Chris Corrin

The primary focus of this paper is a discussion of women's political participation within Hungarian society at a variety of levels, from both traditional and alternative perspectives. Aspects of women's participation are assessed within the frameworks of changing state/society perspectives, parliamentary developments in Hungary, and in terms of the construction of women's identities and changing conceptions of citizenship. The aim of this assessment is to contribute to ongoing debates about the ways in which considerations of politics, when broadened, encompass a wider field of analysis and enable analysts to recognize that 'woman' does not denote an unproblematic political category that remains a stable entity over time or space.

Theorising 'the political'

Concentration in traditional theorising about politics has been on conventional, constitutional, political behaviour. Alternative theories, from the moral perspectives of oppositionists - such as Hungarian political analyst György Konrád in his book Anti-Politics1 - to those of feminist theorising about women's political participation, have had the effect of 'problematizing' the traditional definitions. Most attempts at defining politics share certain assumptions, such that politics is recognised as having a social context and, at a minimum, can be seen to involve the question of how people influence the distribution of resources. Alternative analyses view politics as a process of articulation, the working out of relationships within given power structures. The divisions between public and private are not rigidly defined in such alternative perspectives - unlike traditional associations of maleness with the public and femaleness with the private. Recognizing 'the political' as part of our everyday lives allows politics to remain part of the social whole. In terms of theorising about women's lives, the 'personal as political' became a key feminist principle in Western feminism after the 1960s.2 The connotations of personal as political took on different dynamics within oppositional writings about politics in Hungary and elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. Beginning with the 1960s, 'the political' began to be questioned from the perspective of anti-politics and considerations of resistance to statist oppression.3

Western feminist analysis has not arisen in a social vacuum but as a response to the changing circumstances and opportunities associated with industrialism. Forces have been at work across societies which are helping to undermine systems of male dominance. Feminist analysts aim to accelerate and consolidate the impact of these forces by bringing gender issues into the public political arena for further consideration. Public policies can be seen to have played a part in maintaining women's subordinate status in Western, Central and Eastern Europe, certainly in terms of employment and childcare issues, yet women can and do use public politics in their own interest.4 Differing definitions of 'the political' do set parameters for our conceptions of participation in questioning the role of political participation in differing political systems. These questions are important in attempting to locate the nature of changing political perspectives in Hungary.

Despite the changes over time, with the expansion of the 'public' arena in scope and with increased governmental intervention, traditional views of politics still hold that an apolitical private sphere exists. Such a private sphere centres mainly upon family life which still defines and limits many women's wider social engagement. Some political analyses recognize that politics does occur outside the public sphere. Generally, however, the wider focus tends to concentrate on community-level politics so that little is considered with regard to familial relationships. The focus remains 'external' to home life. In Hungary, considerations of the importance of 'family politics' have changed very much over time. Differentiations can be made broadly between the decades of 'state feminism' in the 1950s and 1960s, characterised by concern for the position of women in the labour market during extensive industrialisation, and the conservative turn in the 1970s. This new ideological trend replaced the image of the 'working woman' - able to fulfil commitments in parallel with male workers - with that of women who accepted traditional family values and were able to fulfil a double function as employees and mothers.5 The political changes of the past decade, both the social processes and political policy decisions, have reinforced the prevailing ideas of traditional families and roles for women. In order to explain how women influence, and are in turn affected by, the changing ideological climate and the system of social allocation of resources, feminist analysts consider this broader sense of social power relations.

Political participation

What is political participation? One definition is: 'Those legal activities by private citizens which are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take.'6 This raises various questions. Is this definition adequate, given its emphasis upon legal and autonomous activity? What knowledge is gained in assessing participation, not only in terms of electoral turnout, but of party and group membership and participation in community activities? Do the changing conceptions of citizens' participation 'fit' into such conventional definitions of political participation? For many political analysts the above definition is too narrow. It excludes attitudes towards, and beliefs about politics and much civic activity in general. The 'private' citizen in such a definition falls within a traditionalist conception excluding sexual politics and familial political activities.7 Such political participation as taking part in demonstrations (legal and illegal) and local community activities are excluded from this narrow definition. Certainly it is too limited for analysts who view politics as affecting not only the actions and decisions of governments and state forces but also interactions within societies, communities and our homes. Broader definitions owe much to feminist considerations of 'the personal as political' as well as to the 'new politics' initiated by the activism of new social movements which are seen as challenging the old ideas of activities around elections and voters as making up the central core of what politics is about. When considering the 'new politics' - illustrated by peace campaigners, ecological groups plus many women's groups and campaigns - within the broader conception, it is apparent that the term 'participation' considerably widened.

The notion of alternative politics and wider definitions of participation have become important in this connection over the last two decades, especially with respect to state/society divisions in western liberal democracies and certain of the state socialist countries including pre-1989 Hungary.8 Strong moral and ethical convictions underlie the new political demands and goals, and the debate is extended beyond ideological distinctions of left and right, stressing universal principles and consequences.9 Recognition of the importance of women's activism in politics, as citizens within hierarchical politicised frameworks, is shown by Biljana Kasic in her forward to the collection Women and the Politics of Peace:

The political, in the understand[ing] of many of the presenters at the Forum, is expressed as a search for public responsibility for peace as an unquestionable value, an ethical imperative and the only alternative, and equally relevant to international makers of global politics of development as well as local institutions of government, civil society and the population at large.10

Here Kasic is breaking down some of the binary divisions between state politics (at national and local levels) and those of citizens in society, invoking the 'ethical imperatives' in the tradition of democratic oppositionists such as Konrád and Havel.

Old and new politics in Hungary

In Hungarian politics two movements were crucial sites of new political interaction and forms of expression in the 1980s - the 'Greens' or ecology movement and the student/youth movement. As has been outlined elsewhere, various factors led to the demise of the former and to the spectacular political success of the latter.11 Women's participation was apparent in both movements, yet when the Alliance of Young Democrats, FIDESZ, succeeded in gaining representation in Parliament in 1990 the gender balance of its representatives did not differ from that of other Hungarian political parties. The rise of issue-based groups concerned with women's issues was also becoming apparent early in 1990 and several became established. Such groups as the Hungarian Feminist Association, the Hungarian Women's Foundation (MONA) and Hungarian Women Entrepreneurs, have been considered more fully elsewhere.12 Given the fact that the politics of 'the Party' (the former ruling communist party) had been very much discredited, it was apparent in 1990 that many Hungarians were not prepared to support political parties.13 Many women, in particular, did not identify with the newly-emerging political parties and did not choose to become visibly active within them.14 This development parallels the disenchantment in party politics in Western states, although for very different reasons with regard to backgrounds and histories of participation.15

