

# Summaries

## The Responsibility for the Future Generations

Condorcet's Conception

MÁRIA LUDASSY

The responsibility for the future generations was one of the principal motives of the authors of the French Encyclopaedia: in the case of a barbaric invasion this monumental book could save the summary of the European knowledge for the future. Condorcet, the last of the Encyclopaedists, while hiding as condemned to death by the Jacobinists, wrote his *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind* (1793–1794), a summary of the theoretical and practical, scientific and political development of the spiritual knowledge of humanity. In this book, as well as in his program of public instruction, he declares the emancipation of women as part of the general human rights. And as a part of this political emancipation, he suggests that contraception is morally as well as political admissible, in an age when liberals (the *physiocrats*) and *ultramontan* Catholics were equally *nativists*. Besides, this ultraliberal *Plan de l'instruction publique* of Condorcet excludes all kinds of indoctrination, including the obligatory acceptance of the human rights. Thus he cannot exclude the possibility of a future generation, which, by its free choice, will annihilate liberty.

## Moral responsibility and practical modalities

FERENCZ HUORANSZKI

According to many contemporary accounts, although responsibility requires that agents' actions be responsive to their reasons, it does not always require that agents be able to do otherwise in the particular situation in which they act. Some believe that the ability to act otherwise is a necessary condition of responsibility only when one performs a blameworthy action, whereas others, following Frankfurt, believe that the ability to act otherwise is never a condition of responsibility. However, there are many ways in which one can act for a reason, some of them are compatible with the agent's responsibility, and some of them are not. The paper argues that only those agents who have the ability to act otherwise can act for or against some reason in a way that is compatible with their responsibility. Thus, the ability to act otherwise is at least one condition of responsibility for actions.

## **Naturalism and moral responsibility. The Frankfurt-type examples**

LÁSZLÓ BERNÁTH

The article analyses the connection between naturalism and moral responsibility in the contemporary debate about free will, focusing on theories which propose accounts of free will compatible with naturalism. The first part of the paper provides a critical assessment of the traditional compatibilist approach and Kane's event-causal libertarianism. I argue that both approaches fail as neither can simultaneously satisfy the autonomy-condition and the alternative-condition of free will, while the supporters of both conceptions think that satisfaction of these conditions is important. The second part surveys semi-compatibilism and the semi-compatibilists' well-known method of argumentation which is based on Frankfurt-type examples. This, I believe, is the most promising approach; nevertheless, Frankfurt-type examples cannot be conclusive because of the flicker of freedom which is necessarily included in them. My conclusion is that naturalism and moral responsibility cannot be easily reconciled, thus, presumably, naturalism has considerable ethical consequences.

## **Do We Control Our Beliefs?**

ANNA RÉZ

Many authors presume that we cannot in principle be morally responsible for our beliefs, because we cannot exercise control over them. Usually there is a more or less voluntaristic picture of control lurking behind this claim: the idea that the paradigm example of exercising control is controlling our actions and any kind of control which falls short of that is insufficient to ground responsibility ascriptions. In this paper I would like to argue that instead of focusing exclusively on action-like control, we should explore the criteria we implicitly endorse when talking about controlling tools, vehicles and other external objects. Once we take a look at the ordinary usage of the word 'control', the voluntaristic picture will turn out to be needlessly restrictive. I propose that the well-known methods by the means of which we form and revise beliefs are sufficient to establish the claim that we are in general able to control them.

## **Situation, virtue, wit: The question of moral responsibility – then and now**

LÁSZLÓ NEMES

As so-called situationist philosophers (like John Doris or Gilbert Harman) have recently argued, if human beings behave in systematically inconsistent ways in

different moral situations (as current social psychological findings seem to demonstrate), we cannot talk about stable moral characters, therefore virtue ethics, as we know it from ancient philosophers, should be a mistaken position. In my paper I attempt to show that this approach is based on a rather incorrect depiction of ancient moral thinking. Three examples are used to support this view: Ulysses' case with the sirens; one of Seneca's moral advices to keep distance from the crowd; the various ancient moral philosophies based on a division of the soul into distinct parts. I think that these and similar examples can shed some light on the complex nature of ancient thinking about moral virtues, and make it reconcilable with the latest science and practice oriented approaches. In ancient thought on moral responsibility, not just the moral character, but wits and practical skills were recognized as important tools to get closer to the ideal of a virtuous person.

