

Summaries

The Starting Point of Fichte's Jena Science of Knowledge

TAMÁS HANKOVSKY

The starting point of the *Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge* may be interpreted in the following different ways. 1. In this work Fichte truthfully embraces Reinhold's program, which aimed to give a foundation to philosophy by tracing it back to a unique principle. 2. *In reality*, however, the entire system of Philosophy in Fichte's work disentwines from three principles that are only partially subordinated to each other. From among these, the first accounts for the absolute independence of man, the second considers his limitations, and the third mediates between the two principles. 3. Fichte's intellectual honesty was manifested by the fact that he acknowledged both otherwise contradicting experiences, although his vision of man finally resulted in choosing the principle as a *formal* starting point of his work which conceives man as an absolute I. 4. My paper gives a detailed analysis of the first pages of the work, which comprises the first steps of the process leading to the discovery of the first basic principle. 5. Closely related to this, the paper also addresses the special problem that logic is, in a certain sense, the foundation of all sciences; hence, the basic principle of the science of knowledge can only be an absolute first principle if it also provides a foundation for logic.

Transition from Reason to Spirit

An Attempt to Reconstruct a Moment of German Idealism

JÁNOS WEISS

The paper explores the role theology played in the evolution of German idealism and in Jacob Böhme's thought in particular. Böhme judged reason to be inferior to the sacred doctrine in so far as the former fails to reveal its origin as a created faculty. Philosophers from Schelling to Hegel (Schelling was well-acquainted with Böhme's work) tried to make out of reason the proper subject of the sacred doctrine. In Schelling we find a quasi-Spinosistic interpretation of the reason which, coming into the fore, becomes the only cognitive power after having absorbed the other Kantian faculties. Hegel, in turn, intends to get rid of the hypostatical nature of Schelling's concept of reason by dynamising the latter's Spinosistic and static notion and putting it into the framework of an

overall pedagogical project leading to the absolute conscience. In doing so, it is argued, he identifies reason with the Johannine *Logos*, so we find theological considerations in the background of Hegel's philosophy.

G. W. F. Hegel and What He Intended as the Start of His Bulky Introduction to His Lectures on the Philosophy of History

MIKLÓS MESTERHÁZI

These pages attached to the translation of the explanations about the species of historiography, introducing Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history, are a cursory philological overview of publications, and, of course, a dedication. It is well known that the bulk of Hegel's complete works were compiled from piles of hand-written fragments, sketches and students' notes and that the volumes were edited for publication first by disciples then by philologists. Concerning such editions, time and again unquenchable doubts arise about whether they truly interpret what the author had said. These doubts were manifested by several new editions – published one after the other in the course of the recent two decades – that presented the students' notes without any sort of embellishment, patching-up or rounding-off.

Further, although the material of Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of world history got into able hands when the first complete edition had been prepared: both the first editor, Hegel's disciple Eduard Gans and his successor Karl Hegel, who was to correct his editorial work had an intimate knowledge of Hegelian philosophy, and intended to rely on Hegel's manuscripts, above all, this overture of the lectures, the translation of which can be read here, has come to be somewhat contracted (if compared with the manuscript material). Furthermore the later editor of the Lectures, Georg Lasson even removed it from its proper place, and located the fragment, the originality of which seemed to him suspect, to a sort of appendix; for he thought, Hegel could not have started his lectures in this way. Hegel, however, did have the habit of starting his lectures with a criticism of the "ordinary views". And what he intended as an opening for his bulky Introduction to his lectures on the philosophy of history can hardly be uninteresting, as it shows (though the philosophy of history may be an irreparably problematic genre of philosophy) that Hegel had thought over his views also from the point of view of the problems of historiography. The reasoning about variations of historiography has eventually been relocated to its proper place by the Johannes Hoffmeister edition – in a most rewarding form, namely as a cautious editorial reconstruction of Hegel's manuscript.