Hungarian politics in transition

The events which spread throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in 1989/90 began a transition in which the active and chosen political participation of masses of people was highlighted. This was encapsulated in the famous chant in Leipzig during the candlelight vigils - 'we are the people'. Formal mass participation or mobilisation in politics was always supposed to have been higher in the 'socialist' states than elsewhere. In part this was connected to the broader definition of what was seen as participation in 'socialist' politics which included ideas concerned with loyalty and solidarity, and because citizens were often heavily encouraged or strategically co-opted into sitting on committees, joining campaigns and serving on people's organisations. Even young people were more or less expected to join communist groups such as the Pioneers. In part this derived from Marxist conceptions of power being vested in the people and from practical concerns of Party control. The Party's needs - to stay in power in defence of a political economic system, in opposition to capitalism - were always paramount. This meant that the quality of participation was less important than the appearance of participation, guided by Party officers supposedly in the 'interests of the people'. Certainly in many Central and Eastern European countries a small number of activists were participating in activities in opposition to their regimes. In the Hungarian context economic activities around 'private' work had been important in terms of the development of the 'second society'.16 It is clear that throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and China in the 1980s, the Party/State apparatus appeared to have, generally, lost touch with 'the people'. Mass demonstrations have always been a feature of political participation but after the revolution in 1956 in Hungary and the Prague Spring in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, such demonstrations were more apparent in Paris or Rome (and in some areas of Poland) than in Budapest, Prague, Leipzig or Bucharest.

The phenomenon of 'anti-politics' (however hard to define) had long been apparent in oppositional writings in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia (e.g. Beszélő, Samorzadnösc and Krytyka). Anti-politics tended to be both a critique of power per se and a form of tactical intervention. Considering 'anti-political politics' Vaclav Havel noted a belief in politics as a practical morality:

Yes, anti-political politics is possible. Politics 'from below'. Politics of people, not of the apparatus. Politics growing from the heart, not from a thesis. It is no accident that this hopeful experience has to be lived just here, on this grim battlement. In conditions of humdrum 'every-dayness' we have to descend to the very bottom of a well before we can see the stars'.17

Such analyses opened up political thinking within the oppositional circles in certain Central and Eastern European countries by broadening conceptions of 'the political' beyond Western traditionalist definitions. In this context, there are parallels with feminist analyses in considerations of the importance of familial politics, as will be assessed. However, the fact that many oppositionists assumed governmental office in the aftermath of 1990 elections in Hungary and elsewhere, did leave something of a vacuum in terms of civil opposition to governmental authority and reduced considerably the environment in which more abstract political theorising was fostered, certainly in terms of critiques of policy direction. Some arguments regarding 'civil society in power' pointed up the dangers of not having voices from below and critical appraisals of the new government elites.18 In Hungary, several prominent (former oppositionist) MPs did leave Parliamentary politics in order to return to their roles as 'critical participants' within society.

Democratic developments in Hungary

Given the differing interpretations of politics outlined above, the focus of divergence between traditional and alternative, especially feminist interpretations, has broadly been considered in terms of public/private distinctions. In Western feminist conceptions the removal of distinctions between public (valued external 'male' world) and private (undervalued, internal/domestic 'female' world) became crucial in understanding broader conceptions of political activity and engagement and the gendering of certain processes and identities. This included issues of sexuality, of women's autonomy in control of their bodies, resistance to male violence and gaining autonomy in living their chosen lives. In breaking down perceived distinctions between varying arguments the issues of different outlooks and cultural backgrounds became important.

This was similarly a 'live' consideration in Hungary, within a different context. The existence and consequences of a 'second society' has been ably demonstrated.19 Following the delicate contract between the Kádárist state and Hungarian society after the 1956 revolution, changes within society during the late 1970s and early 1980s meant that families became viewed as alternative sites of 'privatized development' within the second economy. Júlia Szalai points out that the fragile compromise between the Party and society after 1956 was: "a tacit acceptance, even a gradual expansion of the space for individual autonomy, based on the ideological-practical 'rehabilitation' of the one and only institution which was legitimately independent of direct political control, i.e. the family."20

Participation in informal productive activities to attain individually-chosen goals developed into a vast social movement within Hungarian society. Families organised and made choices in terms of their own conceptions of modernity rather than following 'officially declared' expectations. Due to labour-power shortages in socialist enterprises, employers came to accept the seasonal dictates of small-scale agriculture and workers spending an extra hour on 'informal' work at the expense of official work. In this delicate political balance adjustments were made and 'peaceful coexistence' became the guiding principle within a considerably broadened arena of 'politics'. Connotations from a 'personal is political' perspective began to take on other forms in terms of 'people power' challenging state power. When critical elements of 'the people' take up governmental positions, conceptions of 'personal' and 'political' become sites of reconsideration once more - certainly in terms of civil society "in power."

Changing the compromise

In Hungary during the 1970s the negotiated compromise between the majority of citizens and government officials was undergoing definitive changes. Women's work situations became more flexible at this time, especially with the introduction of the child care allowance in 1967 (reintroduced in 1985 as the child care 'fee'), which allowed women to care for children in the home with some financial support while their jobs remained open. In its first year the allowance was used by almost 70% of women entitled.21 These measures showed an ideological shift of a conservative nature in the protection of 'the family' and reestablishing traditional roles within the family. Neményi notes families' defensive strategies against the wideranging social policies which resulted in the development of the new model of nuclear family consisting of two wageearners and children, born soon after marriage and placed in part-time child care institutions. This type of family proved unstable as was shown by frequent divorces, remarriages and an increasing number of single parent families. At the same time a nostalgia for a traditional form of family was suggested even though most families had not experienced such living arrangements.22

By 1986 the rate of women taking up child care leave - for at least part of the three years of their eligibility - had risen to almost 90%. These policies clearly represented advantages and disadvantages for different women and groups of women within Hungarian society.23 Other social policy measures followed which allowed various groups within the workforce to withdraw for periods of time, whilst retaining the official ties with their workplaces. This lessening obligation for full participation in the 'socialist' arena was double edged in that it was both gender- and age-biased. Women and elderly male workers were the main subjects and their opportunities in the private sphere were offset publicly by the possibility of lower wages, fewer openings for promotion and lower rates of occupational mobility. Yet as Szalai notes:

Thus, besides its face-value in demonstrating material progress, the increase of private consumption had another significance: it expressed alternative notions about modernization, it induced and realized alternative taste (opposing the cultural patterns dictated by the authorities in control over the public realm) it created scope for alternative socialisation of children, and helped to acquire alternative knowledge which one could never get in institutions of the officiallyrun system of formal education.24

The various political, economic, social and cultural changes evolving within this second society led to the recognition of alternative conceptions of living. The importance of this lay in the gradual questioning of the very essence of the delicate compromise between state and society. Evidently, alternative communities posed threats to overall control from above. Over time developments within the family-based economy eventually became the organising principle of everyday life so that people were less defenceless in the face of official authority and were able to resist attempts at political intervention from above. The effects of these developments were keenly experienced by women, who were in large measure the main organisers of family enterprises. Here is a key to analyzing the Hungarian case and to the difficulties of theorising the differential impact of democratization processes in Hungary upon various women's situations. In the years following the changes of 1990, women's influence (and that of many men) in second economy activities within Hungarian society seem to have become considerably changed and, in many cases, reduced in scope. This was in large measure due to the immense economic changes that neo-liberal economic thinking introduced into Hungarian society.

