# Summaries

Evidence and Infinite in Descartes
TAMÁS PAVLOVITS

In the early modern age the cognitive relation to the infinite changed profoundly. Descartes' contribution to this process was his interpretation of the infinite. He argues that the infinite can be known not only by evidence: knowledge of the infinite is more evident than knowledge concerning any finite objects. The aim of the paper is to provide an interpretation of this claim. I will argue that in Descartes' account the infinite takes part in the transcendental structure of the mind and it is the basis of all evident knowledge. According to Descartes, the evidence is founded by the opening of the mind to the infinite.

Berkeley's Cartesianism and Two Models of Self-Knowledge
DÁVID BARTHA

In this paper I argue that George Berkeley developed a novel and unique model of self-knowledge that should be considered as an alternative to the prevailing theory of self-knowledge in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, advocated by both the so-called rationalists such as Descartes, and empiricists such as Locke. Berkeley, as he was reluctant to accept that we acquire ideas of ourselves, ultimately rejected the perceptual model of self-knowledge. Correspondingly, he also threw out the whole substance-mode ontology, which, in turn, rules out the possibility of interpreting his theory of self-knowledge simply as a Cartesian one, according to which ideas, i.e. perceptions, can represent or reflect the soul and its operations.

## Artificial Thinking and Human Intelligence
ZOLTÁN HORVÁTH

It is an exciting philosophical question related to artificial intelligence whether a computer might be able to think. Many people are concerned with this possibility, others, however, welcome the idea. In the first part of the paper I examine what sort of processes may really be considered as thinking in a computer, in the special case of chess-programs (a very successful problem-solving system, indeed). My conclusion is that it is not merely the calculations (the „brute force") of the machine that create thoughts. Instead, we mechanize our *own* thoughts and ways of thinking. What computers show us is how significant cognitive performances may be attained by relying on *our general principles* supported by huge computing power, iron discipline and accuracy. In the second part, I try to apply the same reasoning to the architecture and operation of the computer itself. I argue, contrary to the received view, that these are in accordance with the principles of such philosophers (i.e. Descartes, Locke and Kant) for whom thought is not a results of some complicated algorithm, but the fundamental starting point.

## The "Framework" of *Either-Or*
JÁNOS WEISS

In the paper I start from Adorno's thesis that philosophical works cannot be „summarized" *(nicht referierbar)*. In my view, this is particularly true in the case Kierkegaard's major work (in which unity is hardly to be found and the diverse parts of the text belong to different genres as well). In general we may say that this makes an all-encompassing unity in interpreting these diverse works very problematic. As a consequence I suggested to interpet Kierkegaard's *magnum opus* acccording to its „framework". In laying out this interpretation we encounter two fundamental motives of Kierkegaard's philosophy, namely the notion of „secret" and the addressing the reader in hope of his „spiritual uplifting" *(erbauliche Ansprache des Lesers)*.

## The Problems of Religious Acosmism in Karl Jaspers' Reception of Kierkegaard
ISTVÁN CZAKÓ

Karl Jaspers' reception of Kierkegaard is characterized by some commentators as a kind of uncritical approval. In my paper I wish to argue that this criticism of Jaspers is not entirely adequate, since his relationship to the Danish thinker is by far not uncritical. It seems that the *punctum saliens* of Jaspers' criticism in this context is the religiously motivated negation of the world *(religiöse Weltverneinung)* which is certainly preponderant in the late thought of Kierkegaard. In order to make clear Jaspers' relevance for the history of reception, I briefly canvass some peculiarities of the early German reception of Kierkegaard in the 1920's and 1930's, and then consider Jaspers' existential concept of the world and the negation of the world as well. In the main part of the paper I try give an historical reconstruction of the formation and development of Jaspers' increasingly sharp criticism of Kierkegaard, which resulted in his distancing himself from the Danish

thinker later in his career. Finally, I point out that although Jaspers' criticism is not unfounded, it is one-sided, since it is based mainly on the later writings of Kierkegaard and disregards some important aspects of his early works.

## Anxiety and the Divided Self – The Modern Psychological Interpretations of the Kierkegaardian Guilt and Anxiety

LAJOS HORVÁTH – KATALIN BALÁZS

In this paper, our aim was to develop a multidisciplinary approach regarding the problems of anxiety and guilt. In the first section we carefully examine the Kierkegaardian concepts of *anxiety* (objective and subjective) and *original sin*. In the following sections we scrutinise the meaning variances of these Kierkegaardian concepts in pastoral psychology and existential psychology. We propose that C. Stephen Evans, R. D. Laing and in some sense Kierkegaard has a common theme: the problem of the divided self. We also claim that Evans's psychoanalytic reinterpretation of the Kierkegaardian anxiety and his concept of the self are a dangerous reduction of the God-men relationship. Also, we maintain, that in a curious manner Laing had the capacity to modernise the Kierkegaardian views about anxiety and despair, and one can find the spirit of Kierkegaard in Laing's interpretation of the inner life of schizophrenic patients. Further, Laing has a non-reductive phenomenological approach to the problem of the divided self. However, we suggest that the Kierkegaardian "transformative melancholy" seems to be a conundrum that cannot be schematized with the psychological nomenclature.