of self starting from the body schema. The other approach, the *centrifugal image* starts from outside, from *social interaction*, and builds the self image from interpersonal relations. After summarizing three hundred years of development a schema is presented about the recent trends towards unifying these two traditions. Developmental, evolutionary, neuroscientific accounts as well as narrative approaches within the human sciences try to relate the two traditions usually presupposing a minimal Self and a more elaborate narrative Self.

The Melancholy of the Black Sun and the Deconstruction of the Selbst

Poststructuralism and Post-Jungian Psychology

LAJOS HORVÁTH – ATTILA SZABÓ

Post-structuralism and deconstructionism have long been echoed in post-Jungian psychology, especially in the recent works of James Hillman and Stanton Marlan. In this paper, we argue that the contemporary deconstruction of Jung's concept of the Selbst (Self) is essentially saturated by metaphysics, or more precisely, by the elements of an approach rooted in natural philosophy. Both Hillman and Marlan focus on the dark side of the human psyche; the theoretical problems of the death instinct, depression, and ego-death are of great significance for them. These existential dilemmas made them to move towards the deconstruction of the Selbst-concept. After outlining the conceptual background, we aim to demonstrate the phenomenal features of ego-death and melancholy through the psychology of art as they appear in Marlan's works and commentaries. Lastly, we compare Hillman's and Marlan's philosophical concepts of the soul with the tenets of classic Jungian anthropology.

Perceptual Idealism as an Answer to the Challenge of Scepticism

JENŐ PÖNTÖR

One of the main motivations for perceptual idealism is that it promises to handle the problem of scepticism. In this paper, I first outline the most commonly discussed sceptical argument as an improved version of the simple argument from error. Then I argue that scepticism poses no lesser threat for the perceptual idealist than for the realist.

Zvolenszky and Artefactualism

Who Created Harry Potter After All?

ÁDÁM TAMÁS TUBOLY

In her recent articles, Zsófia Zvolenszky argues for the ‘artefactualist’ thesis of fictional characters. Contrary to the antirealist conceptions, the artefactualist claims that there really are fictional characters like Harry Potter and Sherlock Holmes. These characters, furthermore, are abstract entities, as Zvolenszky argues, since neither of the concretist approaches can account for our intuitions regarding the creation of fictional characters. The aim of my paper is to highlight some debatable points of Zvolenszky’s account. (1) She did not discuss such alternative proposals (like Platonism-ersatzism) which – with some modifications – could be viable options in the debate about the ontology of fictional characters. (2) We could raise some questions about Zvolenszky’s positive view also, arguing that it is also mystical in some respects and has to deal with such problems that seem to undermine its benefits. (3) In the costs-benefit game about fictional characters there are certain plausible non-metaphysical candidates that serve the same purposes but without the special ontology of abstract artifacts.