It was apparent during the 1980s that women's involvement within kindergartens, schools and hospitals was such that changes in determining standards and priorities were being enacted. The involvement of community- and family-based participation in these areas became part of the overall running of these institutions and determined certain changes of direction and provision in services.25 In building upon these developments a peaceful route to establishing a political framework was opened in the completion of social and economic transformation of Hungarian society. This route appeared to have some conflicting aspects with regard to participation and ongoing involvement of citizens within the formal political sphere. There was a form of 'embourgeoisement' emerging which set up differing expectations throughout Hungarian society, part of which concerned political expression and representation. In the course of these changes divisions between 'rich and poor' became sharper and more apparent as state support for vulnerable groups was not keeping pace with other developments, especially inflation.

With the democratic developments and the formation of new political cultures in Hungary after 1990, questions arose regarding legitimation, state/society compromise, civil society as critical public, and once again, the primacy of economic considerations over political problems. With regard to women's political involvement, the question was raised: Have these political openings brought with them spaces for citizens', particularly women's, activities? Central to this question are issues of equality and difference between the sexes and the changing conceptions of citizenship which are emerging.

Parliamentary developments in Hungary

Women's participation in the initial stages of social and economic transition after 1989 can be clearly seen and was apparent to an extent at the public political and policy levels throughout 1989-90. Subsequently women's involvement in public, political initiatives seems to have subsided. The overall declining political participation within Hungarian society generally, can be considered in terms of the speed and direction of party development and Parliamentary politics.

The speed of events in 1989 caught almost everyone, especially the political elite, by surprise. The rapid loosening of power by Hungarian Communists during their efforts at 'controlled reform' pushed the opposition social movements into an electoral situation more quickly than was envisaged.26 The pace and history of change in each of the Central and Eastern European countries was very different, with Poland and Hungary having a much richer recent history of oppositional activities, so that communist power there was becoming undermined from the early 1980s. In 1989 the regimes in these countries were showing the weaknesses that had been 'papered over' in preceding years. That they had provided security of life in terms of employment, housing and basic material necessities now had to be assessed against the reality of economic decline, sometimes concealed temporarily by borrowing in the West. The policies followed by the Communist leadership up to the late 1980s did have one rationale - the maintenance of the Party's hold on power.

Western countries developed their capitalist economies on firm ground before they established liberal, democratic institutions; these political arenas were well-prepared for the fluctuating levels of citizen participation within the parameters of individual competition and pressure group and interest group politics. Establishing participatory democracies in Eastern Europe, at both the national and grass-roots levels, is proving more complex and contradictory as the transition from centralised economies to capitalist infrastructure has to go on at the same time. When to this fact is added the psychological pressures of social insecurity after forty years of stability, the mobilization of different social groups in defence of living standards and the social safety net has become necessary. Whether these social groups can influence decision-making is still unclear as are the routes that protests and lobbying may take.27

In terms of 'transition' and 'democratization', analysts point to several factors as necessary in developing a democratic multi-party system within Hungary as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. These include: creating a bureaucracy accountable to elected officials and with fewer economic functions; further directing the economy away from centralised demands and towards greater marketization, privatization and free trade; resolving issues of responsibility for the crimes of the communist era; and developing closer links 'with Europe' in economic and political-military affairs.28 The fact that the transition, however dramatic, could not become a complete break with past, was realized in the first years of democratic government, particularly with regard to the need for experienced policy-makers. Basically, the 1990 election in Hungary produced a parliament of male, well-educated but politically inexperienced representatives. The percentage of women representatives was approximately that of the UK at this time.29

Gaining release from the economic burdens generated by 'Soviet socialism' was eased to some extent by the existence of a 'second economy' in Hungary. Nevertheless, difficult economic tasks still had to be faced: structural adjustment, creation of a modern economy, ecological repair and a transition towards capitalism.30 Concentration in the immediate transitional years of 1990-92 was on political developments within the Parliamentary system, often at the expense of political consolidation within interest groups in society, economic and legal reforms and in broader social policy initiatives. The legacy of conceptions of 'The Party' and 'The Power' for active citizenship meant that whilst Hungarian citizens enthusiastically joined the larger social movements in 1989, when these movements had to form party identities - largely in the shape of the MDF (Magyar Demokrata Forum [Hungarian Democratic Forum], the leading party in government coalition) and the SzDSz (Szabad Democraták Szövetsége [Federation of Free Democrats], the leading party in the opposition coalition) - participation and identification drastically decreased.31

Party participation and representation

After interviewing women members of parliament and leaders of large women's organizations in 1990, Éva Fodor noted three viewpoints on women's role in society which corresponded to the ideological orientations of the parties: the Christian-nationalist stand, the liberal views and the moderate socialist ideas.32 The Christian Democrats - who were widely organized especially in the countryside, and appealed to women engaged in charitable work - offered classes on domestic management and provided entertainment for families. Their preference was for state intervention to promote women's role as bearers and educators of the nations' children. Of the two liberal parties, FIDESZ (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége [Alliance of Young Democrats]) true to classical liberal ideology, did not wish to have any affirmative action for women as it smacked of socialist paternalism. The SzDSz introduced new topics to the political agenda such as sex education, sexual harassment and domestic violence. The Foundation of the Women of Hungary (MONA), established by women activists within the SzDSz, has become successful in evaluating and participating in the formation of policy decisions concerning women directly or indirectly. Whilst the Hungarian Socialist Party's (Magyar Szocialista Párt or MSZP) women's organization deals with issues of health, the environment, motherhood, sex education and abortion rights, their primary focus remains women's rights within the workplace.