### **Heidegger's Thinking as Basis of a Possible Philosophy of Landscape**

DEZSÓ CSEJTEI – ANIKÓ JUHÁSZ

The paper is a separate chapter of a thorough investigation of the philosophy of landscape. Although Heidegger has not written extensively about this topic, his philosophy can be considered as a starting-point and an essential contribution to an authentic philosophy of landscape to be written in the future. After discussing the connection between Heidegger's position and that of Georg Simmel, the essay develops two fundamental tenets: (1) We are *not creators* of the landscape, but only its *re-vealers*. (2) If, *for all that*, we are creators, we do it in the sense of *poiesis*. Special attention is paid to the phenomenon of *atonement*, as a most important ontological condition and stance in revealing the landscape. Finally, a detailed analysis is dedicated to a dialogue (*Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit – Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken*) in which Heidegger gives a thorough interpretation of *Gegend*, that is to say, the environment, both from a mystical, a literary and a philosophical point of view.

### **'Reading' of the Aesthetic Experience in Gadamer's Hermeneutics**

JÁNOS LOBOCZKY

In my paper I address two questions: (1) why aesthetic experience is so overwhelmingly significant for Gadamer and (2) what he takes to be the horizons of the analysis of aesthetic experience. Gadamer claims that artistic experience reveals truth that cannot be verified by means of scientific methods. Accordingly, in one of his late lectures, he speaks of two kinds of knowledge: 'artistic' and 'scientific' knowledge. For Gadamer, the analysis of the different existential

relations of art does not only provide thematic subjects and important starting points for a new sort of theory of artworks, but it also displays the totality of his hermeneutic approach. In accordance with this totality, and especially with the truthfulness of the artwork emphasised by him, he does not intend to divide the holistic complex of the aesthetic experience into "levels," or layers, since he does not regard the work of art as a simple aesthetic object. Consequently, in his analyses, he does not separate primary aesthetic experience and understanding, the interpretation of the artwork. After all, the experience of art is a way of self-understanding, that is, it is a preservation of the hermeneutic continuity of human existence.

### **The Phenomenology of Integral Conscious States: On the Boundaries of Perception and Fantasy**

LAJOS HORVÁTH – ATTILA SZABÓ

In this interdisciplinary paper we will characterise the phenomenology of ayahuasca visions from two main viewpoints. On the one hand, we scrutinise the complicated matters of psychedelics in context of consciousness studies. On the other, we will mobilise some of the basic conceptions of the phenomenological tradition – relying on Merleau-Ponty's and Husserl's phenomenology –, to differentiate between the features of perception, hallucination, and vision. We propose that actual research concerning the problems of *psychointegration* can be extended by utilizing the heuristic value of basic phenomenological concepts (i.e. intentionality, body schema, fantasy). As an overall goal, we intend to show that Merleau-Ponty's late ontology can be a useful explanatory tool for circumscribing the irrational and chaotic experiences induced by psychoactive substances (in arguing for this point we rely substantially on Beny Shannon's phenomenological ideas).

### **To Be Reluctant, To Shrink Back, To Interpret: Remarks on Deodath Zuh's review**

ISTVÁN M. FEHÉR

This article is a reply to Deodath Zuh's review in which he puts forward objections to what he calls my „tendentious interpretation of Husserl”, given in an interview, and similar, according to him, to „Heidegger's historical-hermeneutic method applied in his Kant book”. My answer is articulated along the following arguments:

In order for something to be a „tendentious interpretation of Husserl” it must first be an „interpretation of Husserl.” But this condition is not met. In the criticized piece I offer no interpretation of Husserl.

The claim that Heidegger’s Kant interpretation is tendentious is a pure assertion, it is tacitly presupposed without arguments and clarification, as if no supporting evidence and clarification were necessary.

Commenting on a passage of Husserl in the interview I used the expression „to be reluctant” which the Reviewer takes tacitly to have the meaning of „shrinking back”. My summary (not interpretation) of Husserl’s position is thought to be similar to Heidegger’s „method” in that Heidegger used the verb „shrinking back” a couple of times in his interpretation of Kant. „To be reluctant to do something” is however in no ways identical with „shrinking back from doing something”.

Deodath Zuh attempts to defend Husserl over against Heidegger, but in order to be able to do so he must first construe Husserl as having been attacked, which is not the case. The Reviewer makes me say things I have not said.

In summary: it is not a question of taking sides either in favour of Husserl or of Heidegger, viz., defending either of them over against the other. Rather, what it comes down to is to be committed to serious inquiry and truth.

### **Critique and Interpretation**

Answer to Deodáth Zuh’s Review

ZSUZSANNA MARIANN LENGYEL

In my reply I reflect on Deodáth Zuh’s reading of the book *The Truth of the Other. Papers in Honor of István M. Fehér*. I elaborate my argument in three steps. First, I claim that Zuh, in his polemical discussion of the book, did not make clear its main philosophical goals; therefore, I provide a brief overview of the conception of book, by which I wish to demonstrate the divergence between the basic intention of the book and what the Reviewer’s reconstruction may take it to be. Second, I go on to argue supporting István M. Fehér’s contribution given in his interview, and I try to show why the Reviewer’s criticism is highly debatable. Finally, I intend to answer the objections of Zuh formulated against my article.