Before 1989 women in Parliament had largely meant 'women in seats', rather than politically-active women voicing demands in the decision-making arenas. Was it then to be expected that there would be a sudden increase in women politicians in the post-communist era? It seems plausible that the legacies of communist politics would affect women's representation most critically in three areas. Firstly the belief widely held by women and men, that politics is a 'dirty business' which some men are prepared to undertake, yet few women are willing to become involved in - because personal reputations are at stake and in such arenas women's reputations regularly become sexualized. There is also the legacy of the public/private divide in Hungary, in which women are perceived to be more concerned with the 'domestic' aspects, in terms of servicing male politicians, working in the offices, i.e. being active 'behind the scenes'. This appears to be also true of women's work within the second economy following marketization. Scattered and anecdotal evidence suggests that women's activities within the newly registered private business sectors are less apparent than those of men.

A second reason for a decline in women's participation in party politics concerns the extent to which party membership and participation have been encouraged and engendered. Under communist rule it was felt that women could choose not to join the Party, whereas for certain professional males membership was viewed as a definite career necessity. This meant that involvement with party politics became gendered. Not to join 'The Party' meant long-term privations for many men, whether or not they chose to be involved within the oppositional groupings. With the formal quotas that had existed for 'women', 'the working class,' and other groups within the Communist Party, the aggregated figures from the 'socialist' decades offer no evidence of such nuanced 'choices' on the parts of identical men and women.

The third aspect of the gendered nature of party participation became apparent in men's and women's reactions to the collapse of the old system. Since for many men not joining 'The Party' was a moral choice from which their future careers suffered, it has been argued that many men viewed the new democratic political arena as one in which they could return to a positive career path. Júlia Szalai points out that:

The rapid emergence of the new parties promised to make a correction in the unjustly broken careers. Party politics became the arena of meeting men's needs within a short time. Thousands of previously non-existent posts were opened, offering dignified and responsible positions to a great number of well-educated, politically motivated men who earlier could not find acceptable forms to realise their ideas. In turn, however, the current situation reinforced women's scepticism towards party politics.33

Here Szalai is arguing that rather than viewing participation in party politics as creating alternative visions of social development, Hungarian citizens saw this kind of involvement as a means of correcting certain 'masculine' patterns of occupational mobility. In this context, some women were able to seek professional advancement other than in the new political posts in professions requiring language skills and in banking, accounting and finance. The virtual absence of women within the political elites gave importance to informal political participation which became more apparent when analyzing Hungarian politics from a gendered perspective.34 Women's involvement in non-elected part-time social policy Commissions has been high and their presence tends to safeguard the rapid modernization of local childcare facilities, day centres, homes for the elderly, and other infrastructure for the protection of vulnerable social groups.

Given the more marked differentiation between groups of citizens in Hungary since 1990, women's choices of political involvement obviously vary for different groups. Older, retired women, Roma women, younger unemployed women, or mothers unable to work through lack of childcare facilities, are often the most hard hit since they exist on fixed incomes in circumstances of ever-increasing costs.

State and societal factors shaping women's lives

I have argued elsewhere that the Hungarian state under 'socialism' played a key role both in shaping a female political subject - the new 'socialist woman' - and structuring 'the woman question'.35 The terms state and society are used to relate to changing conceptions of political participation and social interaction. Definitions of the state usually include aspects of the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Yet, who defines which forces are legitimate? Generally not women. Some theorists have viewed the state as a neutral instrument of public policy such as equal employment but others argue against this.36 For many feminist theorists the state is actually a combination of forces, the strongest being male dominance. Here there is an apparent difference between the socalled 'liberal' strategies of women's emancipation - which is concerned with adaptation, i.e. women gaining individual 'rights' as they are already defined within society - and the more 'radical' efforts towards liberation con-cerned with redefining the whole arena of such 'rights'.37 For women in Hungary the fusion of 'rights' and 'duties' by the statist forces meant that women generally lost out. For many men in this situation their so-called rights and duties were not only compatible but complementary. For women their 'right' to work conflicted with their 'duty' as mothers. Women's duties have always been more emotive and stressful than those of men, because men have generally distanced themselves from the domestic sphere. Women were often caught in the double bind: while their domestic responsibilities were not as important as men's worldly ones, men were allowed to countenance failure without being devalued personally. If any aspect of domestic life failed to live up to often idealized assumptions, it often happened that women were held personally responsible and made to feel guilty about whatever it was that had not lived up to expectations. These situations were not unique to Hungarian society.

State policy on 'liberating' women

It is now recognized that the total form of state within Hungary during the period of 'classical socialism'38 was one that placed primary emphasis on economics. All other issues, including welfare and social policy matters, were measured in importance against the economic imperatives. In the period 1956-67, when socialist policies were consolidated, this economistic approach, coupled with state rhetoric of women's equal place in society, led the way to the so-called 'double burden' which women in Hungary and similar Soviet-type societies suffered. Women were free to work 8 hours each day at the public, paid workplaces and then come home to another 4 hours or so in the private, unpaid workplaces. The psychological strain of this is well summed up by Mária Márkus when she writes of women having to 'explain' their behaviour constantly in terms of the worker/mother duality.39 These psychological stresses were not broadened out onto a group level as they might have been in some social situations, but remained at a personal level for the great majority of Hungarian women.40

My research work was undertaken in the 1980s, towards the end of the time of 'reform socialism' from 1968-89. It became clear to me that two factors played equally decisive parts during the 1980s in confirming women's responsibility for home work and their desire for 'smooth' family lives. The state/society divide was probably the major factor in women's desire not to problematize their extra work in the home - the domestic division of labour. Most women considered that their lives were hard enough, their partners also worked very hard often in second and third jobs within the second economy, so that it did seem reasonable to them to carry out their second or third job in the home and caring for children. Yet the structure of second economy work, coupled with women's unpaid working responsibilities, meant that very few working women, unlike some intellectual women such as language teachers, could participate in this economic activity which generally gave status and respect to those engaged in it. In couples where both men and women worked at more than one job it remained the case that the women did the majority of housework, and all of the child care. When men did share some responsibility for domestic work it was viewed as 'helping' women. The state encroachment into most spheres of women's lives was underlined by the activities of the Magyar Nők Országos Tanácsa (National Council of Hungarian Women). This was not an autonomous movement but was virtually a branch of the Party which women saw primarily as 'a paper organization'. The fact that the Women's Organization existed meant that no groups of Hungarian women could gather together legally as there was no 'real need' for any other organization to represent them.

In terms of child care allowance (gyermekgondozási segély or GYES) which was introduced in Hungary in 1967, a good deal has been written.41 It is enough to note that there have been debates concerning its place in Hungarian social policy in terms of adequacy/efficacy, and how such an allowance is seen to be changing certain structures within society, what it means for families and for women. There was a noted change in opinions amongst doctors concerning children's needs in terms of their socialisation at creche and the preschool. The fact that there was the potential for rising unemployment in the late 1960s in Hungary was a factor in some of these changes, even though unemployment did not actually become a cause for concern at the time. Many analysts have linked these developments with policy-makers' perceptions of women as a flexible labour force. There are parallels with the situation arising with marketization taking place and debates centering upon women's place within the home.

In theory mothers were respected in Hungarian 'socialist' society and the pro-natalist policies of successive administrations in Hungary point to the government emphasis on raising the low birthrate. In practice many women were often humiliated in more ways than in terms of medical care when trying to control their bodies in terms of conception and childbearing. It was not until the early 1970s that oral contraceptives were made easily accessible.42 In the mid-1970s and again in 1990 it became clear both to the Hungarian authorities and to the general public that the government could not expect to smoothly institute a campaign to solve what the authorities viewed as a 'demographic problem' by manipulating abortion laws. Gaining effective control over their fertility is a necessity for women in achieving choice in other areas of their lives and enabling them to play their chosen roles in society. Government concerns about decreasing fertility no doubt stem from the statistics on live births - 125,679 in 1990, down to 100,350 in 1997 and approximately 97,500 in 1998.43 It is clear that regulations regarding abortion are again being reviewed in the late 1990s with the new FIDESZ government attempting to formulate laws so that terminations of pregnancies will be closely controlled. In addition the withdrawal of financial support for contraceptive pills seriously undermines women's autonomy to make choices regarding their bodily integrity and family planning. In this area, pronatalist state policies are very much considering the needs of women as 'mothers' rather than as citizens.

Analyses of citizenship and women's politics

There have been many ways in which Hungarian women have been able to construct their identities over time and how 'state' and societal forces have intervened and shaped this process. Aspects of women's activities in terms of childbirth and controlling childbearing were considered in addition to issues concerning the duality of the mother/worker roles under which Hungarian women variously laboured over the periods of 'socialism' from 1948-1988.44 Women as paid workers, domestic workers, childbearers and childcarers are at the heart of social relations, yet as far as decision-making in all its spheres is concerned, women occupy a less than central part. The duality of state/society pressures upon women and the ways in which the statist policies of the 'reforming' Hungarian authorities from 1968 attempted the shape women's expectations and thereby their lives, have long been recognised. Until the political changes of 1988/89 many Hungarian women had little opportunity to try to change particular situations and redress the balance in their lives. In considering women's analyses and activities towards change in the recent period it is possible to assess some of the consequences of the political changes for women. These consequences are apparent at the levels of attitudes, legislation and everyday reality, to enable us to gauge how much space has been opened, what new analyses made and what women's activities have been enabled.

Conceptions of citizenship are integral to an understanding of how state forces and social elements interact in the Hungarian context and of women's perceptions and involvement in these interactions. It has long been argued that the concept of citizenship brings with it notions of inequality. In Western, market-oriented systems status and social class are often contradictory forces within citizenship claims. While such states attempt to guarantee status equality in society, existing social and class barriers perpetuate inequality. In the so-called state socialist countries, such as pre-1989 Hungary, social and class barriers had supposedly been eliminated and were indeed blurred under the Kádárist compromise. Issues of status remained very obviously on the societal agenda. Status was very often measured in economic terms in communist Hungary as well as in terms of influence.

Being a party member brought with it a kind of status, certainly in so far as bureaucrats were able to set the agenda for economically generated differentiation within Hungarian society. Party members also reaped financial rewards through a variety of accepted practices, some corrupt. Yet in other areas of Hungarian life being an oppositionist also brought with it some status in terms of dignity and ethics - concepts often used within Hungarian opposition circles. Invoking the 'ethical imperative' is in the tradition of key democratic oppositionists such as Konrád and Havel. If political decision-making is not based on ethical principles recognised by all citizens, then some safeguards are required for the protection of various interests. If some women become excluded from attaining their full citizenship potential through gender discrimination then the anti-democratic and exclusive political climate is in need of change.45

Here the politics of difference and equality is important as it must comprehend both how women are variously excluded from citizenship by gender biasses and how women act to change these situations. In their activism many women in Hungary and elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe are recognising the 'differentiated universalism' which feminist sociologist Ruth Lister proposes. In arguing for a synthesis of rights and participatory approaches to citizenship which links with notions of human agency, the exclusionary powers of citizenship in relation to both nation-state 'outsiders' and 'insiders' are recognised. In considering outsiders, it is proposed that: "a feminist theory and politics of citizenship must embrace an internationalist agenda.... it offers the concept of a 'differentiated universalism' as an attempt to reconcile the universalism which lies at the heart of citizenship demands with a politics of difference."46

In considering the 'equalizing' effect of citizenship, the ways in which the state apparatus viewed women as a collective entity in pre-1989 Hungary is important. The Hungarian state played a large role in attempting to construct and shape the collective identity of Hungarian women. The adoption of Soviet-styled Marxist-Leninist ideology had its effects on Hungarian life. The modus vivendi reached under Kádár's government was one in which lipservice was still paid to state-generated equality.47 Women's 'emancipation' was ensured and women were considered to have achieved or, more precisely, to have been awarded, 'equality'. As noted earlier the concept of equality often confuses more than it clarifies. Who were Hungarian women supposed to be with to? Were working-class Hungarian women or poor women, equal to poor men? Were poor Romany women to be treated on equal terms with poor Hungarian women? Were intellectual women supposedly equal to less educated women and/or intellectual men? There are many and varied elements which make up the different groupings within societies. In terms of Hungarian women's interests, there were of course Party women, rich women, poor women; consequently their concerns remained nuanced and various. The Hungarian state systematically produced policies based on a specific collective identity 'women', which cut across traditional social and economic divisions. Women have never been and indeed cannot become one 'category', yet we do make up half of the world and so are involved in many different arenas of life. Despite the fact that around 97% of Hungarian women are of Magyar origin, cultural and ethnic diversity amongst women in Hungary exists. These are most marked in the case of women of Romany origin, and less obvious for rural Slavic women and women of German descent. Of course fundamental differences exist in economic activities, household patterns and life styles amongst Hungarian women and the urban/rural divide is a very important one. Also, as noted when considering citizenship, the issues of class and status often outweigh sex in making up women's perceptions of themselves in terms of their identities.48 But the facts that Hungarian policy-makers and scholars considered 'women' as an entity in policy making and sociological study, and that women suffer inequalities on the basis of their gender - and thereby are ascribed gender attributes which are socially and often officially constructed - remain important areas for consideration.

Ever since the 1960s, various groups within Hungary have pointed out inequalities beyond those based on gender. The Hungarian 'right' to free medical treatment basically has always meant very poor medical treatment for ordinary citizens, regardless of the tipping system, because of the inadequate infrastructure of the health service generally, within a crisis-stricken economy. For women the 'right to work' lost all meaning over the years as it was associated with the total exhaustion of working all day in paid work and most evenings and weekends at home. The same applies to abortions. In this connection, 'women's right to choose' is not the first argument that will be taken up. However, women's right to control their fertility is viewed as a necessity by many Hungarian women and men, and the debates over reproductive rights take similar forms all over the world.49

Active women's groups since 1990

Of the different 'types' of political participation by women three examples illustrate something of the range: the Women Entrepreneurs, the Foundation of the Women of Hungary (MONA) and NaNE (Nők Nőkért az Erőszak Ellen - Women working with Women Against Violence). These groups have offered different analyses of social change and work in different ways to achieve it. The models of change within which these groups range are between assimilation and liberation. In the former, the Women Entrepreneurs are basically asking for their full share of the cake - assimilation to the world of men, within an already agreed framework. In the latter group, NaNE, women are seeking to change the rules of the game so that a different cake is constituted. The activists in MONA range across these aims and expectations. In each of these groups are women who are trying to change the terms of debate so that women, men and children can work together to assess terms of reference, including what human equality entails. It has been recognised that the practical constraints for women organisers - of time and money, for leaflets, fares; resources for places to meet, phone lines; energy for housework, child-care; and lack of support in terms of wider community attitudes - mean that establishing women's groups and undertaking women's projects are not easy and straightforward tasks.50

Founded in 1991, the Women Entrepreneurs had chosen to break from the Entrepreneurs Association because their voices were not being heard. Knowing their ideas were useful but not recognized within the larger association, women chose to establish their own association. At least two types of women are interested in their work: successful managers, without job satisfaction, who have personal aims to improve their working lives; and rural women forced into new work through job losses. The main aim of the Women Entrepreneurs is to assist and encourage those women who wish to start their own enterprises but do not have the necessary skills or funding. The women in this Association have looked beyond the borders of Hungary, they consider such organizations as the American Association of Entrepreneurs as well as some of the Italian cooperative associations, as their models. They are making good use of information on marketing and on obtaining loans at home and abroad. In the economic climate of post-1989 Hungary, with its unemployment, this work was very important for a variety of Hungarian women. Working within the assimilation model, these women want 'fair shares' in the marketplace for all women wishing to enter it.

An embryonic women's group had been established within the SzDSz in 1990. It was short-lived, as were several others set up at that time, within academic and professional circles, and the trade unions. One such organization was the Democratic Union of Scientific and Research Workers. Many of the democratic groupings in the years from 1989-1991, including feminist groups, were short-lived because of the general malaise and unease following the 1990 elections. Expectations were high, perhaps inflated in some quarters, about the possibilities that a complete change of government could herald. Change in many areas was very slow and there was public complaint of a government that was 'all talk and no action'. Much time was spent in Parliament discussing religious education in schools with important budgetary decisions being rushed through at the end of sessions. Yet the women's groups within the SzDSz did reform to become MONA (The Hungarian Women's Foundation) established in November 1992. The main, and ambitious, goal of the foundation was and still is to promote more active participation by women in political life and the civil sphere. Between April 1993 and April 1994 the Foundation concentrated on the project 'Women in Civil Society' which initiated a series of meetings designed to serve as a catalyst for existing women's groups in Hungary and for the inclusion of other interest groups.

The National Women's Roundtable, held in April 1993, was attended by over 150 women from twenty-four different groups. One researcher notes five groups as playing a determinant role in the future of the Hungarian Women's Movement: The Gypsy Mothers Group, The Hungarian Feminist Network, The Association of Hungarian Women, The Ombudswoman Programme and the Women's Club of Sopron.51 Of these, the Gypsy Mothers Group is of particular interest, as it has the potential to link with other similar groups within Central and Eastern Europe on shared platforms. There are Roma projects throughout the region, many of which are have been funded under the European Union PHARE Democracy Initiative - a programme to promote economic reconstruction in Poland and Hungary. Alongside this, several of the other groups' first contacts were with international women's associations outside Central and Eastern Europe, although the Feminist Network does work with some feminist groupings in neighbouring countries as well.

The group concerned with violence against women had been initiated by several Hungarian women who had participated in a seminar on 'Violence against Women,' at the Women's Commission sessions of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, held in Bratislava, Slovakia. Participants included women from the SOS Hotline in Belgrade which worked with women suffering abuse - in the home, the neighbourhood, or in the war. Within a year the Hungarian group had gained official registration as NaNE and in January 1994 the fourteen founding members established their offices in Budapest. From the start the activities of this group attracted much media attention which meant their service went into operation to service callers earlier than anticipated and so volunteers were required quickly. Following their training in association with activists from the SOS hotlines of Belgrade and Zagreb, their explicit aims included: operating a phoneline for women experiencing violence; reducing the high levels of violence against women and children; pressing for change to relevant laws and policies and their implementation; and improving support services for survivors of physical, psychological and sexual violence.52 In the following years the group made more national and international contacts with an international conference in May 1994 on 'Violence and Democracy' and direct contact with shelters and hostels offering temporary accommodation to women and children in Budapest as well as Family Assistance Centres operating inside and outside the city. Other groups in provincial areas interested in setting up a phoneline have contacted NaNE to discuss the possibilities. Kriszta Szalay has pointed out that: 'Volunteers in NaNE have had a chance to look into the often grave state of affairs within the Hungarian legal, health care and education system'.53

The key to the political participation of women within these groups and their campaigns is their desire to correct the gender imbalances within Hungarian society at large, and the consequences that give women fewer opportunities for involvement at various levels at work and in decision-making. They recognize from their experiences that women are often disadvantaged when participating in community activism and attempting to create change.

Conclusions

This article has considered key themes for analyzing the gendered nature of political participation in Hungary since 1990 through assessments of Hungarian political developments and feminist analyses of politics. The importance of historical legacies in attitudes and beliefs have been apparent. Differences in attitudes, values and expectations have been inscribed into individual histories through socialisation processes over generations. Policies which characterised 'the woman question' in the 1950s were in a very different vein to the ideological trends of the 1970s. Various political, economic, social and cultural changes which evolved during the 1980s in the 'second society' led to the recognition of alternative conceptions of living. In this recognition lay the gradual questioning of the very essence of the delicate compromise between state and society. These ongoing processes of democratisation of Hungarian society called forward key questions about the relationship of the state and the individual. The 'anti-politics' of oppositional movements had found the notion of 'civil society' important for identifying space for the construction of alternative relationships to those of the state power. The dramatic changes after 1990 complemented many aspects of this alternative organising of everyday Hungarian life. The effects of these developments were often contradictory and were keenly experienced by different groups of women in a variety of ways. The consequences of broadening definitions of 'the political' can be seen in the inclusion of women's needs, interests and activities within our ideas about citizenship.

The changed political, economic and social climate in the past decade in Hungary is still very much double edged for different groups of women. When the informal aspects of second economy activity became more formally recognised, some women began to work without pay or recognition - their husbands were the 'businessmen'. There may be less scope for some women's resources within the current capitalist market-oriented situation than there was in the system that prevailed before 1989. In a more openly competitive financial environment skills of defending family budgets may be overtaken by increasing costs.

The question of sexual politics - defending women's specific interests in areas of choice around childbearing, resistance to male violence and opportunities of public paid work - remains a complex arena of debate. The parallel growth of the second economy within pre-1989 Hungary meant that rather than resisting state forces by direct confrontation, Hungarian citizens were resisting them in alternative forms of by-passing state activities. This was achieved both through privately-generated work, and spending, in both rural and urban areas, so that state forces could not intervene with ease in these processes. Yet post-1990 there have been tensions between a dislike of state intervention and the need for certain sectors within society, such as working mothers, to have impact upon government policies. The arguments of the liberals - and even some of the socialists - for 'rolling back' the state as well as citizens' rights to state support, have given rise to heated debates. The controversies about abortion highlight some of the contradictions inherent in these debates as far as women's interests are concerned.

Certain aspects of cultural change in post-1989 Hungary have been very slow, despite, or perhaps as a consequence of, immense political upheaval. Some old myths live on, particularly those concerned with women's 'natural roles' which were clear throughout 1990 when members of the Catholic Church were encouraging people to sign petitions about restricting or outlawing abortions, while the country's government 'sat on the fence'. In 1999 there is again much discussion in the Hungarian press about abortion issues. As cheap and safe contraception is not available in Hungary to every woman who needs it, the fallback position of having the right to abortion is essential. When the abortion issue becomes 'newsworthy' due to government proposals to change the existing legislation, various arguments concerning the paternalism of the old regime come into focus: a good example of how the politics of the past can be resurrected to inform the present. As many Hungarians still associate the issues around women's equality and abortion with the old communist administration, it could be relatively easy to dismiss the abortion issue as a communist issue. Yet, in response to such arguments Hungarian feminists in the recent past have proclaimed that: "We regard any regulation drastically interfering in the life of the citizen impermissible. The era during which individuals' private lives were shaped via centrally issued prohibitions and demands is now a thing of the past."54

The spectrum of beliefs represented in this discourse spans the range from feminist to religious fundamentalist and is again under debate from similar perspectives in 1999, with women's rights/needs to have an abortion being once again disputed.55 Questions here arise concerning the nature of 'transitional' politics, and about Hungarian citizens' trust in, and the legitimacy of, the new political elites and institutions. The failure of the MDF government between 1991-1994 to establish certain basic institutions of a capitalist system meant that, after its electoral victory in 1994, the Socialist Party faced the paradox of being the 'vanguard' of building capitalism. The FIDESZ government since 1998 have been dealing with the threat of a population decline by means of state intervention providing social services to meet women's needs as mothers rather than as citizens.

Given earlier considerations of the part played by familial politics in undermining the state's dominance over Hungarian society, it is clear that to understand the phenomenon of gendered political participation within Hungarian society a wider recognition of 'the political' is required. Analyses need to be fully contextualized, historically and socially, so that the differentiation in processes of 'transition' to a multiparty system with a market economy can be assessed. The efforts of women since 1990 in ameliorating some of the harshest aspects of the economic reforms as they impact upon households, are becoming apparent. Although certain groups of women (such as bankers) have been able to succeed in the competitive, market-oriented framework, many women and groups of women have not. The rapid social differentiation that market economics has brought to Hungarian society over the past decade has resulted in vast inequalities which have yet to be fully dealt with in social policy measures and government legislation. Situations in which women are abused by traffickers and pimps are only recently being investigated and recognised as crimes. Older women living in poverty are not yet adequately counted into the social system. Women suffering violence in the home and elsewhere do not have as many options for support and redress as they need. In these and similar undervalued policy areas feminists and other women's groups have been particularly active over the past five to ten years. The need for long- and short-term campaigns and projects is recognised in such politics and a wide variety - from the small feminist groups to the larger women's organizations within parties - remains a necessity in adjusting the gender imbalances within Hungarian society. This wide variety of groups is a necessity for the adjustment of gender imbalances because the issues raised for women as citizens, workers and mothers call forward key questions about the nature of democratic society. The processes involved in Hungary's transformation to a post-communist society affect different groups of women keenly and sometimes in contradictory ways. Failure to recognize emergent citizens' initiatives within a wider political perspective may mean that key areas of political activity will be ignored. If gender issues remain imbalanced, the results will render inadequate any accounts of the democratization processes in Hungary and elsewhere. As has been shown, the active involvement of women at various levels in Hungarian democratic politics has been giving support to the social renovation processes at work in Hungary. In so doing, women are challenging perceived imbalances of power within civil society by creating more inclusive and responsive political and economic mechanisms. In this way they are contributing to the creation of conditions for more constructive and egalitarian dialogues in the next millennium.

NOTES

1 György Konrád, Anti-Politics: An Essay (London: Quartet, 1984).
2 Chris Corrin, Feminist Perspectives on Politics (London: Longman, 1999).
3 In the 1970s Hungarian social and political scientists became aware of a cleavage between the 'first' or official society, and the 'second,' informal or latent, society in their country. During the 1980s this cleavage became the focus of serious research efforts. Elemér Hankiss, East European Alternatives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 83.
4 Gisela Kaplan Contemporary Western Feminism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1992); Sheila Rowbotham, Women in Movement (London: Routldge, 1992); Chris Corrin, Magyar Women: Hungarian Women's Lives 1960s-1990s (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1994); Nickie Charles and Felicia Hughes Freeland, eds., Practising Feminism: Identity, Difference, Power (London: Routledge, 1996).
5 See Lynne Haney, "From Proud Worker to Good Mother: Women, the State and Regime Change in Hungary," in Frontiers 14 (1994) (3).
6 N. Nie, and S. Verba, "Political Participation," a 1975 work reprinted in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1992). vol. 4, ch. 1.
7 See P. Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Conciousness and the Politics of Empowerment (London: Harper, 1990); A. Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (New York: Crossing Press, 1984); C. Pateman, Sexual Contract (Oxford: Polity Press, 1988); A. Phillips, ed., Feminism and Equality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); Júlia Szalai, Women and Democratization: Some Notes on Recent Changes in Hungary, unpublished paper, 1994; also Corrin, Magyar Women.
8 C. Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," Social Research, 52, no. 4 (1985), pp. 817-68; W.L. Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe (London: Macmillan, 1998); Éva Fodor, "The Political Woman? Women in Politics in Hungary," in Marilyn Rueschemeyer, ed., Women in the Politics of Postcommunist Eastern Europe (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 142-67; A. Melucci, "Social Movements and the Democratization of Everyday Life," in John Keane ed., Civil Society and the State (London: Verso, 1988).
9 Melaine Tatur, "Why is there no Women's Movement in Eastern Europe?" in P. Lewis, Democracy and Civil Society in Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan, 1992).
10 Biljana Kasic, Women and the Politics of Peace (Zagreb: Women's Studies, 1997), p. 7.
11 See Chris Corrin, "People and Politics," in S. White, P. Lewis and J. Batt, eds., Developments in East European Politics (Basingtone: Macmillan, 1993), p. 19.
12 See Corrin, Magyar Women, p. 232; Reka Pigniczky, "The Making of a Women's Movement" in Tanya Renne, ed., Ana's Land: Sisterhood in Eastern Europe (Boulder, Colorado, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 121-132.
13 Mihály Vajda, "Hungary after the local elections," East European Reporter, Vol. 4 No. 3 (Autumn/Winter 1991).
14 Mita Castle-Kanerova, "Czech and Slovak Federative Republic: The culture of strong women in the making?" in Chris Corrin, ed. Superwomen and the Double Burden: Women's experience of change in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (London: Scarlet, 1992) pp. 97-124. Barbara Einhorn, Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender, and Women's Movements in East Central Europe (London: Verso 1993). Nanette Funk and Marcia Mueller, eds., Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastem Europe and the Former Soviet Union (London: Routledge 1993).
15 Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl, When Parties Fail (New York: Princeton University Press, 1988).
16 See Hankiss, East European Alternatives.
17 Vaclav Havel in Keane, Civil Society and the State [cited in n. 8], p. 398. On the subject of 'anti-politics' see also György Konrád's Anti-Politics, cit.
18 Tamaz Mastnak, in The HcA's founding assembly (Prague: Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, 1991).
19 See Hankiss, op. cit.
20 Szalai, Women and Democratization, op. cit. p. 7.
21 See Mária Némény, "The Social Construction of Women's Roles in Hungary" Replika, Hungarian Social Science Quarterly, special issue, 1996, pp. 83-90.
22 Ibid., p. 86.
23 Corrin, Magyar Women, p. 149.
24 Szalai, Women and Democratization, op. cit., p. 11.
25 B. Deacon, et al., eds., The New Eastern Europe: Social Policy, Past, Present and Future (London: Sage Publications, 1992), p. 172.
26 R. L. Tőkés, Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic reform, social change, and political succession, 1957-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
27 T. Cox, "Government-Interest Group Relations in Hungarian Politics," a paper presented at the British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies Conference, Cambridge, March 27-29, 1999.
28 V. Bunce and M. Csanádi, "Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary," East European Politics and Society, Vol. 7, no. 2 (1993), p. 243.
29 Chris Corrin, Superwomen and the Double Burden: Women's Experience of Chanqe in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (London: Scarlet Press, 1992).
30 Bunce and Csanádi, p. 245.
31 Corrin, Magyar Women, p. 240.
32 See Fodor, "The Political Woman?" cit.
33 Szalai, Women and Democratization, cit., p. 23.
34 See Corrin, 1992, op. cit., and O. Toth, "No Envy: No Pity," in Funk and Mueller, eds., Gender Politics and Post-Communism, cit., p. 213-223.
35 Chris Corrin, "Gendered Identities: Women's experience of Change in Hungary," in S. Rai, H. Pilkington and A. Phizaklea, eds. Women in the Face of Chanqe: The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 167-185.
36 Elizabeth Wilson in her work Women and the Welfare State (London, 1977) argues that the state not only tries to define women but also regulates their sexuality.
37 Parallels have been made between feminist arguments concerning women's liberation and similar issues for many ethnic and nationalist movements. This issue is also pivotal for lesbians and gay men. What is involved is not just a radical redefinition of 'rights' but the valuing of the right to nonassimilation, that is, the right to be different. Being different should not mean having to assume a lesser social status.
38 Szonja Szelényi, Equality by Design: The Grand Experiment in Destratification in Socialist Hungary (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 7.
39 Mária Márkus "Change in the function of socialization and models of the family," International Review of Sociology, 3, (1975).
40 Toth, "No Envy: No Pity," pp. 213-23.
41 Julia Szalai (with the contribution of Agatha Horváth), "Alternative policies for caring for children under the age of 3: the Hungarian Case" (Budpest: Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1978); Mária Neményi, "Hungary" in M. Cochrane, ed., International Handbook of Child Care Policies and Programs (London: Greenwood Press, 1993).
42 From 1st October 1973 district and company doctors were allowed to prescribe contraceptive pills and the pills were placed in the same category as other medicines so that only 15% of list price was paid.
43 See the website http://www.ksh.hu
44 Corrin, Magyar Women, cit.
45 See Chris Corrin, ed., Gender and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe, special issue of The Journal of Communist Politics and Transition Studies 15, 1 (1999).
46 Ruth Lister, "Citizenship: Towards a Feminist Synthesis," in Citizenship: Pushing the Boundaries, a special issue of the Feminist Review 57 (1997).
47 See György Konrád and Iván Szelényi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovic, 1979), for details of inequalities.
48 This distinction between women's ideas concerning identity and the state notions of women as a category clearly point up the differences between the biological categories of 'sex' and the socio-cultural conceptions of 'gender'. Sex and gender are merely factors amongst others in building up women's identity, yet for the state authorities gender often becomes not only the major defining characteristic for all women but an elastic conception which serves to blur all other divisions amongst women.
49 For a review concerned with negotiating reproductive rights see Rosalind Petchesky and Karen Judd, Negotiating Reproductive Rights Women's Perspectives Across Countries and Cultures (London: Zed Press, 1998).
50 See Corrin, Magyar Women, cit., pp. 232-34.
51 Pigniczky, "The Making of a Women's Movement," cit., p. 124.
52 See Kriszta Szalay, "Domestic Violence Against Women in Hungary," in Chis Corrin, ed., Women in a Violent World: Feminist Analyses and Resistance Across 'Europe' (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), pp. 41-52.
53 Ibid., p. 50.
54 Zsuzsa Béres, "Women's Liberation: words of ill repute," Budapest Week, vol. 1, no. 2, March 1991.
55 The government announced their plans to remove the subsidy on contraceptive pills and intention to formulate strict conditions under which the termination of pregnancy will be granted. See Magyar Hírlap, January 18th 1999.